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The situation, characteristics and countermeasures of community group buying in the next three years

 Last Update: 2021-04-16
 Source: Internet
 Author: User

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1.
A brief comment on the gains and losses of each community group buying platform in 2020

Meituan and Duoduo have achieved a breakthrough from 0 to 20 million pieces per day in 2020, and their business has entered about 2,000 cities (including counties), and the number of users has increased by tens of millions.

It can be described as fruitful.

However, there are less exciting facts hidden under the exciting numbers (the data in this article comes from the conference calls of the founders of each platform, platform insiders, industry consensus, and senior experts.

Some of the data are reasonable speculations based on the above data).

The scale advantage of each platform

1.
The scale advantage of each platform

At the end of 2020 (early 2021), the community group buying platforms reached their historical peak, with the largest scale reaching approximately 30 million pieces per day.

Because of the fall of the Spring Festival, the current maximum scale is about 20 million pieces per day, which is approximately equal to the situation in December 2020.

From: Visual China

Judging from the current situation, the scale distribution of each platform is roughly the first echelon of Meituan, with more than 20 million pieces per day, and the second echelon of Prosperity, Orange Heart, and Shihui groups about 10 million to 15 million pieces per day.

/Day, the third echelon of Ali Hema/Maimai and Jingxi are about a few million small, which can be ignored.

Although there is a huge difference in scale between the echelons, about 10 million pieces per day, there is no substantial impact.

Because the scale of each echelon is broken down to the provinces and regions, we find that the difference between the first echelon and the second echelon is very small, and only a few areas have large differences:

The scale of most provinces in the first tier is about 500,000 pieces/day, and the scale of most provinces in the second tier is about 250,000 pieces/day.

Although the former is twice that of the latter, in terms of business impact, the two There is no obvious difference between them, and it will not have a significant impact on the supply chain and warehousing links.

250,000 pieces/day corresponds to about 500 million pieces/year, corresponding to about 250 SKUs, and each SKU is about 1,000 pieces/day.

500,000 pieces/day corresponds to a scale of about 1 billion/year, corresponds to about 450 SKUs, and each SKU is about 1,100 pieces/day.

Taken together, this scale is similar to opening one or two large vegetable markets in each province.

If it is scattered to the provincial capitals, prefecture-level cities, counties, and towns in the province, from the perspective of each administrative district, it is like each administrative district has opened several stalls selling vegetables and department stores.

Compared with subverting offline stores and vegetable markets, it is really better than nothing.

Compared with the competition, it is only the difference between half a catty and eighty-two.

2.
Supply chain of each platform

Assuming that the daily order volume of a certain platform is 20 million, it means that 95% of the provinces have less than 2 million daily orders.
The average daily net profit of suppliers in most provinces is about several hundred yuan.

A first-level wholesaler in a province, doing traditional wholesale business, has an annual turnover of tens to hundreds of millions and an annual net profit of over one million.

I came to the community to buy supplies, get up early every day, and complete a series of things such as delivery, product selection, price setting, and operation.
The difficulty of the operation has doubled.
In the end, I earn several hundred yuan a day and 100,000 yuan a year.
It's really chicken ribs, it's a pity that the food is tasteless and discarded.

In fact, except for a few suppliers in large provinces (less than 10% of the total group) who can make money, most of the suppliers do not make money and have no amount.

Except for prosperity, the infrastructure in the processing warehouse/shared warehouse link of the supply chain is basically zero.

Suppliers have neither volume nor profit.
The key link of the supply chain-processing has not yet, so where do you start with the platform's supply chain advantages and stability?

3.
Warehouse distribution of each platform

In the warehousing process, the central warehouses of some platforms are distributed in multiple cities, and the shared warehouses and central warehouses are not in the same park.
The costs caused by these unfavorable factors are either added to the price by the supplier or the supplier can absorb it.
If you quit, it will affect the stability of the supply chain, or the platform will subsidize it itself.

Due to group efficiency and order density problems, most of the grid warehouses are still in a state of loss, and most of the time has not reached 12 o’clock delivery, and the cost is generally more than 60 cents.
With this node alone, the proportion of order revenue will reach 8.
6%.

In general, the warehousing and distribution link has only managed to cope with fewer errors, which is far from being timely, economical, and profitable.

4.
Comprehensive evaluation of each platform

Therefore, in 2020, Meituan, Duoduo, and Orange Heart will only gain a national scale, and they will be weak in every region.
From the perspective of each business link, either it has just been established and needs to be optimized, or it is not at all.

