How should we view Trump's statement, 'I have never seen a wind farm in China'?

All of Trump’s energy policies—including relaxing regulations on shale oil extraction, eliminating electric vehicle subsidies, and suppressing solar and wind power—are designed to appease traditional energy industries while stifling new-energy sectors. Such short-sighted energy policies will severely undermine America’s future competitiveness, potentially creating a generational gap with major competitors—especially China and the EU—in the energy domain, which will boomerang back on the U.S. years later. As I noted in an earlier answer (January), embracing shale oil offers the U.S. quick access to cheap energy and substantial tax revenue in the short term—but two core problems remain: First, the U.S. shale oil boom has already peaked; current estimates suggest recoverable reserves will last only another 15–20 years. In fact, prior to the shale revolution in 2010, the U.S. had already exhausted its domestic oil reserves and become fully dependent on imports—hence the saying, “Oil breeds the U.S. military.” Second, what happens after oil runs out? Even if global oil reserves last another century, extraction costs will inevitably rise, and recovery will grow progressively harder. Facing energy demand that will increase dozens or even hundreds of times over the coming decades, humanity must pursue new energy sources—primarily solar, with wind as a supporting contributor. Photovoltaic (PV) power generation is already the cheapest source of electricity globally—even without accounting for storage costs. What impact will Trump’s executive order withdrawing the U.S. from the Paris Agreement have on U.S. development and global climate action? New energy—especially PV—has enormous scalability: Fully deploying solar farms across Northwest China and Mongolia could generate over one hundred times the country’s current annual electricity output. Its cost is also exceptionally low—it is already the least expensive electricity source available. Its only drawbacks are energy storage and transmission—both cost-driven challenges, not technological barriers—and far more realistic than elusive controlled nuclear fusion. How should we interpret Elon Musk’s statement, “We don’t need nuclear fusion”? How should we interpret Academician Peng Xianjue’s assertion that “calling nuclear fusion the ultimate energy source is merely a beautiful fantasy—or even misleading”? Controlled nuclear fusion suffers from high costs (deuterium extraction, tritium synthesis, construction, maintenance), limited scalability (tritium must be bred from lithium-6—a scarce, non-renewable resource whose use represents irreversible waste), disruption of Earth’s thermal balance, long construction timelines (minimum 10 years), massive upfront investment, and extremely high personnel requirements (exceeding those for current fission reactors). It holds virtually no commercial viability. For the foreseeable future, humanity’s primary energy source will remain solar energy (including photovoltaics and concentrated solar power). Solar energy can synthesize secondary energy carriers—such as gasoline, diesel, and hydrogen—or materials like olefins and various salts—and may even produce antimatter for energy storage (antimatter production and containment technologies already exist).

Besides prejudice, what are the three major hurdles facing China’s wind power industry?

"China’s wind power industry is entering a golden era of international expansion," stated Qin Haiyan at the 2025 China Wind Energy Spring Tea Forum. By 2030, among Asia-Pacific countries excluding China, only India’s onshore wind power supply chain will be largely self-sufficient; no country in the region—including China’s neighbors—will possess a mature offshore wind power industrial chain capable of meeting local or regional construction needs. "Without China’s industrial and supply chains, other regions worldwide will essentially fail to achieve their planned targets," Qin declared in his presentation slide—painting a vast, starry future for China’s wind energy professionals. (On-site photo from the 2025 China Wind Energy Spring Tea Forum) Ironically, just as Chinese wind power enterprises begin opening doors to overseas markets, they face Western politicians brandishing banners of 'anti-wind-power.' A global backlash against wind energy has begun. Recently, Alice Weidel—the chancellor candidate nominated by Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party—publicly vowed to "dismantle all wind turbines." British politicians have likewise escalated rhetoric, attempting to stigmatize China and promote the so-called 'Chinese wind power threat.' Politicians in France, Italy, and elsewhere have also moved to block wind farm construction—introducing significant uncertainty into wind power globalization. (See earlier reporting by China Energy Network: "Trump ‘Leads’ Global Anti-Wind Power Wave: Wind Power Should Not Be ‘Politicized’") Politicians aren’t merely spouting rhetoric—they’re tightening the screws on wind power through concrete policy measures. On his first day in office, January 20, Trump signed what has been dubbed the "strictest wind power ban in history," suspending approvals, permits, and loans for wind power projects—delivering a direct blow to the entire sector. Simultaneously, Europe and the U.S. have erected high trade barriers; intense trade friction has cast a shadow over China’s wind power exports. Since 2019, Mexico, the EU, Canada, Vietnam, and others have launched anti-dumping or countervailing duty investigations against Chinese wind power products. Today, headwinds are intensifying: In April last year, the EU launched an investigation—under its Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR)—into Chinese wind turbine suppliers operating in five EU member states; at the end of December, Vietnam issued a final affirmative anti-dumping ruling on wind towers and related components originating from China, imposing a 97% anti-dumping duty on general producers/exporters. Western pressure on Chinese wind power equipment exports is escalating rapidly: tariff hikes and import quotas are merely the appetizers—carbon footprint tracing and demands for supply-chain 'localization' are now following closely behind. In May last year, the EU Council approved the Net-Zero Industry Act, stipulating that by 2030, at least 40% of wind turbines deployed in the EU must be manufactured within Europe. Under such layered pressure and encirclement, China’s wind power export space has shrunk dramatically, and overseas orders secured by turbine manufacturers cannot be promptly converted into revenue. According to incomplete statistics compiled by China Energy Network, wind turbine OEMs secured approximately 26 GW of new overseas orders in 2024—yet actual turbine exports totaled only 5.5 GW, a fivefold gap. Meanwhile, turbine export growth stood at roughly 53%, lagging far behind the nearly 300% growth rate in newly signed overseas orders. Faced with these mounting difficulties, Chinese wind power enterprises have no choice but to explore new pathways for international expansion—beginning to build factories overseas and reconstructing global supply chains. Yet, can manufacturing relocation truly resolve all problems?

Trump Directs Trade Negotiations on Wind Turbine Imports via Executive Order

2 days ago

US President Trump ordered Commerce and Trade officials to negotiate wind turbine import terms within 180 days, signaling potential future remedies despite no immediate tariffs.

reuters

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