Another family trust has become the actual controller of a listed company!

The core institutional design of this transaction lies in the accompanying 'Agreement on Acting in Concert': all shareholder rights attached to the equity held by the trust—including voting rights, director nomination rights, and decision-making rights at shareholders’ meetings—are exercised strictly in accordance with the instructions of the settlor, Lin Jing. This structure achieves a clear division of rights: the economic benefits (i.e., income rights) of the equity are assigned to the family trust for future intra-family distribution and intergenerational succession, while voting rights remain firmly under the control of the actual controller. For Jiaxun Feihong, Lin Jing’s personal shareholding stands at only 9.09%, which is relatively thin. Having recently terminated her prior agreement on acting in concert, she introduced the family trust as a new party to such an agreement—objectively reinforcing the stability of the listed company’s control and preventing potential disruptions to corporate governance arising from future changes in family assets. The trust product selected for this transaction is CITIC Trust’s 'Fu-character' series—a dedicated family trust product line designed specifically for A-share listed company shareholders. CITIC Trust, a subsidiary of the central SOE China National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina), reported total trust asset management scale exceeding RMB 2.22 trillion by end-2025, with its family trust business scale surpassing RMB 140 billion. It has accumulated extensive practical experience in equity-related family trusts for listed companies, having previously assisted numerous A-share actual controllers in completing equity succession arrangements using this product series. 02 Typical A-Share Cases of Equity-Based Family Trusts and Two Main Implementation Models Jiaxun Feihong is not an isolated case. In recent years, dozens of A-share listed companies’ actual controllers have transferred equity into family trusts; the market has gradually crystallized two mature implementation pathways: One is direct shareholding by the trust, coupled with an agreement on acting in concert; The other employs a two-tier structure embedding the family trust within a limited partnership SPV, where the actual controller serves as the general partner (GP) retaining voting control, while the trust acts as the limited partner (LP), holding the vast majority of economic interests. Case One: Chuanggong Lawn (605099), same 'Fu-character' series by CITIC Trust — Direct Shareholding Model In July 2024, Wang Qiangzhong—the actual controller and concerted actor of Chuanggong Lawn—established two family trusts under CITIC Trust’s 'Fu-character' series (Nos. 15888 and 18888), transferring a combined 1.9928% of the listed company’s shares via block trades. An agreement on acting in concert was signed, designating the trust as a concerted actor whose voting rights strictly follow the settlor’s instructions—leaving the listed company’s control structure unchanged. This case closely mirrors Jiaxun Feihong’s arrangement: shares were transferred via block trade, the trust was directly registered as a shareholder of the listed company, and voting rights were locked down through the agreement on acting in concert. This approach features a simple architecture requiring no additional holding platform—ideal for actual controllers seeking rapid implementation of equity-based family trusts—and represents CITIC Trust’s standard methodology for its 'Fu-character' series. Case Two: Weihai Guangtai (002111), Dual-Layer Structure: Family Trust + Limited Partnership SPV Between 2025 and 2026, Li Guangtai—the actual controller of Weihai Guangtai—transferred a cumulative 6.88% stake in the listed company in multiple tranches into a limited partnership platform named 'Weihai Guangtuo', controlled by his family trust. Structurally, Li Guangtai holds only 0.01% of the partnership but serves as its general partner (GP), wielding full authority over operational decisions and equity voting rights; meanwhile, CITIC Trust—acting on behalf of the family trust—holds 99.99% of the partnership interests, entitling it solely to distributions (e.g., dividends and appreciation gains) without any participation in voting or decision-making. A key advantage of this model is that the trust entity does not appear directly on the listed company’s shareholder register. Adjustments to beneficiaries’ rights within the family can be handled entirely at the partnership and trust levels—without requiring any change to the listed company’s shareholder registration—thus minimizing disruption to the secondary market.

An 800-million-yuan family M&A drama | Equity: What determines the outcome isn’t the 80% stake—it’s Grandpa’s 5%.

