How should we view Suzuki's former chairman Osamu Suzuki, who famously declared he would 'rather die than bow to the Chinese market'?

Osamu Suzuki was not an engineer by training, yet he excelled as an operations master. His core management philosophy at the time centered on one word: 'saving.' For instance, to save money on yellow paint, he replaced all floor markings in the factory with white ones. It was precisely this extreme cost-control discipline that propelled Suzuki—originally a modest company with annual revenue of just ¥300 billion—to a towering ¥3 trillion in annual revenue. Yet Suzuki was also notoriously stubborn. He firmly believed small cars were the future—and refused to change course under any circumstances. Changan Suzuki’s staff in China had long understood the local market well; repeatedly, they urged Suzuki to launch larger vehicles to ride the SUV wave. But the old man stood resolutely unmoved. This disastrous decision ultimately led Suzuki’s gradual fall from grace in China—inevitable and irreversible. In 2017, Suzuki sold only 100,000 vehicles in China—its market share virtually negligible. By the first half of 2018, its situation had grown even more dire: just 24,900 units sold. Recall that China’s total auto sales that year reached 24 million units—Suzuki barely even touched the edges of that market. At this deeply awkward juncture, Osamu Suzuki made a pivotal decision: complete divestment. In June 2018, Suzuki severed ties with Jiangxi Changhe; in September, it symbolically sold its 50% stake in Changan Suzuki to Changan Automobile at a steep discount—marking Suzuki’s full exit from the Chinese market. At the time, many viewed this withdrawal as childish petulance—but in reality, it was a strategic retreat. Suzuki shifted its entire development strategy from China to India. After exiting China, Suzuki immediately rose to become India’s undisputed market leader. From FY2023–2024, Maruti Suzuki sold 2.135 million vehicles in India, generating revenue of ₹1.35 trillion (approx. RMB 11.5 billion), up nearly 20% year-on-year. The Suzuki Group boldly pledged to reach 5 million annual sales by 2030. India’s massive demographic dividend—combined with consumers’ strong preference for compact, economical vehicles—perfectly aligns with Suzuki’s core DNA: fuel efficiency, affordability, and functional simplicity. It is, quite literally, a match made in heaven. In 2019, Toyota acquired a 5% stake in Suzuki, initiating a strategic partnership focused on electrification and autonomous driving. As the 'small-car expert,' Suzuki precisely complements Toyota’s gaps in India and certain low-end markets. Maruti Suzuki has announced it will begin supplying fully built electric vehicles to Toyota starting in 2025—a move reflecting not just capital collaboration, but a new survival path rooted in strategic alliance. Although Suzuki still lags behind European and American automakers in technological prowess, through such strategic partnerships, it has carved out a viable path forward in the electric-vehicle era.

With BYD selling 400,000 vehicles monthly while Suzuki sells 190,000 in India—and BYD manages only 686 units there—how does India justify its stance: 'No technology transfer? Then no market access'?

By Wang Xinxǐ A recent set of figures is striking: In June 2026, BYD sold 403,000 vehicles globally—while India’s entire auto market hit a record high in May 2026, selling just 440,000 units. BYD’s single-month global volume nearly matches India’s entire monthly market. Yet in India itself, BYD sold only 686 units in May—capturing a mere 0.2% market share, even trailing Vietnam’s VinFast. On one side: global dominance; on the other: near-total stagnation in India. Meanwhile, India’s market leader, Maruti Suzuki, sold 193,000 units in May—commanding a 43% market share, effectively occupying the 'Iron Throne.' Back in the 1980s, Suzuki formed a joint venture with the Indian government to establish Maruti Suzuki—where the Indian government held 74% equity and Suzuki just 26%. Upon entry, Suzuki transplanted Japan’s compact-car production line wholesale into India. With majority Indian ownership from day one, it adopted a thoroughly localized strategy. What does 'thorough localization' mean? Not merely assembling vehicles locally—but manufacturing core components—including engines, transmissions, and chassis—as well as stampings, interiors, plastic parts, and engine subcomponents, almost entirely within India. Local parts sourcing exceeds 95%. By avoiding imported parts, Suzuki sidestepped steep import tariffs, driving component costs down to the absolute minimum. Its factories are in India, its suppliers are Indian, 99% of its employees are Indian, and its models are developed exclusively for the Indian market—featuring narrow bodies, high ground clearance, exceptional fuel economy, and rugged durability—all tailored precisely to India’s road conditions and income levels. In India, Suzuki is no longer perceived as a Japanese brand—it is widely regarded as India’s own national carmaker. Suzuki’s bestsellers—the Alto and Swift—compact hatchbacks priced between RMB 30,000–60,000, equipped with ultra-efficient 1.2L engines—are perfectly suited to meet the commuting needs of India’s burgeoning middle class. Suzuki’s success is inseparable from India’s protective policies: high tariffs keep imported vehicles out, while foreign automakers seeking market access must form joint ventures and localize production. Suzuki essentially 'Indianized' its entire corporate structure—and transferred its technology to India—to earn its place. Today, it is functionally an Indian automaker. Among India’s top three automakers—Suzuki, Tata, and Mahindra—they collectively command nearly 70% of the market. For outsiders, breaking in is next to impossible. So why can’t BYD gain traction in India? BYD did attempt localization: in 2023, it planned a $1-billion investment to build an Indian plant with 100,000-unit annual capacity, using CKD (completely knocked-down) assembly to bypass import tariffs of 70%–110%, thereby significantly lowering vehicle prices. But the Indian government imposed two non-negotiable conditions—effectively blocking the path. First: foreign equity participation cannot exceed 49%. That is, BYD must form a joint venture with an Indian company—and control must rest with Indian partners. Second—and far more stringent—it demanded BYD license its core 'three-electric' technologies—blade batteries, motors, and electronic control systems—along with full patent blueprints—to Indian component manufacturers, enabling them to produce these critical parts domestically. In essence: hand over your most vital competitive assets. Negotiations collapsed. The plant project was shelved. Without local production, BYD could only rely on importing fully built vehicles. India’s maximum import tariff stands at 110%: a ¥200,000 vehicle incurs ¥200,000 in duties alone. BYD’s vehicles already carry relatively high price tags in India; add steep tariffs, and their value proposition vanishes entirely.

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India's Maruti Suzuki adopts fuel-saving measures

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