The 'Chicken Dinner' Contest of Rightward Shifts in Major European Countries

The National Rally in France plays its cards more subtly. Bardella’s publicly announced policy agenda includes withdrawing from EU electricity pricing rules, restricting immigration, reinstating the criminal offense of illegal residence, abolishing *jus soli* (birthright citizenship), and abandoning the EU’s 2035 ban on new internal-combustion-engine vehicle sales. Notably, none of these items calls for ‘exiting the EU.’ Le Pen once vocally advocated ‘Frexit’ early in her career, but later realized voters rejected it—and consequently downplayed the idea. The logic behind France’s rightward shift is to reclaim national policy autonomy *within* the EU, rather than leaving it altogether. This differs fundamentally from Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD), whose slogan ‘Germany First’ questions the EU itself; by contrast, the National Rally challenges only specific EU regulations. The UK case is the most ironic. Farage’s Reform UK surged to 33% in opinion polls—15 percentage points ahead of Labour—on pledges such as ‘ending migrant boats within two weeks’ and ‘scrapping the net-zero emissions plan on Day One.’ The UK has already left the EU and enjoys significant geographical advantages; in theory, it holds full autonomy over immigration control. Yet in 2025, the number of migrants crossing the English Channel hit a record high—over 30,000 people. Brexit did not solve the migration problem; it merely shifted the issue from ‘the EU forces me to accept them’ to ‘I can’t manage them myself.’ Reform UK’s response? Double down: promising to imprison all illegal entrants and deport 600,000 people within five years—a figure practically impossible to implement, yet one that resonates emotionally: if moderate measures failed, go hard. Italy offers the most pragmatic example of rightward shift. When Meloni came to power in 2022, many viewed her as Europe’s alarm bell for rising right-wing populism. Three years on, she has neither withdrawn from the EU nor from NATO—in fact, she actively seeks EU funding and migration agreements. In November 2025, Italy and Albania held their first intergovernmental summit, signing 15 bilateral agreements covering energy, migration, and defense. The centerpiece: Italy will build migrant processing centers in Albania, and individuals rescued at sea will be transferred there immediately for asylum screening. Initially criticized, this model is now being emulated by the European Commission and several member states. Meloni has demonstrated that right-wing governments can deliver results without overturning the table. Poland is waging an internal war of attrition. After Tusk returned to power in 2023, he declared Poland’s ‘return to Europe,’ pledging that renewable energy would account for 56% of the country’s electricity mix by 2030. Yet in the 2025 presidential election, Nawrocki—running in alliance with Law and Justice—won. He openly branded the EU Green Deal ‘ecological madness’ and advocated reviving domestic coal mining. Poland’s coal-fired power share dropped from 72.5% in 2021 to 52.7% in 2025, while renewables rose to 31.4%—a pace of transition that is actually quite rapid. But the president holds veto power, and Nawrocki has already used it to block a bill easing restrictions on onshore wind farm development. Poland’s challenge lies not in whether its direction is correct, but in the mutual sabotage between president and prime minister. Viewed side-by-side, a common thread runs through these countries: the driving force behind the rightward shift stems primarily from migration concerns and economic anxiety—not ideology. Germany’s AfD rose in the East due to the unresolved thirty-year economic gap between East and West. France’s National Rally advanced from political fringe to largest party in the National Assembly by tapping into middle-class anxieties over declining living standards and perceived erosion of secular values.

[Euro-Extraction Poland News] Can’t Take It Anymore! Poland to Cut Fuel VAT!

Global inflation has triggered rapid price hikes—and Poland is no exception. According to Poland’s Central Statistical Office, consumer and service prices in December 2021 rose 8.6% year-on-year and 0.9% month-on-month. Yet based on the author’s lived experience in Poland, actual price increases far exceed the officially reported figures. It must be said: inflation has already severely impacted everyday life for ordinary households and disrupted normal operations for typical businesses—and may even threaten social stability. To combat runaway inflation, the Polish government implemented various measures—including raising benchmark interest rates—but with minimal effect. According to a statement released by the Polish government spokesperson on Friday, January 7, 2022, the government is actively preparing its ‘Anti-Inflation Shield 2.0’ and plans to roll it out incrementally next week.

Poland Moves to Quickly Tame Fuel Prices After Nawrocki’s U-Turn

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Poland imposes windfall taxes on the energy sector and cuts fuel VAT to curb rising prices after President Nawrocki reversed his stance. The measures aim to reduce inflation and cap pump costs, raising 4 billion zloty from oil companies like Orlen.

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Poland Moves to Quickly Tame Fuel Prices After Nawrocki’s U-Turn

Poland Moves to Quickly Tame Fuel Prices After Nawrocki’s U-Turn

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