New Libya: Tribes and Warlords

The result was a crushing defeat for Haftar. His forces retreated all the way to the outskirts of Sirte before finally stabilizing their front—with air support from French and UAE aircraft. This was the news summary at the time: On June 29, 2020, Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) forces and Turkish mercenaries east of Sirte were bombed by MiG-29 and Su-24 fighter jets deployed by the Libyan National Army (LNA). Dozens were killed in the bombing, and 50 combat vehicles were destroyed. On July 8, 2020, armed groups affiliated with the GNA advanced toward Sirte. Prior to this, both sides had been locked in a stalemate across the region between Misrata and Sirte. On June 6, the GNA had launched a three-pronged advance on Sirte—but suffered heavy losses under LNA air strikes due to the absence of accompanying air-defense systems. It is reported that at least 14 MiG-29s and Su-24s, along with UAE drones, were deployed at Jufra Air Base. Since then, the frontline has largely stabilized. The Death of a Mediator: Balancing Acts and Fatal Gambits In 2025, amid new developments in Israel, Syria, and Yemen, Libya also witnessed some intriguing shifts. On December 24, 2025, a loud explosion over Tripoli International Airport thrust Libya back into the center of international attention: a military helicopter carrying Libyan Army Chief of Staff Muhammad Haddad crashed three minutes after takeoff, killing all 11 people on board. Dubbed by Western media as “Libya’s Architect of Peace,” this four-star general had overseen eight ceasefire agreements over the past five years—including the landmark 2020 Geneva Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. This perilous balancing act defined Haddad’s entire five-year mediation career. A native of the western Zawiya tribe who graduated from an eastern military academy, he deeply understood Libya’s rules of survival: during the third round of ceasefire negotiations in Tripoli in 2022, he deliberately chose Misrata Port—the stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood—as the signing venue; during the 2024 Sharara oilfield crisis, he simultaneously invited energy experts from Egypt and Turkey to jointly verify production levels. In his statement following the crash, UN Secretary-General António Guterres remarked: “Haddad forged a ‘Libyan Way’ of mediation—wrapping a general’s medals in the robes of tribal elders.” Yet this model ultimately proved unsustainable. The “Tripoli Agreement,” published in November 2025, exposed a fatal flaw: it permitted Turkey to maintain a military base in Misrata until 2027, in exchange for Ankara’s pledge to persuade its allied militias to withdraw from the Sirte oilfields. However, immediately after the agreement was signed, Haftar’s LNA declared it would “take all necessary measures to defend national sovereignty,” while western militias continued controlling the pipeline leading to the Sharara oilfield. In an encrypted email sent to the UN Special Envoy just 48 hours before the crash, Haddad wrote: “All parties are using the peace process to prepare for war—I am like a tightrope walker, with boiling oil beneath my feet.” One day before he fell into that oil, Pakistan delivered to Haftar’s LNA 16 JF-17 Block 3 fighter jets, 44 “Al-Khalid” main battle tanks (a Pakistani-assembled version of China’s VT-4), 12 “Super Mushshak” trainer aircraft, and mortar systems—valued at approximately $4.6 billion, though the actual transaction price may have been $2–3 billion, inclusive of long-term training and maintenance.

Crude Oil on the Edge: SC’s Extreme Pricing Is Being Corrected

I. Core Conclusion SC crude oil has shifted from one-sided sharp gains into a phase of volatile pullback from elevated levels. Short-term bias is bearish; medium-term outlook remains wide-range sideways oscillation. Core judgment: This decline does not signal a fundamental bear market, but rather reflects simultaneous realization of geopolitical risk premiums and negative demand feedback. The basis for SC’s squeeze has been substantially weakened, and the prior pattern of “strong domestic, weak external” prices is reversing. Long positions should await full exhaustion of geopolitical headwinds; short positions face limited further downside. II. Bullish and Bearish Rationales (A) Bearish Rationales (Currently Dominant): 1. Geopolitical Premium Reversal: Iran proposed reopening the Strait of Hormuz “within seven days of lifting the blockade”; U.S.–Iran foreign minister-level talks are progressing; Trump stated “oil prices will fall below pre-conflict levels.” Saudi Arabia has restarted its East–West Pipeline and resumed exports from Yanbu port—removing the pricing foundation for supply disruption expectations. 2. Demand Negative Feedback: China’s August crude oil apparent demand fell 16.62% year-on-year; cumulative January–August demand declined 9.83% YoY. High landed costs are eroding refinery margins, placing independent refiners at risk of load reduction or shutdown in October. 3. Unexpected Inventory Build: API crude inventories rose by 1.786 million barrels (vs. expected drawdown of 563,000 barrels)—contrary to widespread market expectations of a draw. (B) Bullish Rationales (Medium-Term Support Remains): 1. Globally Low Absolute Inventories: Global land-and-sea crude inventories sit at the lowest level in five years; for the week ending September 20, inventories fell by 42.56 million barrels week-on-week; U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) has dropped to its lowest level since 1982. 2. Actual Supply Contraction: Saudi Arabia’s August exports fell to ~3 million barrels per day—the lowest since 2017; closure of the Sharara–Zawiya pipeline in Libya cuts ~130,000 bpd. 3. Diesel crack spread hits record highs, highlighting acute imbalances at the refined-products level—supporting refineries’ crude procurement appetite. III. Outlook Short Term: Bearish oscillation, with persistently high volatility. Geopolitical headlines remain highly volatile (Iranian official sources and Iranian media have already denied parts of the Strait reopening reports; U.S.–Iran talks reportedly “failed to reach agreement on contentious issues”). SC remains extremely sensitive to headline news.

Libya reopens Sharara-Zawiya pipeline after closure

Sep 26, 2026

Libya's National Oil Corporation resumed crude flows through the Sharara-Zawiya pipeline after a five-day shutdown caused by security disputes. The disruption resulted in approximately 942,000 barrels of lost production valued at $95 million.

reuters

2026-09-21

Armed group shuts valve on Libya's Sharara crude pipeline, cuts output, NOC says

2026-09-26

Libya reopens Sharara-Zawiya pipeline after closure

Libya reopens Sharara-Zawiya pipeline after closure

FAQ