The U.S. suddenly eased restrictions on Russian oil and postponed military action against Iran—what lies behind this is a new hegemonic strategy of extracting value from allies at low cost.

The Pentagon’s lights stayed on all night as it rushed to finalize a three-day large-scale military strike plan against Iran, already placed on Trump’s desk. The next morning, Trump picked up his phone and posted a tweet: “No strikes before the midterm elections.” At that very moment, the U.S. Treasury Department was far from idle: while Trump announced the postponement of military action, it added 17 vessels involved in transporting Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products to its sanctions list. Previously, the U.S. had adamantly enforced sanctions on Russian energy exports, disregarding appeals from Japan, South Korea, and India—but now it began easing them. On October 9, Trump posted on Truth Social that he had held a “very successful” discussion with Russian President Putin, stating: “Russia has agreed to immediately supply over 300,000 tons of diesel to the U.S. and global markets, followed by another 500,000 tons in November, and then an immediate additional 1 million tons.” (Observer Network) Simultaneously with announcing the relaxation of diesel-related sanctions on Russia, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a license permitting transactions related to Russian diesel trade until April 2027. This means the move is not a one-off, temporary arrangement, but rather a policy adjustment with a clearly defined timeframe. The world was left stunned; Zelenskyy even stated that Washington’s actions were “not what partners do,” calling the decision to allow Russian diesel exports “a weak choice made by a strong partner,” and expressing a sense of “betrayal.” (Observer Network) Trump’s maneuvers indeed leave many baffled. Yet we must avoid simplistic narratives—such as portraying Trump as unreliable and incoherent, as incompetent and obsessed only with stock charts, or as signaling U.S. decline and retreat from global hegemony toward a narrow focus on the Americas. Many assume Trump simply wants to disengage from the Middle East—or merely aims to lower U.S. diesel prices ahead of the midterm elections. In reality, Trump’s moves form part of a comprehensive strategic calculus. I. The U.S. Can No Longer Afford Its Old Approach Rome wasn’t built in a day—and neither was America’s overextension. After the Cold War, the U.S., as the world’s sole superpower, enjoyed overwhelming comprehensive national strength—far outpacing all others. Flush with cash, the U.S. strutted across the globe, perpetually engaged in conflict—not just armed warfare, but economic warfare too—or actively preparing for it. Sanctions are inherently double-edged: they inflict eight hundred casualties on the enemy but one thousand on oneself. In a boxing ring—where two fighters deplete their health bars head-to-head—the U.S. truly has no rival; after the bout, it can recover and revive. But the world isn’t a one-on-one duel—it’s an integrated whole. For instance, U.S. sanctions against Russia hurt both sides, yet Europe, China, Japan, and South Korea didn’t pause—they kept advancing. Likewise, U.S. sanctions against China, against Europe, or against any other country or region follow the same logic: the U.S. and the sanctioned party suffer jointly, while third parties continue progressing unscathed. Ultimately, U.S. external sanctions resemble the sweeping global tariff war launched during Trump’s second term: other countries bear losses only vis-à-vis the U.S., whereas America suffers comprehensive damage—how, then, can it sustain such a posture? Take the U.S.’s more than 40-year sanctions on Iran since the Cold War: Iran’s GDP did shrink sharply, yet China, India, and other non-sanctioned nations achieved rapid growth—and the U.S. itself paid the price of fraying alliances. Militarily, the U.S. attacked whomever it disliked—when no real adversary remained, it waged war on “air” (i.e., the so-called War on Terror).

On October 10, 2026, U.S. and Russian heads of state held a telephone summit and reached an agreement: the U.S. agreed to lift sanctions on Russian diesel exports. How should we assess this event?

On October 9, Trump himself announced: the U.S. would purchase Russian diesel. That same day, Russian representatives sat in Washington and demanded—not just a single shipment of oil—but a full package: licenses granting all major Russian oil companies permission to export diesel to the U.S. That same week, the U.S. Congress had just passed legislation sanctioning Russia and Iran, authorizing up to 100% tariffs on countries purchasing Russian oil and gas. Placed side by side, these two developments appear contradictory: on one hand, imposing harsh sanctions; on the other, reaching out for oil. I reviewed Reuters’ original report and recalculated the numbers—my conclusion differs: they are not contradictory; rather, they constitute the two jaws of a single pair of pliers. First, consider diesel itself. Diesel is not gasoline—it powers trucks, ships, and generators. Globally, diesel has been tighter than crude oil over the past two years. Though U.S. shale oil supplies are ample, the U.S. still faces a persistent diesel shortfall. When diesel prices rise, logistics costs rise first—and when logistics costs rise, supermarket shelf prices follow. Inflation in the U.S. is not an abstract statistic—it is votes. Trump’s arithmetic is straightforward: lower fuel prices → tame inflation expectations → reduce public grumbling → secure the midterms. This is the most direct reason the U.S. needs diesel. Digging deeper brings us to the dollar. What underpins the dollar’s credibility? Its ability to buy goods worldwide—especially cheap energy. Low oil prices form the bedrock of dollar strength. Whoever controls affordable oil supply holds pricing power. Russia’s vast oil reserves—if choked off by sanctions and diverted toward yuan- or rupee-based settlements with China and India—would erode dollar dominance. Data from 2024–2025 shows clearly: the fastest-growing segment of RMB settlement is precisely Russian oil trade. Once the license takes effect, this model will be reabsorbed into the dollar settlement system. Yet viewing only this layer still treats the two events as separate. The true second layer resides in the tariff bill. That 100% tariff targets “countries purchasing Russian oil and gas.” Since sanctions began in 2022, who has purchased the most Russian oil and gas? China and India. The licensing scheme pulls Russian oil westward; the tariff pushes it eastward. One pulls, one pushes—both with aligned intent: to reclaim the “sanctions discount红利” (discount windfall) that China and India have been enjoying over the past two years—and funnel it into America’s own pocket. The logical chain is short: Russian oil enters the U.S. openly and in dollars, narrowing the discount; as the discount narrows, profit margins for Chinese independent refiners shrink; subsequently, RMB settlement share declines; further down the line, Russia’s bargaining leverage vis-à-vis China strengthens. For instance, Moscow’s negotiating position on the long-discussed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline will harden significantly. Thus, a global decline in oil prices does not automatically translate into lower landed costs for China. While absolute oil prices fall, the discount windfall simultaneously shrinks. The deepest layer of this calculation targets—half of it, at least—China’s pocketful of discount windfall. Why is Russia willing to sell? After over two years of war, what sustains Russia’s budget? Oil and gas exports. Sanctions severed Europe—the largest customer—forcing Russia to sell oil and gas at steep discounts to China and India, with delayed payments and circuitous financial routes. Now that the U.S. itself is asking for oil, what does that mean for Russia? It’s an official invitation back into the global pricing system—and one denominated in dollars. But Putin seeks more than revenue from oil sales.

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