Compared with Meituan and Duoduo, Xingsheng does not have an advantage in terms of scale in the country, but its business links are complete, and its business is concentrated in a few regions in Hunan and Hubei, and it is the king in the region.
With regional advantages, Xingsheng has its own foundation.

If only Hunan (representing Xingsheng), Jiangxi (representing Duoduo), Sichuan (representing Orange Heart), and Guangdong (representing Meituan), the market in the four provinces and autonomous regions can be expanded, if the amount of capital and mutual alliance factors are not considered, I believe that Hunan must not be the first to be attacked, and may even be the last to be attacked.
This proves that the results of Meituan, Duoduo, and Orange Heart are not stable, while the results of Xingsheng are more solid.
This feature is very important from 2021 to 2023.
The only obvious problem with Xingsheng is that there is only one base area and no room for improvement.

Not only do I affirm prosperously, but also suppliers and brands in the industry think so.
The picture below is the survey feedback made by "New Distribution" to brand dealers:

Orange Heart and Shihui Tuan are between Meituan, Duoduo, and Xingsheng, neither of which is occupied or obvious.
Alibaba and JD.
com belong to hindsight, and they are totally untouched in terms of speed, scale, quality, and stability of results.

If you have to make a summary judgment on the results of 2020, I think Meituan, Toto ≥ Xingsheng> Orange Heart, Shihui Tuan> Ali, Jingxi.

If I summarize the strategy for 2020, I think Meituan, Duoduo, and Orange Heart are blitzkrieg strategies for speed and national scale, and prosperity is a regional strategy for quality and regional scale.

The advantage and disadvantage of the blitzkrieg is that it quickly paved a national stall, but most of the area was not digested, the quality was not good, and there were unstable factors.

The advantages and disadvantages of the regional strategy are that it has established certain barriers in the regional market, kept the results, and established a set of high-quality business closed loops, but faced the dilemma of breaking the game in other regions.

2.
The situation and characteristics of community group buying from 2021 to 2023

I think the community group buying battle is divided into three stages, namely the market expansion stage in 2021, the confrontational consumption stage from 2022 to 2023, and the strategic offensive stage from 2024 to later.

The main feature of the market expansion stage is that there is a lot of room for growth in the market, and all parties do not have to fight fiercely against consumption to obtain multiple growth.
At this stage, there is some confrontational consumption, but it is only partial, phased, and low-intensity.
Jointly exploring the undeveloped market is the theme.

In the market expansion stage, because of the need to respond to competition, it is necessary to start to implement the strategy of regional segregation, and in the form of "development of key areas" + "acquisition", a regional segregated market will eventually be formed in some provinces.
If there is no regional separatism, it will be difficult to make progress in 2022.

The main feature of the stage of confrontation is that the market space is shrinking rapidly, and all parties rely more and more on competing for each other's share for growth, and this has become the dominant growth logic.
The joint development of untapped markets will become a partial and non-dominant growth logic.

In the stage of fighting against consumption, regional separatism will become the most important or only competitive means and achievement.
Players who do not have a regionally segregated market may be substantially marginalized, although it may seem that the data is not bad.

In the strategic offensive stage, all parties carry out refined operations based on the regional separatist market, relying on the strategic layout implemented from 2021 to 2023, and the group-level layout outside of community group purchases, competing with rivals and gradually eroding each other’s Regional separatist market.

In the above three stages, there will be a combination of community group buying inside and outside the battlefield.

Before the specific analysis, we need to understand a question: why community group buying is a regional scale economy rather than a national scale economy like e-commerce.
The core reason is the characteristics of next-day delivery and zero inventory of community group buying.

Commodities purchased by community groups go from the supplier's warehouse to the central warehouse of the platform to the grid warehouse, and finally to the group leader.
The time is only 16 to 24 hours, and the platform cannot be stocked on a large scale.
Therefore, the supplier must be local and deliver the goods accurately at the specified time.
Non-local suppliers can't do it.
From the perspective of the supply chain, community group buying must be localized and regional.

From the perspective of warehousing and distribution links, this is also the case.
The central warehouse in one province cannot supply goods to other provinces.
Because the distance is too far, the inter-provincial time will take several hours, and it is impossible to deliver the goods to the township hundreds of kilometers away in the neighboring province before 12 o'clock the next day.

