Saudi Aramco notified Asian buyers of a crude oil supply cut for April.

Putting these three facts together—less oil, the wrong grades of oil, and higher prices—this is the reality facing every refinery in Asia in April. China’s largest refiner, Sinopec, has already cut processing volumes by 10%. Approximately 40% of China’s crude oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for one-third of its total oil imports. Japan sources 95% of its crude oil from the Gulf region, with 70% of that transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Japanese refiners have requested that the government release strategic reserves; the government has instructed national reserve sites to prepare for such a release. South Korea—a technology-driven economy (home to Samsung and SK Hynix)—relies on Gulf crude for refining and petrochemical feedstocks. Since the outbreak of the war, the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) has fallen by 12%. In just the first three weeks of March, India paid an additional $1 billion for roughly 21 million barrels of crude imported from the region. Of this, Saudi Arabia supplied 15 million barrels—about 70%—all shipped via the Yanbu route. The Yanbu detour is currently the only reason any Saudi crude can still reach Asia. The East-West Pipeline, which supplies Yanbu, has a nominal capacity of 7 million barrels per day, but as of March 17, its utilization rate stood at approximately 80%. Yanbu export volumes have surged threefold—from 1.2 million barrels per day pre-war to over 3.6 million barrels per day. Yet on March 19, Iran directly attacked the Yanbu port. Greece intercepted two Iranian missiles targeting the port. After a brief loading suspension, operations resumed. This detour route—now critical to keeping Asia’s refineries running—has become an explicit military target. Saudi production has already declined by roughly 2 million barrels per day—from nearly 11 million barrels per day in February to about 8 million barrels per day—as Aramco shut down its Safaniya and Zuluf offshore fields, whose storage facilities are already full due to inability to export crude via the Strait of Hormuz.

How should we view the missile strike by the Houthi movement on Saudi Aramco’s headquarters in Dhahran, causing widespread damage?

I remain more concerned about financial market implications. I specifically checked the precise timing of the Saudi Aramco attack—and converted it to Beijing time: 4:23 a.m. on October 14, 2026. At that exact moment, Brent crude oil prices clearly spiked upward—albeit modestly. This shows that capital markets immediately registered the incident and responded with real money. Saudi Aramco is the world’s largest and most profitable oil and gas company. As a state-owned enterprise with over 81% ownership by the Saudi government, Aramco is the lifeline of the nation’s economy—and its primary source of fiscal revenue. If their oil fields were truly destroyed, the Saudi government would undoubtedly react with extreme alarm—because this really is their lifeline. Thanks to its vast idle production capacity, Aramco can rapidly ramp up output during global supply disruptions, effectively serving as the “central bank” of the global oil market; its production policy directly influences international oil prices. Institutions such as Citigroup estimate that if regional oil and gas infrastructure suffers severe damage, oil prices could surge to $120 per barrel. During earlier Strait of Hormuz blockade crises, economists had already warned that prices could quickly breach $100. After the attack, Saudi officials claimed the impact was “minimal” and caused little damage. Coalition spokesperson Turki al-Maliki posted multiple updates on social media detailing the coalition’s defensive achievements, stating that on the day of the attack, coalition forces intercepted and destroyed six missiles and three drones across multiple locations in Saudi Arabia. On the same day—the 13th—the coalition announced military strikes against fuel storage and transportation facilities under Houthi control in Sana’a and Al Hudaydah, Yemen. At first glance, the situation appears manageable: limited damage, proportionate retaliation. But the problem is that Yemen’s Houthi movement—often dubbed the ‘flip-flop army’—is notoriously resource-poor and fights with extreme desperation. Their strategy is essentially one of trading lives for gains. Ultimately, Saudi Arabia stands to lose the most.

How Aramco Learned to Keep Pumping Oil Under Fire

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Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser detailed rapid-response strategies enabling swift recovery from drone attacks on its infrastructure. Despite regional conflicts reducing output, the company restored operations quickly using specialized teams and local supply chains.

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