The U.S. Begins Pouring Money into Securing Minerals: The Next Truly Scarce Resource May Not Be Chips—But the Metals Used to Make Them

In the past, these metals behaved more like ordinary commodities: producers expanded output when prices rose and cut back when prices fell. Now the rules of the game are changing. Because what the U.S., China, and Europe are competing for is no longer simply "who can fabricate a chip," but rather: Where will the minerals needed for chips come from? Who will smelt them? Who will process them? And what happens if supply is cut off? As a result, strategic metals are beginning to carry something previously unnoticeable: A security premium. I. The U.S. Is No Longer Just Talking About "Supply Chain Security" A clear shift is underway: the U.S. is now investing real money directly into its critical mineral supply chain. In August 2026, the U.S. Department of Energy announced a batch of seven projects focused on critical minerals, battery manufacturing, and recycling—with a total funding of $500 million. The direction is unmistakable: Keep mining operations in the U.S. Keep scrap materials from being exported overseas. Rebuild domestic smelting capacity. Produce battery materials domestically. In short: minimize reliance on overseas supply chains for critical industries. This move carries far greater significance than the $500 million figure alone suggests. Because the mining industry has a harsh reality: Owning a mine does not equate to controlling the supply chain. Extracting ore is only the first step; subsequent stages include beneficiation, smelting, refining, and materials processing. The true bottleneck for many critical metals lies not in whether deposits exist underground—but in who possesses the capability to transform raw ore into industrially usable materials. What the U.S. is urgently trying to build up is precisely this middle layer. II. What’s Truly Scarce May Be the Ability to “Turn Ore Into Materials” Nth Cycle is a telling example. Its work sounds anything but glamorous: processing black mass recovered from spent lithium-ion batteries. Yet therein lies the crux of the problem. Black mass still contains substantial quantities of valuable metals such as nickel and lithium. Many countries lack not waste feedstock—but the economically viable capability to refine it. So they export scrap, let others process it, and then buy back the refined materials. Clearly, that is not the kind of supply chain the U.S. wants. Nth Cycle’s planned facility will be capable of processing up to approximately 24,000 tons of black mass annually, targeting high-purity nickel intermediates and battery-grade lithium carbonate. It has also signed a long-term offtake agreement with Trafigura. You’ll notice an intriguing shift. In the past, investors were most excited by whoever discovered a new mine. Going forward, what may matter increasingly is who can reprocess discarded waste into strategic resources. In an increasingly fragmented global supply chain, recycling itself becomes a mine. III. Silicon, Graphite, and Batteries Are All Part of the Same War Another noteworthy development is silicon-based anodes. Conventional lithium-ion batteries rely heavily on graphite. Yet if the U.S. aims to rebuild its domestic battery supply chain, it cannot remain perpetually dependent on overseas graphite processing capacity. Hence, an alternative approach emerges: Can we increase the proportion of silicon in anode materials? The Coreshell Technologies project—supported by the U.S. Department of Energy—is pursuing exactly this path, aiming to manufacture silicon-anode battery materials using metallurgical silicon produced domestically, thereby reducing dependence on imported graphite. What truly merits attention is not any single company’s stock price—but the broader industrial logic behind it: Graphite is insecure? Then find substitutes. Overseas refining is insecure? Then build domestic refineries. Waste streams flowing out?

Benchmark Study of Global Commodity Supply Chain Leaders: Deconstructing Glencore’s Eight Core Capabilities

The root of the gap lies in resource control. Glencore owns and operates mines, smelters, and warehousing facilities across 35 countries globally. In 2025, its self-owned copper output reached 851,600 tonnes, and its self-owned cobalt output stood at 33,500 tonnes—these volumes represent not merely physical assets, but the very foundation of pricing power. By contrast, China’s leading commodity enterprises hold less than 10% overseas equity stakes in mines; their external dependency on core raw materials—including iron ore and nickel ore—exceeds 80%, with the vast majority of profits captured by overseas miners. Chinese firms’ resource investments largely remain at the level of ‘minority shareholding,’ ‘long-term supply contracts,’ or ‘offtake agreements’—without asset ownership, they remain perpetually at the mercy of others. In 2026, Glencore stands at a new crossroads: merger talks with Rio Tinto remain ambiguous and unresolved; part of its assets in the Democratic Republic of Congo are up for partial sale; and a secondary listing in Australia is imminent. Meanwhile, while curtailing coal production, it earned a staggering $2.4 billion from coal amid the global energy crisis. Every strategic adjustment made by this corporate behemoth poses a profound question to China’s commodity supply chain enterprises: As the threshold for playing the ‘extreme game’ rises ever higher, what should we emulate—and what should we avoid? This report traces Glencore’s five-decade evolution, deconstructing the logic behind its eight core capabilities—and confronting head-on the painful costs of unrestrained expansion. It further focuses on the deep structural disparities between China’s top-tier commodity supply chain enterprises and Glencore—particularly regarding profitability and resource control: trillion-dollar revenues paired with a net profit margin below 1%; massive trading volumes coupled with near-zero upstream resource control. Based on this analysis, the report proposes four breakthrough pathways for upgrading China’s commodity supply chain enterprises. Ultimately, it returns to a fundamental question: How can Chinese enterprises chart a course in the era of Globalization 2.0—one that combines Glencore’s bold ambition with a resilience that surpasses Glencore’s own? Company Overview and Business Model Positioning Glencore’s story began in 1974, founded by Marc Rich and headquartered in Baar, Switzerland. Today, it is listed in both London and Hong Kong. After more than fifty years of evolution, the company has grown into a global resource giant holding industrial assets in 35 countries and operating trade networks in over 50 countries. In scale, Glencore is nothing short of a commercial leviathan: in the first half of 2026, it sustained strong recovery momentum, achieving $174.4 billion in revenue—a 49% year-on-year increase—and $4.4 billion in attributable net profit, a dramatic turnaround from the $655 million net loss recorded in the same period last year. However, Glencore’s profits are highly concentrated in its metals and energy divisions, exhibiting pronounced cyclical volatility. In 2025, record-high copper prices failed to offset declining profitability in its coal business, causing core profits to fall year-on-year. In contrast, during the first half of 2026, Middle East conflicts drove up energy prices and pushed copper prices to new all-time highs, sending the company’s adjusted EBITDA soaring 86% to $10.115 billion. This interplay of gains and losses across business segments vividly illustrates its strong cyclical nature. Understanding Glencore hinges on grasping its unique dual-engine model—‘Production + Trading.’ Glencore is both one of the world’s largest operators of copper, cobalt, zinc, nickel, and coal production assets—and the world’s third-largest oil trader. These two engines do not simply coexist; instead, they form a deeply integrated closed loop: real-time production data flows directly into trading decisions, while Glencore’s globally distributed trading network ensures robust sales and distribution channels for its own products.

Nth Cycle inks $1 billion minerals offtake with Glencore ahead of public listing

19 hours ago

Nth Cycle signed a $1 billion offtake agreement with Glencore to supply lithium and critical minerals from recycled batteries. The deal precedes Nth Cycle's planned public listing later this year amidst growing focus on critical mineral trade.

reuters

2026-09-22

Nth Cycle inks $1 billion minerals offtake with Glencore ahead of public listing

Nth Cycle inks $1 billion minerals offtake with Glencore ahead of public listing

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