，、、、。，。。（，，，，）。

1.
2021

1.
1

，、、2000（），34、300、2000、，。

，95%200，50。，。

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，20215~10。20213/。

，、，8000/。、、，4000/。/、，2000/。3.
2/。

/、0，2000，、，、2020，。

20214，5~10。

（），。。

、，2021100。，2021。

1.
2

1.
2.
1

According to the forecast of 80 million pieces in the first echelon, 40 million in the second echelon, and 20 million in the third echelon, combined with the actual situation, I simulated the distribution of the scale of each echelon in each province in 2021, as follows:

Convert the above table to get the following table:

It can be seen from the table that at the end of 2021, the scale of the provinces and autonomous regions in the first echelon with the backwards reached 2 million pieces per day, basically forming a nationwide suppression of the second and third echelons.

If the national expansion strategy is adopted, by the end of 2021, the first echelon can achieve a universal regional scale advantage, and the scale of each province can reach more than 2 million pieces per day.

Supply chain advantage

Let’s look at what it means for a province to reach a scale of more than 2 million pieces per day.

I continue to break down the scale into three indicators: SKU number, daily turnover/supplier, and daily net profit/supplier, as shown in the following figure:

The above table can be analyzed in two aspects:

1) Judging from the comparison of scale in 2020, the number of SKUs in provinces with a scale of 2 million items has increased by 122%, and supplier turnover and net profits have increased by 80% compared to provinces with 500,000 items.

2) From the comparison between 2021 and 2020, platforms with a scale of more than 2 million in provinces and regions have increased by 67% to 300% in the number of SKUs compared to platforms with a scale of less than 2 million.
Profits have increased by 20%~140%.

In other words, the first echelon reached 80 million pieces per day, and the SKU, supplier turnover and net profit in the nationwide market have greatly increased.

The increase in SKU means higher user stickiness, higher unit price per customer, and higher monetization efficiency.
The increase in supplier flow and net profit means stronger supply chain advantages, more suppliers, better service, better quality, and lower prices.

At present, many suppliers are willing to do it in some provinces, but they are not willing to do it in other provinces.
The core reason is that the regional scale is too small.

Warehouse distribution advantage

In the warehousing process, the cost reduction brought about by the increase in the scale of the central warehouse is not obvious, and the cost of the central warehouse is also relatively low.

The cost of the grid warehouse is the focus of the "central warehouse-grid warehouse-group leader" link, but the scale effect of the grid warehouse is based on the group efficiency and the order density of the community.
The province-level scale effect is invalid, more What is needed is the optimization of ground promotion and operations.

A testable fact is that large-scale grid warehouses in Guangdong, Jiangxi and other regions also generally lose money or are not profitable, and there is no obvious difference with smaller grid warehouses in other regions.
However, the efficiency of the group is good, and the smaller areas of the province can also make general profits.

，700~400/，，。

，2021，，，。

，，，，。

（、、）（、），6。2020。

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：

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，250，200、150、100、50、25。20212020，250（4），3，700。4，4。

，。，，。

。

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，。

，2021。20251.
5~2.
5，6~10。，2021202540%，2~4/。3/。

Then, combined with the total scale of the industry, infer the total scale of each echelon.
The third tier can basically be counted as starting from 2021, it is reasonable to reach Meituan’s score of about 20 million pieces per day in one year.
Even if it reaches 30 million pieces/day, it will not affect the results.

If the first and second tiers increase by four times, they will reach 40 million pieces/day and 80 million pieces/day respectively, and the total scale of all platforms will reach 320 million pieces/day, which is in line with the industry scale in 2021.
The result is the result described in the text.

If the growth rate of the first echelon is higher than 4 times, then the final result is that the first echelon will completely suppress the second and third echelons.

Can the second echelon achieve a growth rate of more than 4 times, for example, 5 times or 6 times? I don't think so.
The reasons are as follows:

If the second echelon can reach it, judging from the situation in 2020, the first echelon can also achieve a higher growth rate, which will have little impact on the final result.

The second tier has a growth rate of 5 times or higher, and the industry scale in 2021 will be close to 400 million pieces per day, reaching 50% of the industry ceiling.
I think this is unlikely.

In summary, the total daily number of items for each echelon in 2021 is reasonable, so the scale distribution of each echelon and province is reasonable.
Therefore, the final conclusion that "the first echelon will completely suppress the second and third echelons" is also reasonable.

