How should we view the Houthi movement’s sudden, rapid advance to control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and southern Red Sea? What impact does this have on the current situation?

The bombing of Sana'a International Airport immediately enraged the Houthi movement. The Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out the airstrike. However, according to Yemen’s Ministry of Defense, Yemeni armed forces struck the runway at Sana’a International Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing. Although the Yemeni government claimed responsibility for the attack, the Houthis still directed their accusations toward Saudi Arabia and launched retaliatory missile and drone strikes against it—thus reigniting the conflict. Saudi Arabia had waged war against the Houthis for many years without defeating them; instead, the Houthis grew increasingly powerful. After Saudi Arabia and Iran reconciled, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis also announced a reconciliation in 2024. Yet following the U.S. launch of hostilities against Iran, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran became more delicate—and consequently, ties between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis deteriorated as well. Mutual trust between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has always been extremely low. Then, on July 20, the Houthis warned international shipping companies that vessels engaged in trade with Saudi ports could face military strikes—further expanding their previously announced maritime blockade targeting Saudi Arabia. In response to the Houthi blockade, Saudi Arabia opted to form a coalition. On July 30, Saudi Arabia announced the formation of a multinational maritime defense alliance with 13 other countries to safeguard freedom of navigation, international trade, and energy transportation security in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. These 13 countries are: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, the Yemeni government, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia. Following the Houthis’ announcement of the blockade, the number of Saudi oil tankers transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait plummeted initially—nearly dropping to zero. Saudi oil tankers were forced to detour via the Suez Canal. However, beginning in August, sporadic transit of Saudi oil tankers through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait resumed. This was because the Houthis had previously been stationed far from the strait’s narrowest point—making full control difficult. Thus, the Houthis’ recent offensive along Yemen’s western coast aims precisely to fully seize the Yemeni side of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—including its narrowest section—thereby dramatically strengthening their control over the strait. This development is unquestionably detrimental to Saudi Arabia: going forward, Saudi oil tankers will find passage through the Bab el-Mandeb even more difficult. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea stated in a declaration that this offensive targets “gathering points of Saudi-backed forces” along the western coast, aiming to expel “hostile forces” from Taiz Province in southwestern Yemen and Al Hudaydah Province along the Red Sea coast. The statement claimed “hundreds” of enemy personnel were killed or captured, and nine Saudi aircraft were shot down during engagements with Saudi fighter jets. Sarea added that international maritime traffic remains “safe”—but Saudi vessels remain subject to restrictions. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis continue escalating. On September 11, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement confirming that multiple drones launched from Iraqi territory had attacked the country’s East-West Crude Oil Pipeline, causing injuries and partial damage to infrastructure. The Iraqi government subsequently condemned the attack and launched an investigation. The Speaker of Iraq’s Parliament stated that launching attacks against Saudi Arabia from Iraqi territory is “unacceptable”.

Briefly outline the history of the Houthi movement.

In April 2022, under UN mediation, both sides reached a ceasefire agreement, resulting in Yemen’s de facto division: the Houthis controlling most of the north, while the Yemeni government holds sway over the south and east. The relationship between the Houthis and Iran is key to understanding this situation. The West has long regarded the Houthis as Iran’s “regional proxy.” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly stated that the Houthis’ recent military operations bear “clear Iranian involvement.” According to Reuters, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) directly guided the Houthis’ advance along the Red Sea coast; Iran has also pledged additional funding, weapons, and senior military personnel. Yet the Houthis are not entirely subservient to Iran. Iran acknowledges the Houthis as allies but publicly denies providing them with direct military command, insisting the Houthis are “not proxies.” The Houthis pursue their own political agenda—controlling Yemen, expanding regional influence, and compelling Saudi concessions—goals that overlap with, but are not identical to, Iran’s interests. Why is the Bab el-Mandeb Strait so critical? Located at the southern end of the Red Sea between Yemen and the eastern coast of Africa, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is only 29 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, divided into two channels by Perim Island. Its name—meaning “Gate of Tears”—reflects the treacherous nature of its waters. Approximately 7% of global oil trade and 12% of total world trade passes through here. Much of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil bound for Asia—bypassing the Strait of Hormuz—is shipped via this route. On September 11, 2026, the Houthis seized Perim Island and simultaneously gained control over areas near the coastal town of Dhubab in southwestern Yemen. Yemeni government forces evacuated Perim Island overnight on September 10; Houthi fighters landed on the island early on September 11, encountering virtually no resistance. Situated at the center of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Perim Island commands the primary shipping lane linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean—making it a pivotal node for controlling the entire strait. To understand the background and implications of this event, one must situate it within the broader context of U.S.-Iran tensions. With navigation through the Strait of Hormuz still disrupted, Saudi Arabia has increasingly relied on its transnational East-West Crude Oil Pipeline to transport oil to Red Sea ports for onward shipment via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Now that the Houthis control Perim Island, this alternative route faces direct threat. Saudi Arabia’s August crude oil output has already fallen to approximately 6 million barrels per day—the lowest level in over 30 years. On September 10, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made two phone calls to former U.S. President Donald Trump requesting American military action against the Houthis—but Trump declined, agreeing only to provide intelligence and target identification support. The United States is reluctant to become entangled in Yemen’s quagmire: Saudi Arabia’s seven-year intervention beginning in 2015 failed to decisively weaken the Houthis, and Washington wishes to avoid repeating that costly mistake. How might this end? In the short term, the Houthis have secured *de facto* control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—but they have not yet achieved “complete closure.” Commercial vessels still transit the strait daily, albeit in reduced numbers. Rather than imposing an outright blockade, the Houthis’ strategy is to sustain security threats that steadily drive up shipping costs—prompting insurers and shipowners themselves to opt for alternate routes. This “slow strangulation” proves more painful than a blunt, immediate shutdown. In the medium term, the decisive factor will be whether Saudi Arabia and Iran can reach some form of compromise. The Houthis’ primary objective in launching military operations is to compel Saudi concessions on the Yemen issue. Sustained attacks inflict economic damage on Saudi Arabia, potentially pressuring Riyadh to return to negotiations.

Carriers Resuming Suez Transits Even as Houthis Strengthen Grip on Bab el-Mandeb Strait

Sep 14, 2026

Major carriers including COSCO and OOCL are resuming Suez Canal transits despite Houthi control, reducing diverted capacity to a two-year low. This normalization eases Asia-Europe constraints but shifts congestion to downstream ports in Southeast Asia and India.

icis

2026-09-14

Carriers Resuming Suez Transits Even as Houthis Strengthen Grip on Bab el-Mandeb Strait

Carriers Resuming Suez Transits Even as Houthis Strengthen Grip on Bab el-Mandeb Strait

FAQ