New Libya | Tribes and Warlords

【Answer 1】 Fawzi al-Mansouri, Major General and head of military intelligence for the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar, was assassinated in an attack; the western Zawiya refinery and its associated energy infrastructure suffered repeated drone strikes; and Libya’s Central Bank Governor Najy Issa resigned on the same day. These three incidents—occurring within a 72-hour window—directly undermined the U.S.-backed initiative to unify Libya’s eastern and western institutions. East: Setback to Benghazi’s Military Intelligence Apparatus On the night of August 10, al-Mansouri was killed when an explosive device—pre-planted beneath his vehicle or a nearby car—detonated as he prepared to board his car outside his residence in the Hawari/Sayida Aisha district of Benghazi. His funeral was held on August 11. Khalid Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar, announced that an investigation had been launched and characterized the incident as terrorism—but as of mid-August, no perpetrator had been publicly identified. Al-Mansouri was no ordinary local officer: since May 2024, he had headed the LNA General Command’s Military Intelligence Directorate; previously, he served as commander of the Sebha Military Region and participated in the LNA’s 2019–2020 offensive against Tripoli. He maintained long-standing involvement in eastern security coordination, border control, and engagements with external security delegations—including those from Russia, Chad, and Niger—and was widely regarded as a core member of the Haftar family’s security inner circle. Analysts contend that the symbolic impact of his assassination outweighs the loss of a single official: Benghazi, consolidated under LNA control since 2017, has long been viewed as a relatively stable city in eastern Libya; the fact that a senior intelligence chief could be eliminated via a pre-placed explosive in a residential neighborhood exposes critical vulnerabilities in VIP protection protocols, vehicle inspection procedures, and urban surveillance systems. West: Repeated Attacks on the Zawiya Refinery Located approximately 40 kilometers west of Tripoli, the Zawiya Refinery was commissioned in 1974. With two processing units, its combined daily refining capacity stands at roughly 120,000 barrels—making it one of Libya’s largest and most operationally vital refineries still in service today, and a key fuel supply hub for the capital region and western Libya. Beginning in the early hours of August 8, the complex sustained successive drone strikes targeting its naphtha storage tanks, seawater desalination facility, and gasoline storage tanks. On the night of August 10, a gasoline tank holding approximately 4.5 million liters was struck, igniting a fire that led to its complete collapse. On August 11, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) issued a statement warning that continued attacks could trigger invocation of the “force majeure” clause, leading to a full shutdown of the Zawiya Refinery. By August 12, the North Zawiya substation had also been affected, temporarily taking about 700 megawatts of installed capacity offline across western Libya’s power grid. As of mid-August, no group had claimed responsibility for the Zawiya attacks. Some media reports, citing RFI, speculated that Ukrainian-supplied fiber-optic-guided FPV drones may have been used—and that internal tensions among western militias aligned with the Dbeibah administration could have played a role. Short-Term Impacts on the U.S. Unification Plan and Libya’s Broader Political Landscape In April 2026, Libya’s House of Representatives and the High State Council approved the first unified national budget since 2013; on June 21, the NOC reported national crude oil production at 1.439 million barrels per day (bpd), rising to approximately 1.488 million bpd when including condensate—the highest level since 2013; and on July 1, U.S. advisor Masad Bullo met with officials from the Central Bank, the Audit Bureau, and the NOC to advance budget implementation and accelerate oil output expansion toward the 2027 target of 1.5 million bpd.

Libya’s Post-War Reconstruction: Navigating Hidden Shoals in the Gulf of Sidra — A Comprehensive Analysis of the Political, Economic, Legal, and Investment Opportunities and Risks in Libya’s New Oil and Gas Block Tender

【Answer 2】 (I) Core Risk Analysis 1. Political and Legal Risks: Dual Contestation Amid a Fragmented Landscape The crux of political and legal risk lies in Libya’s absence of a unified central authority. The enduring east-west divide subjects investment activities to persistent uncertainties—including dual regulatory standards and unpredictable rule changes. Regarding block control, 17 of the 22 blocks offered in this tender are concentrated in the Cyrenaica-Sirt Basin. This region—including critical export terminals such as Brega, Ras Lanuf, and Sidra—falls squarely under the de facto control of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Consequently, international investors’ exploration and development activities—from block access and licensing approvals to day-to-day operational security—depend heavily on LNA cooperation and support. Project success thus hinges critically on the stability of this partnership; any shift in factional alignment could bring operations to a standstill. Governance-related uncertainty is even more acute. Libya currently hosts two parallel governing authorities—one in the east, one in the west—forcing investors to negotiate and coordinate separately under distinct political frameworks. This not only inflates communication costs but also exposes them to the risk of “rule invalidation”: should leadership change, existing contracts may be re-examined—or even nullified—while the threat of asset expropriation remains ever-present. More critically, the lack of a unified government means commercial dispute resolution mechanisms remain underdeveloped. In the event of contractual disputes, investors may face a “no recourse” legal environment—where grievance redress is protracted, opaque, and outcome-unpredictable. Political pressure risks frequently manifest through petroleum facility blockades. Local groups have long treated oilfield and port closures as routine tools for voicing demands—often tied to wage payments or resource allocation—and these actions are routinely backed by political actors. In April 2022, protesters blockaded multiple facilities across the LNA-controlled Oil Crescent and Fezzan regions, prompting the NOC to declare force majeure. The immediate trigger? A power-transfer dispute between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and factions aligned with the LNA. This “political conflict → facility blockade → production disruption” transmission chain remains highly susceptible to recurrence—whether triggered by leadership transitions, revenue-sharing disagreements, or other flashpoints—posing sudden, severe shocks to investment projects. 2. Security Risks: Militia Fragmentation and Sectoral Vulnerability Security conditions constitute one of the foremost concerns deterring international capital from entering Libya. The entrenched fragmentation among hundreds of militia groups—and the persistent recurrence of localized armed clashes—leave the oil sector perpetually suspended in a “fragile equilibrium.” Across Libya, hundreds of active militias operate autonomously, pursuing overlapping yet often conflicting interests. Internal rivalries and tensions never subside—a reality the Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, has described as “states within a state.” Although security in Tripoli and surrounding areas improved briefly around the time the tender process was announced in March 2025, conditions deteriorated markedly again starting in May. Any attempt to weaken or consolidate these militias risks provoking fierce resistance—or even large-scale violent confrontation. Should such conflict erupt, oil infrastructure scattered nationwide would be the first and most vulnerable targets—directly threatening personnel safety and operational continuity. The oil sector’s inherent security vulnerability is equally stark. On May 28, 2025, unidentified gunmen stormed the NOC headquarters in Tripoli, threatening staff over “contractual grievances.” This incident not only exposed the GNU’s limited capacity to protect central petroleum institutions—but also signaled to international investors the heightened risk of the oil industry itself becoming a deliberate target.

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Libya's National Oil Corporation warned it may declare force majeure after security forces halted operations at key oilfields. The shutdown threatens the nation's economy, relying on oil for 90% of revenue, amidst rising global crude prices.

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Libya's NOC May Declare Force Majeure After Protests Hit Oil Facilities

Libya's NOC May Declare Force Majeure After Protests Hit Oil Facilities

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