In order to make everyone feel more at ease with this conclusion, I post a hypothesis that "the total industry size in 2021 will be about 300 million pieces/day, the first tier will grow from 20 million pieces/day to 70 million pieces/day, and the second tier will increase from 15 million pieces/day.
Pieces/day to 45 million pieces/day (the growth rate of the first echelon is 3.
5 times, and the growth rate of the second echelon is 3 times)"’s calculation result:

This result is basically consistent with the results estimated in the text (right table), and it can also be concluded that "the first echelon completely suppresses the second and third echelons nationwide.
"

I think that "in 2021, the first echelon will reach 80 million pieces per day and the second echelon will reach 40 million pieces per day" is a more reasonable prediction, although Meituan and Duoduo believe that they can reach 100 million pieces per day.
If the scale of 100 million pieces per day is really obtained, the conclusion that "the first echelon completely suppresses the second and third echelons" will be even more valid.

1.
2.
2 Regional separatism gradually formed

If the nationwide market expansion is implemented, 4 provinces in the first echelon can reach 5 million to 7 million pieces per day, which has formed a substantial regional separatism.

A province can reach 5 million to 7 million pieces per day, while other platforms can basically only reach 1 million to 3 million pieces per day.
The scale of a certain platform is basically the same as the sum of the scales of other platforms in the province.
The reasons are as follows:

1）20211100/（3/27），A600~700/，100~200/。

2）200~400/，A2000/。，3000//（8/27）。

3），，，。

，，。

：

SKU100%~260%，20%~95%。

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、、，，，。

，，。：

，600~700/，。，。

，，，。。

：

，。

，，。

，。

1.
2.
3 How to choose a strategy if the speed is not enough and the competitive advantage is obvious

As analyzed above, the problems faced by the second and third tiers are insufficient speed and obvious competitive advantages.
So what strategy should be adopted? After the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1945, the KMT and the Communist Party faced this situation.

Our party has adopted many strategies, such as occupying rural areas and occupying certain areas, such as the Northeast, Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia.
Regardless of whether it is a rural area or some areas, it is a regional separatism in general, and it has developed from the base area.
The strategy adopted by the Kuomintang is nationwide + key cities.

This is not to say that the Kuomintang’s strategy in 1945 was not good, but that our party adopted the best strategy under the circumstances.
If we compare the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1945 and the community group buying competition in 2021, there are still many similarities in fundamentals.

I will continue to analyze the problems and strategies of regional separatism in the future.

2.
2022~2023 situation analysis

2.
1 Counter consumption

In 2021, whether it is the prosperity of the primary market, Orange Heart, or the secondary market of Meituan, Duoduo, Ali, JD.
Although everyone will consume 10 billion to 20 billion of funds, they will also get a huge increase in business.
.

There is great hope for both the capital market and within the group.
Therefore, funds and resources will be more abundant from 2022 to 2023.
(If the platform does not go well in 2021, it is likely to be marginalized.
)

Funds and resources are sufficient, but the market space is not as large as in 2021, and in the short term, multiple competing pairs, large amounts of funds, and resources enter the market.
Any one party's growth of one business means that the other party has to give up 0.
5 business and another 0.
5 business.
From the new market.

In 2021, the growth of one business by either party means that the other party only needs to give up 0.
1 or 0.
3 business, and the other 0.
9 or 0.
7 business will come from the new market.

Therefore, the main theme of 2022 is to fight against consumption, which is different from the main theme of market expansion in 2021.

When will this confrontational consumption end?

Two necessary conditions must be met: ① All parties have been exhausted and unable to launch large-scale attacks; ② Form an absolute dominant market in the region, both in terms of scale and business links.

If the vitality is exhausted, then the nationwide confrontation will end.

If there are 1 or 2 companies in the area that form an absolute advantage, then the confrontation in the area will end, and other areas will continue until 1 or 2 companies form an absolute advantage.

，，，。

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？：

，，。

，1~2。

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2.
2

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2.
3

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1），，1~2。

，2013，2015。2015，，。2016。

，。

2) After finding the key factors, it takes time to explore the combination of key factors and business, and drive them together through business and key factors, and verify it.

Take takeaway as an example.
From 2013 to 2017, we will first hit the campus market, then the mid-to-high-end white-collar market, and finally the low-end market.
Behind each market segment is a set of standard distribution system and merchant support, which ultimately constitutes a closed loop driven by "user-distribution-merchant".

Of course, this is an afterthought.

