Lula’s dramatic comeback from adversity; China’s response; and Trump’s feared scenario comes true!

What further enraged Trump was that U.S. interference in Brazil’s presidential election ironically boosted Lula’s campaign. To many ordinary Brazilians, the fact that his opponent enjoyed strong U.S. backing was tantamount to selling out Brazil’s sovereignty. Lula seized this sentiment, elevating the domestic electoral contest into a struggle to defend national dignity—and telling all Brazilians that this election would determine whether Brazil would become America’s ‘backyard.’ Through such messaging and other measures, large numbers of swing voters shifted toward Lula, while grassroots citizens turned out en masse to vote for him—ultimately propelling him to the presidency for the fourth time. According to Rong Ping (a Chinese geopolitical commentator), the outcome of Brazil’s election is no mere ‘tempest in a teapot’; rather, it impacts U.S. strategic recalibration—and even the broader geopolitical landscape of the Americas. Upon taking office, the Trump administration vigorously promoted its so-called ‘New Monroe Doctrine’—dubbed the ‘Trump Doctrine’—seeking to treat the entire Latin American region as America’s backyard: excluding extra-regional powers from expanding their influence there and forcing Latin American countries to align with Washington’s strategic interests. This approach is integral to America’s broader strategic retrenchment. Simultaneously, the U.S. has persistently targeted left-wing governments. In Venezuela, the U.S. military amassed warships across the Caribbean Sea under the pretext of anti-narcotics operations, imposed maritime blockades, deployed armed forces to apprehend President Maduro, and openly plotted coups. Toward Cuba, the Trump administration reinstated comprehensive sanctions, relisted Cuba as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism,’ introduced hundreds of unilateral punitive measures, cut off oil supplies, restricted remittances and tourism revenues, and repeatedly issued threats of military intervention—all aimed at coercing Cuban concessions. In Trump’s vision, if Brazil—the largest economy in Latin America—also fell under U.S. sway, the entire South American continent would be fully incorporated into America’s sphere of influence. At that point, the U.S. could control South America’s abundant mineral and agricultural resources—and effectively shut the BRICS nations out of expanding cooperation in the region. This, therefore, constituted the primary motive behind the Trump administration’s overt interference in Brazil’s election. Rong Ping argues that America’s conduct toward Latin American countries mirrors its global tariff hikes and its pressure on Japan, South Korea, and the EU to increase investment in the U.S.—all manifestations of a hegemonic power’s ‘blood-sucking playbook,’ ultimately serving great-power competition. And Brazil is the pivotal chess piece on this board. Brazil is a resource-rich heavyweight: the world’s largest soybean exporter, endowed with vast iron ore reserves, a massive livestock industry, and enormous deposits of rare earth elements and other critical strategic minerals. Meanwhile, China is Brazil’s largest trading partner. China’s huge market continuously absorbs Brazilian soybeans, beef, and iron ore; and Chinese construction machinery, new-energy equipment, and telecommunications products keep entering the Brazilian market. In short, Brazil constitutes a vital component of China’s supply-chain security—and serves as an ideal springboard for China’s deeper engagement across Latin America. The day after the election results were finalized, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs swiftly issued a statement expressing its willingness to continue advancing the China-Brazil Community with a Shared Future. This pledge signals that long-term cooperative initiatives—including bilateral local-currency settlement, agricultural trade, mineral development, and infrastructure projects—will proceed as planned. It both echoes Lula’s stance of refusing to serve as ‘any other country’s backyard’ and reassures cross-border trade and infrastructure ventures between the two countries. Viewed against the backdrop of epochal global transformation, Brazil’s presidential election is merely one microcosm of Global South nations resisting hegemonic orders.

In the 2026 Brazilian presidential election, no candidate secured a majority in the first round, triggering a runoff. What is the current situation?

