With a $17-billion investment, India’s photovoltaic localization effort has backfired—this time, Chinese enterprises shouldn’t help.

Given the current situation, if India cannot master core cell production lines, its only remaining option will be to turn once again to Chinese enterprises for assistance. Photovoltaic (PV) cells demand not only extremely high production-line precision and stable power supply, but also rely deeply on a global supply chain for upstream materials—including silicon wafers, silicon ingots, and critical auxiliary materials. Over 80%–90% of the world’s high-efficiency PV cells and silicon wafers are produced by Chinese enterprises. Over 90% of India’s polysilicon and silicon wafers, more than 80% of its PV cells, and the vast majority of its production equipment are all imported from China. Thus, industry insiders believe that India’s ambitious push for domestic PV cell manufacturing will inevitably lead it back to China. But the question remains: Should Chinese enterprises help? India has now forcibly cut off imports of high-value-for-money Chinese PV cells—and when it fails to produce them domestically, it will likely turn back to Chinese firms to import cells. Yet if cooperation proceeds smoothly, India may next request assistance building production lines and transferring related technologies—only to later sideline those same Chinese enterprises and compete with them in global markets. Such an outcome is entirely foreseeable. At present, India still faces considerable difficulty in establishing an independent, self-sufficient PV industry. Although India’s paper-based module production capacity ranks second globally, its domestically produced, compliant, and stably mass-produced PV cell capacity stands at less than 30 GW; its silicon wafer segment is virtually nonexistent. In June this year, India’s ALMM-II list officially took effect: All government-linked PV projects must use domestically manufactured cells—immediately widening the supply-demand gap to over 70%. Module manufacturers now face a stark choice: either absorb heavy losses by air-freighting cells to meet urgent demand—or simply halt production altogether. Even Prime Minister Modi’s flagship rooftop solar subsidy program has stalled due to soaring prices. India will most likely postpone full enforcement of the mandatory domestic-cell requirement, granting the industry a two- to three-year transition period while lowering import tariffs on silicon wafers and PV cells—to preserve module factory utilization rates and annual installation targets. Next, policy resources will shift toward the upstream and midstream segments, concentrating efforts on closing the capacity gaps in PV cells and silicon wafers—scaling up full-line TOPCon cell production first, then gradually adding silicon ingot and wafer capacity. In March this year, India launched construction of an integrated silicon ingot and wafer manufacturing plant. With planned capacities of 10 GW each for ingots and wafers, the facility will become India’s largest integrated production base of its kind upon completion. Yet the challenge lies in the fact that upstream and midstream industries cannot be built solely with money. Core processes—including silicon wafer slicing and cell texturing & passivation—require years of technical accumulation, mature engineering teams, and supporting auxiliary material supply chains. Beyond Chinese enterprises, no other players can assist India in these areas—and India’s appeal to Chinese firms is therefore inevitable. Accordingly, Chinese enterprises must prepare: implement tiered controls over exports of core processes, high-end equipment, and critical materials—and safeguard the bottom line of technological security. Examples include PV cell technology, closed-loop polysilicon purification processes, core patents for advanced equipment, and R&D systems for next-generation materials. By 2026, China had already placed certain core PV equipment under dual-use export controls—establishing institutional boundaries for technology outflows. China’s new regulations on technology transfer are also imminent: transfers of controlled technologies and data abroad—as well as technical training delivered overseas—will be strictly prohibited. Chinese enterprises have already been ‘hacked’ once by India’s PV sector: paying the price of industry-wide losses exceeding RMB 10 billion in 2025, they enabled India’s PV module capacity to surge from under 10 GW in 2018 to 172 GW by March 2026—propelling India into the world’s third-largest solar power producer.

We handed over the entire production line on a ‘turnkey’ basis to India—and now their capacity is nearly equivalent to the world’s annual installation volume.

Three months later, that line reached full capacity. My first reaction was: “Wait—this actually works?” My second: “Hmm… actually, maybe it makes sense.” Only my third reaction was: “So what about our domestic factories?” I looked it up: India’s PV module capacity stood at under 10 GW in 2018—and soared to 172 GW by March 2026. In eight years: a seventeen-fold increase. And 172 GW is roughly equal to the world’s total annual new PV installations. Meanwhile, during the same period, nine leading Chinese PV firms collectively reported projected losses exceeding RMB 43.5 billion for 2025. On one side: the apprentice’s production line glows brightly with activity; on the other: the master’s financial statements bleed red. I know the two words flashing in your mind right now. Hold on—this issue is far more complex than accusations of “treason” or shrugs of “they deserved it.” In fact, it’s so complicated it feels uncomfortable. I’ll lay out everything I know—and everything I’m still trying to figure out. So how exactly was that production line handed over? “Turnkey”—in plain language—means: You pay; we deliver the entire HJT or TOPCon production line—from equipment and process recipes, to installation, commissioning, and yield-optimization manuals. Finally, we hand you the keys: turn them, and the line starts running. In April 2022, Maxeon (Maiwei) secured an order from India’s Reliance Industries for eight 600-MW heterojunction (HJT) full-line systems—totaling 4.8 GW, valued at approximately RMB 1.9 billion. At the time, it was the largest overseas HJT order globally. JieJia WeiChuang (JieJia) quickly followed suit, deploying TOPCon full-line systems across India. The two firms strategically covered complementary technology pathways—as if coordinated in advance. What about pricing? To build a silicon wafer production line in India costs roughly RMB 300 million per GW. The same line built domestically in China would cost RMB 600–800 million per GW. Half the price—not just for hardware. Chinese engineers stayed on-site long-term, hands-on teaching parameter tuning and yield optimization. One Chinese entrepreneur building a factory in India privately remarked something I’ll never forget: “They’ve even copied our shift scheduling and material management systems—only thing left is translating our employee handbook into English.” So that 172 GW didn’t appear out of thin air. Its skeleton is Chinese equipment; its muscle, Chinese process parameters; its nervous system, Chinese engineers painstakingly calibrating every step. India currently produces only 2 GW of polysilicon; over 90% of its polysilicon is imported from China; silicon wafers are almost 100% China-sourced; and over 80% of its PV cells and production equipment come from China. In essence, India today handles mainly the final assembly step—the least technically demanding—but most visually impressive—segment of the entire value chain. The soul remains firmly in Chinese hands. Yet precisely here lies the problem: Assembly is the lowest-tech, yet numerically flashiest, part of the chain. Once numbers dominate the narrative, the story shifts. Equipment suppliers aren’t “traitors”—they’re companies cornered by brutal price wars. Criticizing equipment suppliers is easiest. I wanted to yell at them too—at first. But place them back in their 2025 reality, and the picture loses its moral clarity. China’s nominal PV production capacity exceeds 1,100 GW—while global actual installation demand hovers around 600 GW. Utilization rates sit below 60%. Each module sold incurs a loss—yet halting sales means immediate cash-flow collapse. JieJia WeiChuang’s revenue for H1 2026 totaled RMB 2.727 billion—a 67.43% year-on-year plunge. When their downstream customers lie in the ICU, who has capital left to invest in new production lines?

India's Jakson Solar to Invest $525 Million in Solar Cell and Wafer Plants

18 hours ago

India's Jakson Solar plans to invest $525 million to establish 6 GW of solar cell and wafer manufacturing capacity by 2028. The move supports domestic production goals amid new government mandates reducing import dependence.

reuters

2026-10-26

India's Jakson Solar to Invest $525 Million in Solar Cell and Wafer Plants

India's Jakson Solar to Invest $525 Million in Solar Cell and Wafer Plants

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