How should we view the situation where American soybean fields are now left unharvested—another rainstorm, and the crop will rot?

In fact, a century ago, China was a major global exporter of soybeans. During the warlord era, Zhang Zuolin in Northeast China rose to become a dominant regional power largely thanks to soybean exports. The fertile black soil of China’s Northeast is exceptionally well-suited for soybean cultivation—and poses no technical challenges. So why did China suddenly shift from being a soybean exporter to the world’s largest soybean importer? A pivotal turning point occurred in 1929, when an American scientist named Morse conducted field research in Northeast China. He collected over 60 crates containing more than 4,000 soybean samples and meticulously documented Chinese farmers’ cultivation techniques—including detailed practices for every growth stage. Upon returning to the U.S., he effectively transferred China’s 5,000-year-old soybean farming knowledge to American soil. Leveraging its vast Great Plains, the United States then launched large-scale soybean cultivation and rapidly became the world’s top soybean exporter; soybean farming soon became a vital revenue source for American farmers. More importantly, in the 1990s, Americans developed genetically modified ‘super soybeans’—engineered to be pest-resistant, drought-tolerant, herbicide-tolerant, and high in oleic acid. This breakthrough dramatically boosted yields, propelling the U.S. to absolute dominance in global soybean production. With this price advantage, the U.S. sought to capture the Chinese soybean market. Initially, their ‘invasion’ met resistance: China had over a thousand domestic soybean processing enterprises and a complete, self-sufficient soybean planting and processing industrial chain—making it difficult for U.S. capital to penetrate. But in 2001, after China joined the WTO, the U.S. pushed for ‘free trade,’ urging China to increase purchases of American soybeans. At the time, U.S. soybeans were indeed high-quality and low-cost. After cost-benefit analysis, China concluded it was a win-win scenario—and began importing massive quantities. What followed, however, was an orchestrated industrial ‘harvesting’ by the U.S. Here’s how it unfolded: In 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) suddenly released a report claiming that drought would drive U.S. soybean stocks down to a 20-year low. Alarmed by the prospect of U.S. supply shortages, many Chinese processors rushed into action. In 2004, China dispatched a purchasing delegation to the U.S. for negotiations—and ultimately signed contracts to buy 8 million tons of soybeans at 4,300 RMB per ton. But in a surreal twist, immediately after the contracts were signed, the USDA reversed course—announcing that U.S. soybean output had not declined at all, but actually increased by 8.2%. Anyone familiar with economics knows that a sharp rise in supply inevitably triggers a steep price collapse. And so, international soybean prices plunged catastrophically—from a peak of 4,300 RMB/ton down to just 2,200 RMB/ton—a staggering 50% drop. Faced with this, honoring the original contract price would have meant ruinous losses. Consequently, roughly 70% of China’s soybean processors defaulted on their contracts, accusing the U.S. of manipulating soybean prices to deliberately ‘harvest’ China. In response, the ‘Big Four’ U.S. agribusiness giants jointly sued China’s defaulting soybean enterprises—demanding over 40 billion RMB in compensation. The U.S. government even imposed a global procurement ban, prohibiting those Chinese firms from buying American soybeans. This series of moves triggered the near-total collapse of China’s soybean processing industry: from over a thousand enterprises at its peak, the sector shrank to just 90 survivors—and of those, 64 were acquired by the Big Four U.S. agribusinesses. As a result, 85% of China’s soybean processing capacity fell under foreign control.

The backlash has arrived—the U.S. soybean industry has completely collapsed! Desperate farmers have written to the White House: ‘We can’t hold on any longer!’

In response to soybean farmers’ distress, Trump publicly urged China on social media on August 10 to ‘quadruple’ its orders for U.S. soybeans—i.e., increase purchases fourfold—citing ‘China’s soybean shortage’ and the potential to narrow the U.S.-China trade deficit. The very next day, Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) soybean futures surged to their highest level in two weeks. Seizing the momentum, Trump swiftly signed an executive order extending the suspension period of tariffs on Chinese goods by another 90 days. Yet these measures failed to alter the underlying reality. After waiting in vain for 11 days without any Chinese response, Trump brandished the sanctions hammer on August 21—freezing the U.S. dollar accounts of two Chinese companies on grounds of involvement in Iranian oil trade. Market reaction, however, was unexpectedly muted: CBOT soybean prices remained flat, while Santos Port in Brazil added five more soybean-carrying vessels bound for China. 06 China’s Strategic Response In stark contrast to America’s anxiety stands China’s calm and calculated response. Chinese enterprises’ large-scale investments in Brazil have fundamentally reshaped the rules of the game: $12 billion has been allocated to upgrade ports and railways—boosting Santos Port’s throughput capacity by 40%; and 35% of bilateral trade is now settled in RMB, effectively insulating transactions from fluctuations in the U.S. dollar exchange rate. Meanwhile, China’s own soybean production is undergoing quiet yet profound transformation. Salt-tolerant soybean varieties cultivated on saline-alkali land in Northeast China have achieved yields exceeding 300 kg per mu (approx. 0.15 hectare). In 2025, China’s soybean output reached 23 million tons—double the figure from seven years earlier. Even more crucially, innovations in feed technology are delivering substantial impact: the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs has promoted low-protein feed formulations, reducing soybean meal usage per pig by 28%. In 2022, soybean meal’s share in animal feed dropped by 3.4 percentage points—equivalent to saving 19.8 million tons of soybean demand. These developments have bolstered China’s strategic grain reserves. According to data from the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration, soybean reserves rose 15.4% year-on-year in the first half of 2025, while crushing enterprises’ inventories can sustain operations for four months. 07 Escalating Political Pressure In the U.S. presidential election, rural voters remain a critical pillar of Trump’s support—and key to his prospects this year. Yet the long-term market damage inflicted by trade policies has begun prompting some farmers to reconsider their allegiance. Polls show farmer support for the Republican Party in Illinois has plummeted by 11 percentage points since 2020—despite the state being a traditional GOP stronghold. U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent’s stance has undergone a dramatic reversal. This once-hardline official—who in May threatened to reinstate maximum tariffs on Chinese goods—surprisingly declared on August 19 that the U.S. and China had held ‘very constructive dialogue’ on economic and trade issues, and anticipated another meeting before November. Bessent’s ‘defection’ was no accident: speaking at a JPMorgan event in April 2025, he candidly admitted that high tariffs on China were ‘unsustainable’ and that the trade war would inevitably ease. 08 The Way Forward The U.S. Department of Agriculture forecasts that U.S. soybean planting area will shrink by 8% in 2025—the second consecutive annual decline—indicating that American farmers are already adjusting their cropping patterns in response to shifting market demand. Thirty percent of U.S. soybean growers are considering switching to corn—but such a pivot risks depressing corn prices, thereby creating new problems.

US Harvest Delays Send Soy Processors Scrambling for Supplies

21 hours ago

Persistent rains delaying the US soybean harvest have forced major processors like Cargill and ADM to offer steep premiums or scale back production. This supply shortage has driven cash prices up significantly, impacting downstream markets for soymeal and biofuel feedstocks.

reuters

2026-09-25

US Harvest Delays Send Soy Processors Scrambling for Supplies

US Harvest Delays Send Soy Processors Scrambling for Supplies

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