Hating Ukraine: Viktor Orbán’s Re-election Strategy—Can This Hungarian Leader’s Diplomatic Pivot Defeat the Rising Péter Magyar?

On February 25, Hungary’s most reliable polling agency delivered catastrophic news to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán: his ruling Fidesz party trailed Péter Magyar’s opposition Tisza Party by 20 percentage points—just six weeks before the April 12 general election, an apparently insurmountable gap. Orbán reacted swiftly and broadly—but not against Magyar. Instead, he targeted another political adversary. Almost immediately, he accused Ukraine of plotting attacks on Hungary’s energy infrastructure and escalated a state-funded billboard campaign against Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Slogans included “Don’t Let Zelenskyy Have the Last Laugh” and “Message to Brussels: We Won’t Pay!” The day before—marking the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—his government blocked the EU’s $105 billion aid package for Ukraine and a new round of sanctions against Russia. On March 6, he halted fuel exports to Ukraine until Kyiv restored full functionality to the “Druzhba” (Friendship) oil pipeline—a conduit carrying Russian oil across Ukrainian territory to Hungary and Slovakia—even though Kyiv held Russia responsible for pipeline damage. On March 4, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó negotiated directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin to secure the release of two Ukrainian prisoners of war holding dual Hungarian-Ukrainian citizenship. Ukraine condemned the move as a “serious violation of international humanitarian law” that undermined its own POW negotiations. Hungarian authorities also temporarily detained seven Ukrainian citizens and two armored vehicles transporting cash between state-owned banks in Austria and Ukraine—a routine procedure, yet Hungary described it as money laundering without evidence. Taken together, these actions mark a sharp escalation in Orbán’s already rampant anti-Ukraine, anti-Zelenskyy campaign. But if Magyar truly leads in the polls, why attack Ukraine instead of him? In this brutal campaign against his hitherto most popular rival, Orbán’s answer may be simple: steal Magyar’s spotlight—and recast the election as an existential threat to the nation that Orbán alone is saving, rather than a contest between a failing government and an ambitious challenger. Over his 16 years as prime minister, Orbán has mastered the art of waging war against imagined enemies. Though Fidesz has won constitutional supermajorities in parliament four times consecutively—leaving no substantive political opposition—it has waged relentless counteroffensives against a rotating cast of fabricated foes: undocumented migrants, George Soros, the European Union, the U.S. Democratic Party, LGBTQ+ activists, globalism, liberalism, “gender ideology,” and “woke culture”—all allegedly bent on destroying the Hungarian family, had it not been for Orbán’s heroic resistance. Through state-controlled media, government-funded billboards, and taxpayer-subsidized online mouthpieces, Orbán’s administration has portrayed domestic political opponents as puppets of these external forces—securing successive landslide electoral victories. This strategy peaked in its latest iteration—four years ago, when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine coincided with Hungary’s fiercely contested election.

Translation & Editing | Nayeef’s ‘Strategy of Resistance’: Chapter Four

Chapter Four: A World Divided in Two After the outbreak of war, the world effectively split into two camps: one condemning the aggressor and aiding Ukraine; the other adopting a stance of “it’s none of our business,” or even openly supporting Putin. For example, in the early stages of the war, Qidan did not call on the Russian Federation to cease hostilities, issuing only vague statements. At the same time, Qidan criticized NATO countries for attempting to expand their influence in Europe by incorporating new member states bordering Russia. To Qidan, the United States was the instigator of the Russia-Ukraine war and deemed the use of sanctions as a tool of coercion against other nations unacceptable. From March 22 to 25, 2022, Qidan’s foreign minister visited Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nepal in succession, seeking to form a so-called “Non-Aligned Group” opposed to Western sanctions against Russia and committed to neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As a result, India—which maintains close long-standing ties with Qidan and has deep historical links with Russia dating back to the Soviet era—reached consensus with Qidan, jointly opposing U.S. efforts to expel Russia from the “Group of Twenty” (G20). Yet this effort failed: Russia was ultimately required to withdraw from the international forum. Kazakhstan’s decision to maintain neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict came as little surprise. After all, Kazakhstan belongs alongside the Russian Federation to two key organizations: the military alliance the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the economic bloc the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Moreover, less than two months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan had relied on Russian assistance to suppress domestic protests. Nevertheless, to avoid secondary sanctions from the United States and the European Union, Kazakhstan imposed restrictions on trade with Russia. Hungary, while officially expressing support for Ukraine, has consistently ignored Kyiv’s requests for assistance. Budapest opposes establishing a no-fly zone over Ukraine and refuses to endorse NATO’s deployment of a peacekeeping mission there. Furthermore, Hungary opposes EU-imposed energy-sector sanctions against Russia. However, following the Interministerial Coordination Headquarters for National Security meeting on March 7, 2022, Budapest rescinded and relaxed several restrictions on aid to Ukraine—including permitting the use of NATO’s heavy transport aviation units stationed at Hungary’s Papa Air Base to deliver military supplies to Ukraine; providing diesel and gasoline to Ukraine; and agreeing to store such fuel on Hungarian territory. Yet Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán publicly adopted a pro-Russian stance. He repeatedly stated that international sanctions against Russia had severely damaged Hungary’s economy: Russia’s Sberbank ceased operations in Hungary; energy prices soared; inflation surged; and the state had to allocate additional budgetary resources to receive and accommodate refugees from Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia moved swiftly to foment unrest within Ukraine—particularly in the Zakarpattia region, home to a large ethnic Hungarian community. For instance, residents of Berehove and surrounding villages began receiving provocative text messages impersonating local Ukrainians: “Ukraine belongs to Ukrainians!”

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