[This Series: The 800-Million-Yuan Family M&A Drama] A real-life account of a family M&A deal: Earning wealth depends on capability; preserving it depends on strategic negotiation. Capability sets the ceiling; negotiation determines survival—or collapse—of one’s entire fortune. Recap of the core conclusion from the previous episode: For the hardworking eldest son, there is essentially only one viable path forward: He may negotiate the acquisition—but absolutely refuses coercive terms, personal entanglement, or profit-sharing demands. Yet everyone overlooks a fatal prerequisite: Restructuring governance, revising contractual clauses, reallocating funds, and modifying transaction rules— all hinge fundamentally on internal family negotiations. The entire internet focuses on: An RMB 800-million valuation, an 80% controlling stake, stringent capital terms, and father–son conflicts over interests. But what truly locks in the final outcome, commands the entire situation, and dictates the ultimate fate of the family fortune has never been these visible, explicit elements. It is Grandpa’s seemingly insignificant 5% equity stake. In capital markets, 5% is negligible. Within the human dynamics of a family business—interwoven with sentiment, public perception, voting power, and moral legitimacy—5% becomes the sole decisive factor. I. The Harsh Truth About Family Businesses: 80% Equity Determines Legal Control—5% Determines Destiny Many heirs to wealth stumble and fall due to the same cognitive illusion: ‘A large equity percentage = dominant voice.’ This real-life RMB 800-million acquisition case shatters that notion completely. The eldest son holds 80% of the equity, generates 70% of the group’s revenue and most of its net profit, and is undeniably the architect, revenue generator, and core operator. His father holds only 15%; his grandfather, just 5%. Numerically, the eldest son dominates utterly. Yet family businesses are never purely legal contests governed by corporate law. They are complex games combining emotional negotiation, ethical positioning, family public opinion, and entrenched power inertia. The father’s true trump card is not equity—it is moral high ground within the family. He occupies the stable position of the ‘older generation guardian of the enterprise,’ raising the banner of ‘the family’s holistic interest,’ and invoking the principle of ‘balancing the interests of both brothers and ensuring fair inheritance’— thereby effortlessly seizing the commanding heights of public discourse. From Grandpa’s perspective: The father has safeguarded the family enterprise for decades, prioritizing stability, security, universal benefit, and balanced distribution—appearing to uphold the greater good. Meanwhile, the eldest son—the hardest-working, most capable, and highest-contributing member— is easily branded as: overbearing, self-interested, arrogant about his achievements, intent on monopolizing the family fortune, and indifferent to sibling bonds. This is the cruelest reversal in the entire negotiation: • The father’s combined 20% equity is fortified by ethical leverage within the family; • The eldest son’s 80% contribution carries the reputational liability of being perceived as ‘family-unminded.’ That single vote decides life or death. If Grandpa sides with the father: The eldest son instantly becomes the ‘culprit obstructing the family’s collective prosperity.’ Subsequent voting, closing, cooperation, procedural execution, and internal approvals will all encounter invisible resistance. Even if legally empowered to veto the deal, the father can still stall progress indefinitely by blocking supply chains, finances, or deliveries—forcing eventual compromise. If Grandpa remains neutral—or leans toward the eldest son: The father’s ‘moral authority of the family’ instantly collapses. The rationale and legitimacy of the proposed comprehensive sale disintegrate entirely. One sentence reveals the essence: 80% equity secures your legal floor; 5% equity held by an elder determines your ultimate life outcome. II. Where Countless Heirs Stumble: Three Fatal Communication Pitfalls When Engaging Elders The eldest son’s greatest weakness has never been capital terms or equity structure. It is the generational chasm in mindset—and the resulting communication deadlock—between heirs and elders. The more capable, profitable, and contributive the heir,

Family Capital Trust Co Acquires 9,987 Shares of Linde PLC

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Family Capital Trust Co established a new $4.74 million stake in Linde PLC during Q3, while the company reported quarterly earnings exceeding analyst estimates.

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