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    Home > Biochemistry News > Biotechnology News > Luckin, whose stores are profitable and restarted to join, is "resurrecting" or "returning to light"?

    Luckin, whose stores are profitable and restarted to join, is "resurrecting" or "returning to light"?

    • Last Update: 2021-04-16
    • Source: Internet
    • Author: User
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    Seeing him build a tall building, seeing the guests at the banquet, but then not only did he not wait until it collapsed, but saw it build another new building on the old site that seemed to have a more stable chassis.



    Luckin's blitzkrieg of subsidies for users filled the gaps in the Internet coffee market, and gained the reputation of Chinese people "cutting American leeks and asking Chinese people to drink coffee".


    However, when everyone thought that domestic coffee was rising, Ruixing Was ordered to delist due to financial fraud.




    What is even more surprising is that Rui Xing, who fell to the altar, was not as obscure as he imagined, but kept breaking out good news.



    On December 17, 2020, the "First Report" submitted to the Cayman Court by the "Provisional Liquidator" by Luckin shows that about 63% of Luckin's stores have achieved profitability.


    The first three quarters of 2020 Revenues are respectively 565 million yuan, 980 million yuan and 1.
    145 billion yuan.
    It is estimated that Ruixing's revenue in 2020 will be between 3.
    8 billion and 4.




    In addition, Ruixing restarted the franchise business again on January 18, 2021.


    Although Ruixing played the banner of "0 franchise fee", the total cost of the franchisee's initial investment was between 350,000 and 370,000 yuan, which is much higher.
    To other franchised tea brands.




    Why does Ruixing, who delisted and filed for bankruptcy, still "live" so well? Is Luckin's "resurrection" a false illusion, or is it a pre-war warning for returning to the stage to continue to lead the Chinese coffee trend?



    Under private domain traffic, Luckin's new retail of data coffee

    Under private domain traffic, Luckin's new retail of data coffee



    Opening 10,000 stores in 2021 is Luckin's goal.


    Luckin’s previous logic was to open "light and small" stores that are different from traditional coffee shops, reduce costs and feed profits back to product quality, and pass on word of mouth to reduce customer acquisition costs.
    With the blessing of capital and Internet marketing, through expansion Scale gains market influence.




    The overall logic is indeed feasible, but Ruixing trusts the competitiveness of its products too much.


    In the process of blindly expanding its scale, it underestimated the operation, the profit did not meet the expectations, and had to use fake methods to whitewash the peace.




    After the bubble was burst, Luckin adjusted its strategy in time, shifted its focus from blind expansion to targeted expansion, closed problematic stores, and opened up the shopping mall market mainly based on campuses and office buildings.


    According to the needs of users, it combined coffee, tea, The combination of fruit and drink has successively launched a variety of hot products, and through a series of adjustments, the profitability of the store has been improved.
    The "pointing needle" for Luckin to adjust its strategic direction is big data.
    Since then Luckin has identified its core advantages and relies on data to drive operations.




    After the drastic changes, compared with the previous blind expansion and expansion, Ruixing's strategy for entering the campus is relatively mature.


    As young people, the student community has a higher acceptance of coffee.
    Luckin's price system and brand image are also in line with the huge demand for beverages in the campus market.
    At the same time, as the main reserve force for white-collar workers, serving college students will contribute to Luckin's future development.




    Through the efficient cooperation of offline stores and online clients, and through data analysis of user needs, we can change our marketing strategy, and serve users better and in a timely manner in terms of store location and product iteration, transforming from the traditional B2C model to The C2M model transforms from a unit or multiple scenarios to infinite scenarios.


    The higher the user satisfaction, the better the positive feedback to the company.
    This is the core advantage of new retail against traditional retail, and Luckin can quickly achieve about 63% The main reason for store profitability.


    Through the efficient cooperation of offline stores and online clients, and through data analysis of user needs, we can change our marketing strategy, and serve users better and in a timely manner in terms of store location and product iteration, transforming from the traditional B2C model to The C2M model transforms from a unit or multiple scenarios to infinite scenarios.
    The higher the user satisfaction, the better the positive feedback to the company.
    This is the core advantage of new retail against traditional retail, and Luckin can quickly achieve about 63% The main reason for store profitability.