From the perspective of business development, the traffic at that time was also one of the key factors.
Traffic is reflected on the user side of the "user-delivery-merchant" triangle relationship.
If there is no traffic advantage of Meituan Dianping, in the competition, this triangle may not be built, or if you are hungry, you may not necessarily lose.

Therefore, key factors do not exist independently, nor can they play a key role in the beginning.

3) If community group buying falls into regional divisions, it will increase the difficulty of breaking the game.
The ultimate criticality may exceed the current community group buying business scope and develop new factors.

From a comprehensive point of view of 1 and 2, the distribution that is considered a key factor afterwards is caused by the business encountering a key problem.
In the early expansion competition, this key factor only played a role in ensuring that business expansion was not hindered.
The final key role is to combine a single key factor with other factors in the middle and late stages of the competition to complete the closed loop at the lower level of logic.

The rider we are talking about is the key factor or one of the core assets of Meituan’s victory.
It is meaningless to discuss key factors separately and statically.

Therefore, it takes time to discover the key factors.
It is necessary to combine the key factors with the business, and then combine other key factors to play a role together, in order to become the final key factor.
It is still a bit early to talk about the key factors in 2021, and it may be confirmed in 2022~2023.

The key issues of current community group buying may include: grid warehouse, processing warehouse, supply chain, capital, and flow.
But at what stage, what role do these factors play, in what form, how long will it take to verify, what is the more complete underlying logic closed loop, and whether there are factors beyond the current community group buying business? I have not completed it yet.
Ideas.

I will put forward my preliminary conjecture in the last part of this article "Community Group Purchase Countermeasures 2021-2023".

3.
2024~ Later strategic offensive

The strategic counter-offensive here is not the kind of high sentiment on the battlefield where the army is pressing the border and pushing forward to victory.
The strategic counterattack here is the silent cannibalization of Chunyu, which is simply refined operations and full chain operations.

Whether it can win depends largely on the layout and strategies from 2021 to 2023, such as regional segregation strategy, mid-to-backend layout, etc.
These layouts may surpass the community group buying business and require group ecological coordination.

Because it is too far away from us and there are many variables, we will not start here.
This article focuses on the situation in 2021-2023.

4.
Long-term regional separatism

Long-term regional separatism will emerge in 2021, which is the core feature from 2022 to 2023, and it is likely to continue into 2025.
Long-term regional segregation will not only have a profound impact on the community group buying business, but will also have a greater impact on various competing entities, such as Pinduoduo.

4.
1 The internal motivation of long-term regional separatism

4.
1.
1 Need to implement regional separatist priority strategy to break the strategic advantage of the first echelon

If all parties follow the strategy of giving priority to national expansion, the result will be the following table, which will be completely suppressed, and the situation will be even more difficult than 2020.

What if the second and third echelons are changed to regional separatist priority?

Although Ali/Shihuituan, Xingsheng, Chengxin, and Jingxi cannot compete with Meituan and Duoduo in the national market, they have concentrated on developing 3 key provinces, and the scale of 3 key provinces has reached 6 million pieces per day.
There are only a few million pieces per day in other areas.

The four companies have adopted this strategy, and 12-15 provinces will be divided, 10 provinces will be left to Meituan, Duoduo separatist, 2-5 provinces will be harassed and divided by various parties (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, Xinjiang , Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Qinghai are ignored).

Then the situation becomes the second and third echelon occupying 3 to 4 key provinces and regions respectively, and the first echelon separates 5 key provinces and regions, and all parties in the remaining provinces and regions have no obvious advantages and disadvantages and become a war quagmire.

The advantages accumulated by the first echelon in 2020 and the dangerous situation that is very likely to be formed in 2021 will be resolved in an instant.

Not only that, the scale advantage of Meituan and Duoduo in the first echelon will be severely restricted, and the goal of 80 million pieces per day is almost impossible to accomplish.

So is this result easy to achieve?

This result is easy to achieve, four times larger than the national scale, and easier to achieve than competing with the first echelon across the country.
The reasons are as follows:

Except for the Xingsheng and Shihui Groups, the main players of all parties are basically opponents of the same size or that cannot be beaten.
Even if the national competition cannot be won, it is not a problem to concentrate on fighting a few provinces.

When multiple platforms adopt this strategy, everyone will deliberately avoid their respective advantages/key areas, and even tacitly target the first echelon.
Meituan and Duoduo can't help multiple opponents of the same size launch attacks in different areas.
.

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