Global SMR Commercialization Review: Projects Are Sprouting Everywhere, but Fuel Supply, Regulation, and Back-End Management Remain Major Obstacles

It has entered the second phase of the UK’s Generic Design Assessment (GDA), secured £210 million in funding from the UK government, and is advancing jointly with private capital—aiming to deploy its first unit before 2030. Design-stage planning already includes provisions for decommissioning funding and decommissioning strategies. However, a key weakness remains: the UK still lacks an operational geological disposal facility (GDF) for high-level radioactive waste (HLW), leaving the ultimate disposition path for HLW unresolved. France｜EDF Nuward Regulatory standards across European countries are not harmonized, creating barriers to cross-border SMR deployment. France’s Nuward project must adapt its design accordingly, exposing its timeline to delay risks; protracted approval processes will further inflate project costs. A common practical challenge: many countries lack national-level radioactive waste disposal infrastructure. While reactor equipment is supplied by vendors, responsibility for waste management and site decommissioning falls primarily on plant owners and local governments—leading to the awkward reality where ‘designs look complete on paper, but real-world implementation conditions fall short.’ Five Core Real-World Contradictions Causing SMR Project Delays and Cancellations Drawing on OECD-NEA reports and publicly available regulatory documents, overseas SMR setbacks stem from multiple overlapping factors—not merely technical shortcomings in reactor design. 1. First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) Cost Paradox SMRs’ touted cost advantages assume mass production in factory settings. Yet early industry demand remains sparse; each demonstration unit is effectively a FOAK project. Compounded by inflation, rising interest rates, and nuclear-sector talent shortages, equipment and civil construction costs continue swelling—making promised cost benefits difficult to realize. 2. Advanced Fuel Supply Chain Is a Hard Constraint Nearly half of Generation IV SMRs (e.g., sodium-cooled fast reactors, certain high-temperature gas-cooled reactors) require HALEU (high-assay low-enriched uranium) fuel. Historically, HALEU was used mainly in research reactors; commercial-scale production capacity remains scarce and geopolitically constrained. Domestic U.S. and EU HALEU enrichment, conversion, and TRISO fuel fabrication lines are still ramping up. Centrus Energy’s expansion plan, for instance, isn’t expected to achieve batch supply until after 2032. This leads to a stark reality: reactor designs may boast impressive paper specifications—but without reliable fuel supply, demonstration operations cannot sustainably proceed. 3. Existing Regulatory Frameworks Are Not Fully Suited to SMRs Current nuclear regulations were largely tailored for large-scale power plants. For modular, clustered, and partially mobile SMRs, there is limited established practice in safety assessment, emergency planning, and siting approvals. Divergent national regulatory requirements hinder international deployment; excessively long licensing timelines further amplify financial pressure on projects. 4. Nuclear Industrial Supply Chain ‘Hollowing Out’ SMRs rely heavily on factory-fabricated components shipped for on-site assembly. Yet Western nuclear industries have suffered prolonged stagnation, resulting in shortages of nuclear-grade skilled labor and large-scale specialty forging capacity. A single critical component delivery delay can stall the entire assembly line—causing costs to snowball continuously. 5. Radioactive Waste and Decommissioning Are Often Underestimated A widespread misconception holds that smaller SMR unit output automatically translates into proportionally lower waste volumes and risk. Regulators have repeatedly cautioned: although individual-unit thermal output is lower, multi-module cluster deployments still generate substantial total plant-wide waste volumes; dismantling and decontamination of pressure vessels and internal reactor components remain as technically demanding as for conventional large reactors.

Tell us about natural uranium

Globally licensed uranium conversion capacity stands at approximately 62,000 tonnes per year, while actual conversion output totals only about 42,000 tonnes—with over half originating from Russia and China. Russia’s conversion capacity is integrated within Rosatom’s vertically aligned nuclear fuel cycle, supplying both domestic enrichment facilities and long-term overseas customers (e.g., India, Turkey). China’s uranium conversion capacity expansion is closely tied to its national nuclear power development plans; recent commissioning of new nuclear units has steadily driven up conversion output. According to INTs-Empire, surging global nuclear construction activity will sustain rising demand for enriched uranium—and thus for uranium conversion—pushing the market from current oversupply toward a tighter supply-demand balance. Natural uranium contains only 0.7% uranium-235 (²³⁵U), requiring enrichment to raise its concentration. Nuclear power reactor fuel typically requires 3–5% ²³⁵U; research reactor fuel demands ~10%; naval propulsion and nuclear weapons require ≥90%. Uranium enrichment is fundamentally the physical separation of uranium isotopes—reducing ²³⁸U content while increasing ²³⁵U concentration. Feedstock for enrichment includes: natural uranium (0.7% assay, primary source), recycled uranium (RepU, ~1% assay, minor share), and depleted uranium tails (0.25–0.30% assay, used as supplementary feed). Producing one tonne of 3% enriched uranium requires roughly 5.5 tonnes of natural uranium feed. Uranium enrichment is both strategically sensitive and capital-intensive, subject to stringent IAEA safeguards against nuclear proliferation—creating significant entry barriers for new suppliers. Global enrichment capacity is dominated by just four producers: Orano (France), Rosatom (Russia), Urenco (UK/Germany/Netherlands), and CNNC (China). Facilities are located across France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, the U.S., Russia, and China; only limited capacity exists elsewhere (e.g., Brazil, Japan). In May 2024, the U.S. enacted the ‘Ban on Russian Uranium Imports Act’, prohibiting imports of Russian-produced low-enriched uranium (LEU) through 2040. Against this backdrop, Western nuclear operators are accelerating fuel supply diversification—sparking intensified global competition for enrichment market share. High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) lies between LEU and HEU in enrichment level—defined as uranium enriched to 5–20% ²³⁵U—and is increasingly becoming the preferred fuel for advanced reactor designs. Per IAEA classification, uranium is categorized by enrichment level as: slightly enriched uranium (SEU, 0.9–2%), low-enriched uranium (LEU, 2–20%), and highly enriched uranium (HEU, >20%). Within HEU, uranium enriched to >85% ²³⁵U is termed ‘weapons-grade’—capable of direct use in nuclear weapons. Today’s Generation III reactors operate on 3–5% enriched fuel. As small modular reactors (SMRs)—roughly three-quarters of which under development require 10–20% enrichment—and Generation IV advanced reactors advance, demand for higher enrichment levels is growing steadily. Compared to conventional LEU, HALEU offers distinct advantages, including higher burnup depth and greater energy extraction per unit mass of fuel.

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ASP Isotopes Inc subsidiary Quantum Leap Energy and South African state-owned Necsa formed a joint venture to produce high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) at Pelindaba, securing an off-take agreement with TerraPower.

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