    Luckin's "First Report" also clearly shows that although expansion is still Luckin's development strategy, by 2023, Luckin Coffee hopes to have only 4,800-6,900 self-operated stores, compared to the previous one to cater to capital.
    With the proposed goal of opening 10,000 stores in 2021, Ruixing has made a lot of steady steps, and the targeted expansion and development strategy will provide a solid foundation for Ruixing to build a new building.



    If the new retail model of data-driven operations is the foundation of Luckin, then private domain traffic may become Luckin's moat.

    If the new retail model of data-driven operations is the foundation of Luckin, then private domain traffic may become Luckin's moat.



    When Luckin's money-burning marketing couldn't get through, it had to shift its strategy to private domain traffic.
    Perhaps it was a mistake or a foresight.
    The success of private domain traffic played an absolute role in Luckin's "resurrection".
    The role of assists.



    Luckin spent 3 months to establish 9,100 private domain user groups around the store.
    The 1.
    8 million private domain user groups contributed 35,000 cups per day.
    After joining the group, the monthly consumption frequency of users increased by 30%, and the overall MUA increased.
    About 10%, new users increase at a rate of about 600,000 per month.
    Private domain traffic has become Luckin Coffee's third largest order source channel, surpassing third-party delivery platform channels.



    The greatest value of private domain traffic is not in the daily additional orders, but in the community, Luckin will open up multi-channel data, and distribute different types of coupons in time to intelligently and personalize users.
    Operation management plays a role in developing new users, activating and retaining old users.

    The greatest value of private domain traffic is not in the daily additional orders, but in the community, Luckin will open up multi-channel data, and distribute different types of coupons in time to intelligently and personalize users.
    Operation management plays a role in developing new users, activating and retaining old users.



    After the delisting of Luckin, blood transfusions lacking capital cannot exchange large subsidies for users as before.
    If you want to stabilize the basic market and make the store profitable, you must add new user growth points to recover the gap of lost users.
    Group-based private domain traffic is Ruixing's breaking point.



    Although the main marketing method of the private domain community is still to issue coupons, compared with the previous large-scale distribution of 3.
    8% discount, private domain communities generally offer a discount of 4.
    8% discount and limited time limited distribution, which undoubtedly increases user enthusiasm while reducing Marketing expenses.



    According to Ruixing industry sources, Ruixing has a strong ability to control costs.
    Counting expenses such as rent and labor, the cost of a single cup of drinks in Ruixing stores is about 9-10 yuan.
    Nowadays, there are few large discounts.
    The purchase price is generally around 15 yuan.
    At the same time, according to Luckin's internal break-even indicators, a single store sells 200 cups a day, and a daily flow of 2,600 yuan is already self-financing.
    It is not difficult to understand why the profit calculation of Luckin's franchise manual uses an average of 200 cups per day as the bottom line.



    In Luckin's calculations, based on the average daily sales of 500 cups, the monthly income of franchisees can reach 59,000 yuan.
    Although Luckin's calculation method is controversial, but based on Luckin's franchise manual alone, the initial investment cost of 350,000 for franchisees is not high, and Luckin's confidence is that Luckin's operation on private domain traffic has begun to take shape Effectively, it can increase the MAU of the store while continuing to provide a large number of orders for the store.



    Is it the beginning or the end? Luckin's internal and external troubles

    Is it the beginning or the end? Luckin's internal and external troubles



    The data-driven operation of the new retail will deliver Luckin to users efficiently and quickly, and the operation of private domain traffic allows Luckin to firmly grasp the users.
    After Luckin's "resurrection", it will spread its wings and continue to undertake domestic coffee.
    Light seems to be only a matter of time, but is reality really so optimistic?



    The core of Luckin's new retail concept is whether the growth rate of the user group can support the continuous improvement of its big data.
    If companies want to expand their scale, users’ geographic location, consumer category and frequency, and sales amount and other data information need a large number of new users to improve the data.
    At present, Luckin seems to put the important task of growing users in the education market on private domain traffic.
    .

