Venezuela has given China a statement.

Venezuela has handed over 17 core oilfields to U.S.-led development—oilfields holding over 65 billion barrels of proven reserves. Though the oilfields remain physically located in Venezuela, the division of newly generated oil revenue, the destination of oil-sale proceeds, and authority over fund disbursement have become the most sensitive points of tripartite博弈 among China, the United States, and Venezuela. What truly concerns China is not whether Venezuela’s declaration that “cooperation continues” sounds reassuring—but whether those words can translate into stable debt repayments. After all, Venezuela still owes China approximately $10–15 billion, most of it accumulated through past “oil-for-loans” arrangements. The turning point came on August 28. Trump announced on social media that major progress had been achieved in U.S.–Venezuelan energy cooperation. On September 2, U.S. Energy Secretary Wright traveled to Caracas and signed an agreement with Venezuelan Acting President Rodríguez; under the deal, the U.S.-based North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP) formally entered Venezuela’s core oilfields. This is no ordinary investment project. NABEP has been assigned full control—from investment and construction, through operations, sales, and revenue distribution—effectively managing the entire value chain. U.S. officials cited a potential cooperation term of up to 100 years, whereas Venezuela publicly stated only 25 years; this discrepancy in duration itself reveals each side’s unspoken calculations. The larger controversy lies in revenue arrangements. According to the benchmark plan disclosed by Venezuela, each barrel of oil is priced at $65, with the government receiving $19 per barrel; the remainder funds infrastructure investment, daily operations, and NABEP’s purchase of 20% of output at cost price. By this calculation, Venezuela could earn roughly $209 billion over the entire cooperation period. The figure appears substantial—but the critical questions are: Where does the money originate? And whose account receives it first? Export rights, settlement rights, and financial accounts for newly produced oil are all U.S.-controlled; the vast majority of new output value will flow first through U.S.-dominated trade and financial channels. Although Venezuela nominally retains ownership of the oilfields, how much income it can actually deploy freely depends entirely on contract implementation and disbursements from U.S.-controlled accounts. U.S. Energy Secretary Wright’s remarks laid the conflict bare: Venezuela’s newly generated oil revenues are not subject to Chinese debt claims. This statement did not publicly declare Venezuela “in default,” yet it effectively drew a line in advance—revenue from newly developed oilfields need not be prioritized for repaying Chinese debt. Older oilfields may continue producing, and legacy contracts may persist—but their output will decline; once new fields come online, their most valuable cash flows will be severed from any linkage to Chinese creditor rights. What makes this approach especially painful is not outright “default,” but rather formal acknowledgment of debt alongside the practical diversion of its most lucrative cash flows onto an entirely separate track. Over time, as older fields’ production declines, Venezuela’s freely disposable repayment capacity will dwindle further. Venezuela has not fully aligned itself with the United States.

Reuters: The U.S. will take over operations of five Venezuelan oilfields previously run by Chinese enterprises.

Focusing on the global deployment of Chinese enterprises, this report provides authoritative, cutting-edge, and trustworthy research insights on internationalization and high-tech sectors. On September 1, 2026, Reuters reported that, at the end of August 2026, the United States and Venezuela reached a large-scale oil production agreement. Under the deal, the U.S.-backed firm NABEP secured 14 new Venezuelan oil and gas contracts—including five oilfields previously operated by Chinese enterprises, plus one oilfield formerly operated by a Russian company. The original report was published in English. This translation, prepared by the China Enterprise Overseas Expansion Research team, summarizes key content for reference and study purposes only; it does not reflect the translator’s personal views. This article totals approximately 1,470 characters. — ༄ — ▍01 Content of the Proposed U.S.–Venezuela Oil Agreement On August 28, 2026, Trump announced on social media that the United States and Venezuela had reached an oil agreement whereby the U.S. would gain “majority control” over more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s proven oil reserves—and secure a 100-year concession. U.S. Secretary of State Rubio stated the project would lower domestic gasoline prices in the United States. On the same day, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez confirmed the agreement via social media, stating that the United States would develop 17 strategic oilfields, with the agreement lasting at least 25 years, attracting $100 billion in private investment and generating over $209 billion in tax revenue for the Venezuelan government—thereby spurring economic recovery. Venezuela welcomed the agreement. [Translator’s note: No finalized version has been released; Venezuela’s claim of “at least 25 years” remains inconsistent with the U.S. side’s assertion of a “100-year concession.”] On August 29, Reuters reported that both sides planned to formally sign the agreement the following week. Negotiations had taken place over several weeks behind closed doors, without public tendering procedures, and the full contract text remains undisclosed. On August 31, Reuters issued an updated report citing two U.S. officials who confirmed that oilfields previously operated by Chinese and Russian companies would be taken over. Under the agreement, NABEP secured development rights to 17 Venezuelan oil and gas projects—14 newly awarded contracts and three extensions of existing projects. These projects span Venezuela’s two core petroleum-producing regions: the Orinoco Belt and Lake Maracaibo. Of the 14 newly awarded contracts, five oilfields had previously been operated by Chinese companies, while one had been operated by a Russian company. (Original quote: “Five of the 14 fields have been operated by Chinese companies.”) The five Chinese-operated oilfields slated for takeover belong to multiple Chinese energy firms. Two projects were operated by China Concord Resources—a Chinese private enterprise sanctioned by the United States in 2019—while the remaining three were managed by Sinopec and CNPC. U.S. officials stated that crude oil previously exported primarily to China from these fields will now be redirected to U.S. domestic refineries in Texas and Louisiana.

Nabep Adds Drilling Rigs, Prepares Major Oil Expansion in Venezuela

Oct 23, 2026

North American Blue Energy Partners (Nabep) is deploying additional drilling rigs in Venezuela, targeting 223,000 barrels daily production after securing Pentagon backing. The firm plans a 25-year expansion strategy involving $1 billion in reinvestments to reactivate aging oil fields.

bloomberg

2026-10-22

Pentagon’s Venezuelan Oil Partner Nabep Adds Rig, Boosts Output

2026-10-23

Nabep Adds Drilling Rigs, Prepares Major Oil Expansion in Venezuela

Nabep Adds Drilling Rigs, Prepares Major Oil Expansion in Venezuela

FAQ