Faced with unbearable imperialist pressure, Cuba has embarked on capitalist restoration.

Meller told AFP: “I had the opportunity to meet with Raúl Rodríguez Castro, and I fully endorse his vision for opening up Cuban commerce. I believe Cuba needs to do this—and the world needs it too. I think it’s time to move forward, time for change—and Raúl thinks so too.” A moving thing. The day after the National Assembly of People’s Power approved the restoration of capitalism—without prior consultation with the Cuban people and with almost no explanation offered—Lalito granted an exclusive interview to Abu Dhabi’s The National, calling for a “friendly relationship” with the United States. He added that the two sides could reach agreement on compensation for property confiscated from Cuban Americans during the Revolution. In the same interview, Carlos Mendoza, Deputy Minister of Trade and Tourism, addressed U.S. businesspeople directly: “We want U.S. businesspeople to understand and appreciate that Cuba is a country open to investment… Investment sectors include mining, tourism, real estate, banking, and finance. While our governments have differences, these should not hinder businesspeople from participating in Cuba’s economic activities.” Marco Rubio and Donald Trump clearly differ in their attitudes toward the Cuban Revolution. Both unequivocally seek to destroy it—but their ultimate goals diverge sharply. Rubio aims for regime change, placing Miami-based Cuban-American counterrevolutionaries in power. Trump, by contrast, believes it sufficient—regardless of who initially governs Cuba—to control the island and its economic resources while expelling China and Russia: he wishes to emulate the Venezuelan model. An almost overlooked thread: when Rubio’s secondary sanctions forced Canadian mining company Sherritt International to withdraw from Cuba, the firm—nearly wholly dependent on its Cuban investments—collapsed. At that moment, a U.S. company owned by a former advisor to Trump’s first administration stepped in, proposing to acquire its majority stake. How could a Texas investor possibly be interested in a Canadian firm crippled by Rubio’s sanctions against Cuba… unless he believed he could obtain a license from Trump to operate in Cuba?! If such a deal were finalized, nickel and cobalt mining in Cuba would shift from Canadian to U.S. hands… precisely as U.S. imperialism races to seize critical mineral resources. Is it far-fetched to suspect similar maneuvers may already be underway across other economic sectors—including tourism and hospitality? Imperialist coercion has already forced partial withdrawals by multinational corporations from Spain and Canada. Will major U.S. chains step in? Or firms from other non-U.S. competitor countries? Rumors circulate that a UAE-based group intends to build a “Trump Island” (!!) on Cayo Santa María. In any case—whether through agreements with Cuba’s state bureaucracy and Communist Party or through force—U.S. commercial control over Cuba’s economy would mean the complete loss of Cuban sovereignty. We must reiterate what we have repeatedly explained: The victory of the Cuban Revolution was built upon the expropriation of capitalism.

How do you evaluate Mianqian Xiaoxi (Bedtime Messages) Episode 1004, 'Iran, Cuba, Venezuela: Why Are They One Family?'

IV. Geopolitical Competition and Suppression: Squeezing Out Rivals - First-mover and relational advantage: Entered Cuba in the early 1990s, cultivated deep ties over decades, and established profound mutual trust with the Cuban government—becoming one of Cuba’s largest foreign investors and securing a first-mover advantage. - Sanctions-resilience: Leveraged its Canadian corporate identity and offshore structures (e.g., Bahamas) to partially circumvent U.S. sanctions against Cuba, safeguarding financial and logistical channels—while other foreign enterprises (e.g., Chinese firms) face significantly greater constraints. - Squeezing out third parties: Used technological blockades, market exclusivity, and governmental influence to constrain potential competitors (e.g., China’s MMG in 2004), ultimately forcing them to exit. V. Monopoly Outcomes - Sherritt long dominated Cuba’s nickel industry, controlling the core share of Cuban nickel output; Cuba received only a share of primary product revenues, unable to capture high-value-added returns. - Established a closed-loop monopoly spanning “technology–operations–markets,” reinforcing its global dominance in lateritic nickel while locking Cuba into a low-end position within the nickel value chain. From commercial, resource-sovereignty, and long-term development perspectives, Sherritt’s profit-sharing arrangement with Cuba is unreasonable—the core issue being “nominal 50/50 parity masking severe value asymmetry,” detailed below: I. “Numerical Parity” vs. “Value Asymmetry” in Profit Sharing - Equity and nominal sharing: In the Moa Joint Venture (Moa JV), both parties hold 50% equity, and profits are nominally split accordingly. - Actual value flow: Cuba handles only lateritic nickel ore extraction and produces low-value mixed sulfide precipitate (MSP); Sherritt controls refining operations in Canada, converting MSP into LME-grade nickel, high-purity cobalt, and other premium products—capturing 70–80% of the value chain’s profits. - Technology and operational premium: Sherritt leverages its proprietary high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) technology and operational dominance to continuously charge technology licensing and management fees—further diluting Cuba’s actual returns. - Debt and foreign-exchange straitjacket: As of Q2 2025, Cuba owes Sherritt approximately USD 344 million; repayment depends entirely on nickel revenue shares, drastically weakening Cuba’s bargaining power. II. Key Evidence of Unreasonableness 1. Imbalanced value-chain distribution: Cuba receives only resource rents and revenues from primary processing, while all high-value-added segments accrue to Sherritt; although nickel exports constitute a major source of Cuba’s foreign exchange, their contribution to GDP growth remains limited, hindering industrial upgrading. 2. Technological lock-in without transfer: Sherritt has long withheld core process technologies, preventing Cuba from independently scaling up production or improving efficiency—leaving it permanently stuck in the “raw-material exporter” role. 3. Mismatched risk and reward: Cuba bears long-term risks—including resource depletion, environmental remediation, and geopolitical exposure (e.g., U.S. sanctions)—while Sherritt, operating via light-asset technology and management, captures the lion’s share of profits with disproportionately low risk exposure. 4. Extremely high substitution cost: Cuba lacks the capacity to build independent refining infrastructure, develop alternative technologies, or access international markets autonomously—creating a “Sherritt-dependency” that further entrenches the inequitable profit-sharing structure. III. Criteria for “Reasonable” Arrangements and Pathways Forward - Benchmark for reasonableness: A fair arrangement must align risk with reward, ensure appropriate technology transfer, grant the resource-holding nation space for industrial upgrading along the value chain, and internalize environmental and community costs. - Feasible improvements: Increase Cuba’s share of refining-stage revenues; mandate a binding timeline for technology transfer; incorporate environmental remediation costs into joint venture expenses; and gradually grant Cuba partial market access and pricing authority.

Sherritt Wins US Fuel License to Rescue Cuba Nickel Mine

Oct 20, 2026

Sherritt International obtained a US Treasury license to transport fuel and sulfur to its Cuban nickel site, facilitating a financial rescue led by Gillon Capital. Full production restart requires additional regulatory approvals beyond this initial authorization.

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Sherritt Wins US Fuel License to Rescue Cuba Nickel Mine

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