The 23-Year War Against U.S. Aggression! What, exactly, did the U.S. seize from Iraq?

U.S. State Department spokesperson Tony Snow stated: 'The passage of this oil law by parliament is one of the four benchmarks set by the Bush administration for the Iraqi government—and is deemed critical to Iraq’s recovery.' But just how critical is it? According to an investigation by *The Middle East Report*, as early as July 2006, nine multinational oil companies had already reviewed and commented on the draft law. By the time its contents were publicly disclosed in 2006, almost no Iraqis had seen the full text. Fine—so here’s a law meant for Iraq, yet Iraqis aren’t allowed to read it. The Iraqi government voiced no objections; scholars raised no objections; ordinary citizens had no voice—only Iraqi trade unions mounted strong opposition. Yet, as the saying goes, 'the weapon of criticism cannot replace criticism by weapons.' With legal backing now in place, control over Iraq’s petroleum industry passed entirely into American hands. As everyone knows, the oil industry has never been about drilling alone. From underground reservoir to international markets, a single barrel of crude must pass through exploration, drilling, equipment supply, gathering and transportation pipelines, storage, refining, port facilities, tankers, marine insurance, security services, trading firms, bank financing, dollar-based settlement, international arbitration, and military protection—including bases and armed forces. Within these links, the most profitable and influential segments lie firmly in the hands of multinational corporations, financial institutions, equipment suppliers, shipping insurers, and military-security systems. From a strategic U.S. perspective, the greatest utility of invading Iraq was precisely to reduce it to a fragile, infrastructure-damaged, administratively weakened nation—desperate for external capital, technology, and security services. Thus, foreign contractors, oil companies, security firms, consulting firms, arms manufacturers, and logistics enterprises flooded in under the banner of 'reconstruction assistance.' The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) acknowledged that, between fiscal years 2003 and 2006, the U.S. allocated approximately $7.4 billion—and actually disbursed about $5.1 billion—for rebuilding Iraq’s oil and electricity sectors; an additional $3.8 billion drawn from Iraqi funds was also spent, primarily on contracts administered by U.S. agencies. Meanwhile, the *Financial Times* reported that the U.S. spent at least $138 billion on Iraq-war-related security, logistics, and reconstruction contracts—of which the top ten contractors collectively received at least $72 billion. KBR, a subsidiary of Halliburton, alone secured no less than $39.5 billion in federal contracts over ten years. This is America’s war economy. The U.S. military launches wars; wars destroy infrastructure; destroyed infrastructure requires reconstruction; reconstruction demands contracts; contracts require foreign contractors—but the region is insecure, so contractors need security, and security means more military presence. Thus, external capital gains contracts, markets, and strategic access. And the cost? Iraqi lives, industries, and national capacity. Beyond industry, what proved even more intolerable to Iraqis was Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order No. 17, which granted coalition personnel and foreign contractors immunity from Iraqi legal proceedings for acts committed within the scope of their official duties. This meant that an Iraqi citizen living in his own country could not hold foreign contractors or armed personnel legally accountable under Iraqi law. Moreover, CPA Order No. 27 opened the door to a 'mercenary market' in Iraq: functions normally reserved for police and military forces could be outsourced to private contractors—including licensed private security firms.

The Geopolitics of Middle Eastern Oil: A Century-Long Struggle Centered on Oil Prices (Serial Author: Chen Sir) — Parts ④, ⑤, and ⑥ (Completed)

II. The Neoconservative Agenda of Democratic Transformation Neoconservatives within the Bush administration—including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz—advanced broader strategic objectives behind the Iraq War: toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime by force, installing a pro-U.S. democratic government in Iraq, and then using Iraq as a model to drive democratic transformation across the entire Middle East. Wolfowitz openly declared that the Iraq War would serve as the starting point for a 'democratic domino effect' across the region. This vision later proved tragically naive—the postwar period plunged Iraq into years of sectarian civil war and chaos, and no such 'democratic domino effect' ever materialized. III. Oil Factor: Core Driver or Secondary Consideration? Whether oil constituted the central driving force behind the Iraq War remains fiercely contested: The 'Oil War' thesis holds that oil was the primary—or at least a core—motivation. Proponents cite the following: (1) Iraq possesses the world’s fifth-largest proven oil reserves (approximately 115 billion barrels), with potentially much larger undiscovered reserves. Controlling Iraqi oil would confer enormous strategic advantage upon the United States. (2) Key decision-makers behind the war—including Cheney, former CEO of the world’s largest oilfield services company Halliburton—maintained deep ties and vested interests in the petroleum industry. (3) After the war, U.S. companies—including Halliburton’s subsidiary KBR—secured numerous contracts to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure. (4) In a May 2003 interview, Wolfowitz stated that weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) served merely as a 'convenient pretext' for war, and that Iraq’s oil wealth made it a far more 'feasible' target than North Korea—'Iraq floats on a sea of oil.' (5) The 'National Energy Policy Development Group' (also known as the 'Cheney Energy Task Force'), established in January 2001 shortly after Cheney assumed office, kept its meeting records secret for years. Partial documents later released through litigation revealed that the group had discussed developing Iraq’s oil resources—even before the September 11 attacks. Critics of the 'Oil War' thesis counter with the following arguments: (1) If the U.S. objective had truly been to gain access to Iraqi oil, a far simpler approach would have been to lift sanctions against Iraq and permit U.S. oil companies to participate directly in its oil development—rather than launching a multi-trillion-dollar war. (2) Postwar, the U.S. did not 'plunder' Iraqi oil. In Iraq’s 2009 oil block bidding rounds, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and other non-U.S. firms won large shares of contracts, while U.S. oil companies secured comparatively modest stakes. (3) The principal motivations for the Iraq War were more likely security-related (perceived WMD threats, counterterrorism strategy) and ideologically driven (the neoconservative agenda of democratic transformation), rather than direct pursuit of oil interests. A more balanced analysis concludes that while oil was neither the sole nor the foremost motive for the Iraq War, it remained an indispensable and significant factor embedded within the broader decision-making context.

Halliburton Sees Years of Growth as Mideast Rebuilds From War

Oct 20, 2026

Halliburton forecasts multi-year growth in oil field services driven by Middle East energy infrastructure rebuilding post-war. The company reported an 8% revenue increase in the Middle East/Asia region during the third quarter, pushing shares up 6.4%.

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Halliburton Sees Years of Growth as Mideast Rebuilds From War

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