The French government was toppled by parliament—the first such occurrence in 62 years; the prime minister will submit his resignation after only three months in office. How should we understand France’s current governance crisis?

Since taking office, the Barnier government—a minority administration—has consistently faced simultaneous pressure from both the left-wing alliance and the far right. Given that figures across the ruling camp competed to oppose forming a coalition government with the left-wing alliance—especially the far-left La France Insoumise (LFI)—this stance of ‘guarding against the right, but primarily guarding against the left’ forced the new government to pivot toward the National Rally (Rassemblement National) in order to secure governmental stability. The Barnier government’s weak posture deepened further as budget bill negotiations moved onto the agenda. Due to President Macron’s repeated delays in appointing a new prime minister mid-year, budget negotiations had already fallen severely behind schedule. Upon assuming office, Barnier discovered that Bruno Le Maire—the outgoing finance minister and a favorite of Macron’s camp—had mismanaged public finances, causing the deficit to surge dramatically. Barnier thus hastily unveiled a plan for steep cuts to public spending, igniting fierce controversy across all political parties. A particularly contentious provision targeted local governments, proposing to withdraw €5 billion from regional and municipal budgets—sparking internal disputes even within Macron’s own party and Les Républicains, while local officials jointly voiced strong protests. During parliamentary deliberation of the budget bill, the Barnier government—lacking a majority in the National Assembly (the lower house)—could only watch helplessly as opposition parties—especially the left-wing alliance, which held the largest number of seats—amended the bill beyond recognition. Ultimately, the government and the National Rally jointly voted against the bill in the National Assembly, forcing budget negotiations into the more cooperative Joint Committee of both chambers for revision. In these budget negotiations, the National Rally’s position played a decisive role. For Marine Le Pen and her party, if they had initially adopted an attitude of ‘listening to words, observing actions’—viewing Barnier’s moves with skepticism upon his appointment—by year-end this fleeting trust, born of novelty, had entirely evaporated. In November, Le Pen faced trial over allegations of misappropriating EU parliamentary funds during her tenure in the European Parliament. The prosecution even requested a five-year ban on holding public office—effectively barring her from the 2027 presidential election. Meanwhile, reports emerged from within the Barnier government indicating it had begun commissioning opinion polls and strategizing how to use the budget bill to compete with Le Pen for voters’ core support. The terrifying prospect of being excluded from the power game—and Barnier’s poaching tactics—enraged Le Pen. The day after the prosecution disclosed its request for a five-year electoral ban, she began repeatedly attacking the Barnier government, issuing ever more specific demands and drawing hard red lines. She exploited Barnier’s objective dependence on the National Rally’s votes during the critical budget vote, first denouncing the government’s proposal to reduce reimbursement for prescription drugs under national health insurance, then proposing electricity price hikes that would burden households—and continuously amplifying these issues in the media. This marked the beginning of her open distancing from both Macron’s ruling camp and Barnier. Finally, on December 1—the day before the crucial budget vote—Le Pen suddenly raised the issue of pension indexation, demanding the government scrap the budget provision decoupling pensions from inflation indexing. When Barnier refused, negotiations collapsed, and Le Pen publicly announced her support for the motion of no confidence.

Le Pen leads her nearest rival by eighteen percentage points—but France must first clear the budget hurdle.

To grasp just how difficult this goal is, the most direct evidence is Prime Minister Édouard Philippe’s (note: corrected to Édouard Philippe in original context, though text says 'Le Cornu'—likely referring to Finance Minister Éric Lombard or another official; however, per source, it is actually Bruno Le Maire’s successor, but here rendered as 'Le Cornu'—we retain 'Le Cornu' as proper noun per original) early-June budget guidance letter addressed to all ministers. The letter was first disclosed by Les Échos and obtained in copy by Public Sénat television. Beneath the header ‘Très signalé’ (‘Urgent’), a horizontal line is drawn; the body contains handwritten annotations in blue ink by the Prime Minister. The letter states that preliminary consultations between ministries and Public Accounts Minister David Amiel yielded ‘€30 billion in funding requests, of which €24 billion is earmarked for launching new expenditure programs.’ These requests ‘would create over 23,000 new civil service positions next year alone, and approximately 40,000 more between 2027 and 2029.’ The Prime Minister added two exclamation marks in the margin. Next comes the widely quoted critique: ‘These budget requests clearly lack prioritization. And if everything is a priority, then nothing is.’ The letter concludes—again in blue ink—‘This concerns every single minister—“every single” underlined twice—whose political responsibility is at stake. We must be serious. I implore you.’ On one side stand the ministries’ €30 billion in new funding requests; on the other lies the need to identify €30–50 billion in savings for this budget. Combined, the gap the 2027 budget must bridge amounts to €60–80 billion. The choice to avoid new taxes is more justified than it appears. The government has ruled out introducing new taxes, focusing all efforts on expenditure-side adjustments. Though this decision—made six months before the presidential election—has drawn considerable criticism, it rests on several defensible grounds. France’s general government expenditure stood at 57.2% of GDP in 2025, ranking second among EU member states—just below Finland’s 57.7%—and well above the EU-27 average of 49.5%. On the revenue side, it stands at 52.1%, likewise among the highest in the EU (average: 46.4%). In a country whose expenditure-to-GDP ratio exceeds the EU average by nearly eight percentage points, identifying the source of the deficit requires little guesswork. A further, institutional factor also applies. France’s budgets over the past two years have frequently relied on Article 49.3 of the Constitution—or on opposition parties’ restraint in filing motions of no confidence. Tax measures passed via such means can easily be overturned by the next government with a single amendment; conversely, expenditure cuts once embedded in staffing levels, contracts, and subsidy lists are far costlier to reverse—requiring time-consuming rehiring, renegotiation, and legislative action. Whether the Élysée Palace welcomes a new occupant in May 2027 depends on which legacy—taxes or spending cuts—the budget submitted on September 30 emphasizes. In an election year, deliberately embedding changes in the harder-to-reverse category is a defensible strategic priority—and marks the key distinction between this budget and the previous two. Reactions from the Senate have not been uniformly negative. Emmanuel Capus, Senator for Horizons, stated he agreed with the message: ‘We’re out of money—we cannot allow public spending to leak away.’

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