Yet according to a Quaest poll conducted this September, nearly half of respondents believed the economy had worsened over the past year, while only 19% felt it had improved. Public debt stands at 82.9% of GDP, and household debt, interest burdens, and rising living costs weigh heavily on ordinary families. I’ve long held that strong macroeconomic data and people’s lived experience are two distinct things—and voters cast ballots based solely on the latter. This isn’t hard to grasp, yet those sitting in the capital are often the last to understand it. Fourth is structural: the Evangelical population in Brazil is growing rapidly, with multiple institutions estimating it now approaches 30% of the total population. On issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, and family values, Evangelicals hold staunchly conservative views—and the slogan ‘God, Homeland, Family’ resonates directly with them. Moreover, Lula is now 80 years old and running for president for the fourth time; genuine fatigue with the Workers’ Party’s prolonged rule is real. These four factors combined do not constitute a unified ‘right-wing bloc,’ but rather several groups with fundamentally divergent demands—united only by a shared opposition to the incumbent. They need not agree on everything—only on one thing. That is precisely why this coalition appears more cohesive than it truly is. First, let’s address what will *not* change—these are the hard constraints. In the first eight months of this year, Brazil’s exports to China totaled USD 77.07 billion—over 30% of its total exports—while exports to the U.S. amounted to just USD 24.1 billion, less than 10%. Over 70% of Brazil’s soybeans are sold to China. This trade structure remains untouchable regardless of who assumes office—it rests on the support of Brazilian farmers and mining magnates, whose votes Flávio himself needs. Indeed, he declared at campaign rallies that he would not abruptly sever economic ties with China, nor would he be ‘forced to choose sides between China and the U.S.’ Yet policy drafts leaked from his camp tell a different story: building a ‘parallel critical-minerals supply chain’ with the U.S., joining the ‘Americas Shield Initiative,’ and adopting a passive stance toward BRICS mechanisms. Let me be clear: these remain campaign rhetoric and draft proposals—not finalized policies. What is said during campaigns and what is done after assuming office are usually separated by considerable distance. Still, should these drafts be implemented, concessions would appear on the surface—but shifts would occur behind the scenes. And those behind-the-scenes channels happen to fall squarely under the control of institutions whose leadership has just changed hands. I must emphasize that this analysis is speculative—not conclusive. First, rare earths: Brazil holds the world’s second-largest rare earth reserves. Its recent tender attracted over one hundred investment proposals totaling more than USD 16 billion—but the associated tax-credit framework won’t take effect until 2030. If the next administration seeks to revise this framework, legislative approval from Congress would be unavoidable. Second, 5G networks and urban rail transit: cancellation need not be announced outright—delays in environmental impact assessments, land-use approvals, or supporting infrastructure can achieve the same effect. These processes largely occur at the state level—and governors in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Paraná have all recently changed. Third, local-currency settlement: the volume of direct RMB–real transactions remains modest—which, precisely because it is small, makes adjustments low-cost. These three points are deduced strictly from ‘who controls what authority’—not from insider information. Judgments may be offered, but the evidentiary chain has not yet reached the threshold of ‘already occurred.’ So—is the outcome of October 25 already sealed? Historical precedent favors Flávio: in the past 30 years of Brazilian presidential elections, no candidate trailing in the first round has ever staged a comeback to win the runoff. Yet one detail bears noting: according to two polls released on October 19, BTG Pactual/Nexus showed 50.3% vs. 49.7%, and AtlasIntel showed 51.1% vs. 48.9%—both margins falling within the margin of error, and both narrower than in the previous round.

Soy, Rare Earths, and Fuels: How Brazil Vote Impacts Global Resource Flows

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President Lula's reelection ensures continued soybean exports to China while complicating US access to rare earth reserves. Analysts predict currency devaluation will boost agricultural competitiveness despite potential farm debt issues under his administration.

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Soy, Rare Earths, and Fuels: How Brazil Vote Impacts Global Resource Flows

Soy, Rare Earths, and Fuels: How Brazil Vote Impacts Global Resource Flows

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