The underlying logic of the U.S.-China truce (original answer was censored)

Chronologically speaking, the U.S. midterm election day in 2026 falls on November 3, while the original truce expiration date is November 10. Assuming no extension, tariffs would snap back upward—meaning that during the October campaign period, the political discourse would be dominated by concerns such as 'prices will rise again,' 'farmers’ orders remain unstable,' and 'market volatility.' The Democratic Party has already made cost-of-living and tariffs central campaign themes and attack lines; its headline on September 17 read: 'Senate Republicans Double Down on Trump’s Tariffs and Block Democrats’ Effort To Lower Costs.' In fact, if you follow U.S. political news even casually, slogans like 'Fighting for an Affordable America' and 'Stop these chaotic tariffs' are everywhere. Cost-of-living has become one of the most decisive voting issues in the midterms—roughly 48% of voters rank it as their top concern—and Democrats are now pulling significantly ahead of Republicans on the question of 'who can better manage the cost of living.' Ironically, Democratic social media campaigns have begun framing tariffs as a 'household tax'—a clever rhetorical move equating 'tariff tax' with 'tax on American families' and 'cost borne by the average household.' Thus, this truce effectively shifts any potential economic shock entirely beyond Election Day—a textbook case of 'diplomacy driven by the electoral calendar.' But why only two months? Let’s return to the Busan Agreement and the series of confrontations (and transactions) preceding it to uncover the deepest logic underpinning bilateral bargaining: technology, security, geopolitics, production capacity, and rule-making authority. On virtually every issue both sides treat as existential—none has yielded an 'obvious,' quantifiable consensus or solution. Viewed through this lens, the intensity of comprehensive U.S.-China competition is, in fact, intensifying—not easing. Regarding U.S. policy toward China, I’ve previously explained that Washington and Beijing operate under fundamentally divergent decision-making logics. U.S. policy is never the product of a single rational actor; rather, it must be understood as the outcome of nested, dual-layered bargaining among executive branch factions, congressional veto players, and domestic distributive interest coalitions. What appears externally as 'Washington’s overarching China strategy' is usually nothing more than a temporary compromise among incompatible missions. In the context of this truce, for instance, the Treasury-centered 'deal-making faction' prioritizes measurable commercial deliverables; the national-security establishment and congressional hawks view tariffs and export controls as tools of pressure and decoupling; agricultural states demand Chinese purchases of U.S. farm products; even U.S. manufacturing is deeply divided—simultaneously seeking protection from Chinese overcapacity while remaining dependent on critical Chinese inputs; and the broader electorate increasingly links U.S. China policy directly to household budgets.

The U.S.-China agreement has finally taken effect—what do its three underlying implications, aimed squarely at decoupling, mean for both countries? Is it a blessing or a curse?

Hello everyone. This afternoon (November 10), China and the United States began implementing reciprocal tariff reductions. Previously, the U.S.-China tariff dispute had been extended twice—each time for 90 days. The first extension ran from May 12 to August 12; the second likewise lasted 90 days, ending today—November 10. Now, the two countries have finally begun implementing the consensus they previously reached. According to reports, the U.S. has reduced its tariff on Chinese fentanyl from 20% to 10%, while China has lowered its tariff on certain U.S. goods to 15%. Most importantly, restrictions on rare-earth exports have—at least temporarily—entered a one-year 'truce.' This 'truce' effectively means a relaxation of controls. Although the U.S. claims that China’s rare-earth export restrictions, announced on October 9, were never actually enforced, we refrain from commenting definitively due to lack of verifiable evidence. Nonetheless, China’s 'aim high to achieve the middle' strategy—essentially a form of maximum pressure—proved effective on October 9. Simultaneously, China began purchasing large volumes of U.S. agricultural products, primarily soybeans. However, China has not yet officially announced this procurement plan; the following data comes from U.S. Department of Commerce reports. These figures indicate that China is projected to purchase 12 million metric tons of U.S. soybeans this year, and approximately 25 million metric tons annually from 2026 through 2028. Please note: These figures are for reference only—their accuracy hinges on official confirmation or denial by Chinese authorities. So what does this mean? First, it signals the formal commencement of a U.S.-China trade truce—or, equivalently, the conclusion of a trade agreement between the two nations. Hence, unlike previous phases, this agreement avoids explicit references to 'Phase One' or 'Phase Two,' but instead sets a one-year timeframe. In theory, this first phase lasts one year, after which both sides will reassess the situation. Second, what does this mean for the economies of China, the U.S., Japan, Europe, and others? Undoubtedly, it is positive. It bears adding that, starting today, the U.S. has suspended port fees levied on Chinese vessels entering U.S. ports, while China has reciprocally eliminated port fees for U.S. vessels. This measure substantially lowers bilateral trade costs, naturally facilitating smoother commerce between the two countries—and thus constitutes good news for the global economy. A Japanese media outlet reported that this development could lift global GDP by 0.03%–0.04% over the next three years, with Japan potentially seeing an even larger GDP boost. Though 0.03% may seem trivial, given the massive global economic base, this remains unequivocally beneficial for all countries. Regarding China’s economic performance over the past two to three months, I’ve recently spoken with entrepreneurs and private banking professionals across various locations—and observed markedly divergent conditions across industries: some sectors are thriving, others struggling. Overall, China’s economy showed signs of slowing in Q3. Without relief from U.S.-China trade tensions, the outlook for Q4 this year—and Q1 next year—remains bleak. The one-year measures now taking effect today are therefore beneficial not only for China’s economy, but for the global economy as well. With the new trade agreement signed, key questions arise: Which industries and groups stand to benefit? Which will see little or no gain? These are precisely the issues demanding close attention.

China’s Selective Crop Buying Tests US Trade Truce Before Summit

Sep 20, 2026

China is halfway to meeting its soybean import pledge but struggles with broader agricultural commitments ahead of the US-China summit. Experts anticipate that tariff relief could revive trade volumes for key commodities like soybeans, corn, and LNG.

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China’s Selective Crop Buying Tests US Trade Truce Before Summit

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