    The core of Luckin's new retail concept is whether the growth rate of the user group can support the continuous improvement of its big data.
    If companies want to expand their scale, users’ geographic location, consumer category and frequency, and sales amount and other data information need a large number of new users to improve the data.
    At present, Luckin seems to put the important task of growing users in the education market on private domain traffic.
    .



    But Luckin’s private domain traffic is not unavailable.
    Luckin was able to "assemble" 1.
    8 million private domain users in three months, and more of them are users who have been ignited during the capital smashing market.
    Most of them have enjoyed it.
    Luckin's first free benefit, received marketing education from Luckin Coffee.
    Although Luckin's current private domain community also has new functions, the growth rate of new users from 0-1 is slow.



    For Ruixing, private domain traffic is more about stopping loss in time when it is not feasible to spend money for users, rather than an equivalent replacement of spending money for user growth models.
    At the same time, the stickiness of Luckin's private domain users is not as high as expected, and discounts are still the main motivation for users to enter the group.
    Ruixing’s private domain group is a sales-type community in nature.
    The main connection between the community and users is to issue discount coupons.
    Without the interactive function of social groups, users are transformed into "iron fans" only by the influence of products.
    The efficiency is low and it is not conducive to users’ perception of the brand.



    Staying on campus does provide a new round of growth points for Luckin's user growth, but Luckin's current business is still a user group represented by white-collar workers.
    Educating the white-collar market on coffee drinking habits is the current focus of Luckin.
    Fortunately, the way to try to break the game is to restart the franchise business.



    Luckin restarted its franchise business again.
    The initial investment cost of franchisees reached as high as 350,000.
    The purpose may be to set a threshold to attract franchisees with commercial resources and share the costs and risks of the education market with Luckin.



    Although Luckin's current expansion route has been much more stable compared with previous blind expansion.
    Through the combination of coffee and tea and fruit drinks, the attractiveness of the product has also been greatly improved, but in view of the negative image left by Luckin's counterfeiting, before the situation is unclear , Whether franchisees are willing to pay is still unknown.



    In addition to its own development limitations, the development of Ruixing is restricted by colleagues in the coffee industry.

    In addition to its own development limitations, the development of Ruixing is restricted by colleagues in the coffee industry.



    Before Luckin, neither the menacing Korean coffee nor even the coffee that relied on the rise of Starbucks had shaken Starbucks' position in the world of freshly ground coffee, and Luckin's previous rise made Starbucks smell the crisis, with "third Starbucks, which makes a living "space", also cooperates with Ali to actively deploy the takeaway business to create "unlimited scenes".



    If the timeline is out of order, Luckin does not have a crisis of fraud, and it may be difficult for Starbucks, a traditional retail coffee that lacks new retail genes, to catch up with Luckin.
    But the timeline will not change.
    When Luckin was deeply affected by the fraud incident, Starbucks used the vacuum period to rapidly develop the new retail coffee business, steadily compensated for its lack of data capabilities, and achieved initial results.
    The resistance of Luckin's future expansion will be even greater.



    In addition to the freshly ground coffee giant Starbucks, Luckin is also currently undertaking the impact of the wave of boutique instant coffee.

    In addition to the freshly ground coffee giant Starbucks, Luckin is also currently undertaking the impact of the wave of boutique instant coffee.





    The boutique instant coffee represented by Yongpu and Sandunban has grown rapidly in recent years.
    According to Tianyan Check, after Yongpu completed the first round of financing of tens of millions of dollars, sales have increased by 5 times a year.
    In addition to the quality upgrade of coffee, a large part of the success of premium instant coffee comes from its brand cultural marketing.
    For example, the joint name of Yongpu and more than 400 IPs, Sandton allows users to participate in the design and development of coffee, and its users are interested in premium instant coffee.
    Coffee brands are very sticky.



    The main user group of premium instant coffee is white-collar workers, which overlaps with Luckin's target users to a large extent.



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