The SHEIN bubble, punctured by a successful IPO—listing immediately followed by a share price decline

At 9:00 a.m. on September 1, SHEIN opened flat at HK$48.56 on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange—but turned negative within minutes. Its intraday low hit HK$43.80, a nearly 10% drop. It closed at HK$48.00, valuing the company at approximately HK$202.9 billion (about USD 26 billion). That offering price itself tells a story. The initial indicative price range had been HK$68–78; the final price of HK$48.56 represented a nearly 30% discount. Public subscription covered demand only fivefold—an unremarkable level for Hong Kong’s TMT sector. Even more striking is another set of figures: this IPO raised roughly USD 1.7 billion, yet the prospectus disclosed that SHEIN may need to pay up to USD 3.5 billion in cash compensation—and issue additional shares—to certain pre-IPO investors. Raising USD 1.7 billion while compensating early shareholders with USD 3.5 billion makes this listing look less like fundraising and more like settling old accounts. Four years ago, the same company was valued at USD 100 billion in private markets. Four years later, public markets assign it only one-quarter of that value—a 75% decline—not due to market sentiment, but because three core narratives have sequentially collapsed. The growth curve broke first. Start with the hardest numbers. From 2021 to 2023, SHEIN’s revenue growth exceeded 40% annually. From 2023 to 2025, its compound annual growth rate dropped to 14.2%. Breaking it down further: +41.1% in 2023, +20.7% in 2024, +8.0% in 2025, and just +1.1% in Q1 2026. This isn’t a one-year blip—it’s a consistent, accelerating deceleration. Half the reason lies in base effects: with annual revenue now exceeding USD 40 billion, natural headroom for incremental growth has narrowed. The other half stems from the external environment: in 2025, the U.S. accounted for 22.5% of SHEIN’s revenue, and Europe for 32.1%—together over half. Yet these are precisely the two markets where regulatory rules tightened most aggressively over the past two years. Regulatory arbitrage has run its course. SHEIN’s growth over the past five years rested not on any technological narrative, but on systemic regulatory arbitrage. U.S. de minimis rules exempted shipments under USD 800 from duties; EU rules did the same for consignments under EUR 150. SHEIN split every garment into tiny parcels shipped directly to consumers—perfectly skirting those duty thresholds. This advantage wasn’t merely about tariff savings; it also masked the inherent logistical cost disadvantage of cross-border single-item fulfillment. In May 2025, the U.S. eliminated the de minimis exemption for parcels originating from China and Hong Kong. In August, the USD 800 threshold was abolished globally. Starting July 2026, the EU will impose a temporary EUR 3 duty per low-value parcel. Roughly 80% of SHEIN’s U.S. site merchandise previously relied on this direct-mail channel. Once that channel closes, two costs rise simultaneously: per-order tariffs and the fulfillment expenses incurred by shifting to local warehouses and local sellers. Low-priced goods suffer most. Estimates suggest a USD 15 dress would incur an extra ~USD 5.60 in new tariffs and handling fees. So SHEIN had no choice but to raise prices. After its April 2025 U.S. price hike, sales temporarily plunged 23%. A year later, U.S. revenue had fallen 14.3%, and North American gross margins had compressed by 4–5 percentage points versus 2023. If it doesn’t raise prices, profits vanish under rising costs; if it does, customers walk away. A classic double bind. Profit peaked before revenue.

The European Commission approved the German government’s plan to nationalize energy giant Uniper, enabling it to escape financial distress caused by Russia’s supply cutoff—how should we view this move?

Catch your breath here, start making money again, then take it private once more. Capitalism—666.

Fearing break-up, Uniper workers want IPO, not sale, as privatisation picks up

18 hours ago

Uniper workers oppose a sale to strategic bidders, favoring an IPO to prevent asset break-up, as Berlin pursues privatization of the €10 billion utility amid competing bids from firms like EPH and Brookfield.

reuters

2026-09-24

Fearing break-up, Uniper workers want IPO, not sale, as privatisation picks up

Fearing break-up, Uniper workers want IPO, not sale, as privatisation picks up

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