How should we view the port fees imposed by China and the U.S. on each other’s vessels—and which side is more affected?

Taking as an example a typical 59,000-ton, 8,500-TEU container vessel operating on the China-U.S. route: if operated by a Chinese company, a single port call could incur nearly USD 3 million in fees. Research institutions estimate this effectively amounts to an implicit tariff increase of approximately 4% on our exported goods. The U.S. calculation behind this move is quite clear. First, it aims to strike at China’s shipping industry: all vessels operated by Chinese companies are subject to the fee, inevitably driving up our logistics costs and eroding our competitiveness. Second, by extending the fee to vessels “built in China,” it seeks to undermine the global appeal of China’s shipbuilding industry—curbing, at its source, the development of China’s maritime capabilities. The U.S. likely assumed that even if China responded in kind, the direct impact on the U.S. would be minimal. After all, U.S.-owned or -operated commercial vessels are extremely few in number—and vessels built in the U.S. are virtually nonexistent. “You retaliate against us? But we don’t even have ships—what can you do to us?” Little did they expect China’s countermeasure to arrive so swiftly, precisely, and powerfully. After meticulous legal preparation, China’s Ministry of Transport announced that, effective October 14, “Special Port Dues for Vessels” would be levied on qualifying U.S.-related vessels on a reciprocal basis. This measure is highly sophisticated. First, reciprocity with escalation. Our initial rate is set at RMB 400 per net ton—slightly higher than the U.S. rate of USD 50—and likewise features a phased, incremental mechanism, reaching RMB 1,120 per net ton by 2028, matching the U.S. target of USD 140 per net ton. Second, precise scope coverage. Our levy applies not only to commercial vessels owned or operated by U.S. companies, organizations, or individuals—but also innovatively includes vessels owned or operated by enterprises in which U.S. capital holds, directly or indirectly, 25% or more equity. While the number of vessels built and operated in the U.S. is negligible, the number of vessels controlled—via 25%+ equity stakes—by U.S. capital is substantial. Applying the 25% equity threshold effectively prevents U.S. capital from evading sanctions through complex ownership structures or flag-switching maneuvers—greatly enhancing the practical effectiveness of the countermeasure. China handles the world’s largest port throughput—far exceeding that of the U.S.—and both its imports of industrial raw materials and exports of finished industrial goods dwarf those of the U.S. Any shipping company acquired by U.S. capital will now face equivalent heavy taxation. If one wishes to avoid this fee, there is only one option: divest U.S. capital. This decisive blow lands squarely on U.S. capital—and hits them where it hurts most. Moreover, the “acupressure-style” extended strike is equally impressive. On the very same day the port-fee countermeasure was announced, China imposed transaction bans on five subsidiaries of South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean (formerly Daewoo Shipbuilding)—a firm that actively cooperated with the U.S. Section 301 investigation: providing data, assisting evidence collection, participating in hearings, and even pledging massive investment in U.S. shipyards—making it a linchpin of the U.S.–South Korea shipbuilding alliance. China’s “precision strike” thus serves a dual purpose: deterring potential collaborators while severing the U.S. ambition to revive its shipbuilding industry with foreign assistance. Once again, China’s response embodies its distinctive strategic style—“swift as fire when attacking; immovable as a mountain when holding ground.”

With China’s formal countermeasures against the U.S. taking effect—including special port dues on U.S. vessels—what international implications will this generate?

In the Sino-U.S. contest over port fees, a rules-based approach to countermeasures has come sharply into focus. Leveraging the purported findings of its Section 301 investigation, the U.S. began imposing additional port service fees on vessels owned, operated, or built by Chinese enterprises on October 14, 2025. China responded in kind on the same day, imposing Special Port Dues on U.S.-related vessels—with fee standards precisely calibrated to match those of the U.S. Notably, China’s countermeasures were no impromptu reaction, but rather grounded in a robust legal framework. The revised Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on International Maritime Transport, adopted at the end of September 2025, explicitly authorize China to impose special fees or restrict port access when other countries adopt discriminatory measures. This provides unambiguous administrative regulation-based legitimacy for China’s countermeasures—a response far more resilient and sustainable than simple tariff hikes. At a deeper level, China’s countermeasures have already transcended sector-specific hedging, evolving into a concrete practice for strengthening China’s trade defense system. Beyond the precise port-fee countermeasures, China’s Ministry of Commerce will join forces with the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other maritime stakeholders to initiate a WTO-compliant legal challenge questioning the discriminatory nature of the U.S. measures.

US Proposes Fees on Spanish Ships and Caps on Olive Oil Imports Over Port Dispute

17 hours ago

The US Federal Maritime Commission proposed fees on Spanish ships and import restrictions on olive oil following a port access dispute. Spain plans to defend its interests while the measures await a 60-day public comment period.

reuters

2026-10-14

US Proposes Fees on Spanish Ships and Caps on Olive Oil Imports Over Port Dispute

US Proposes Fees on Spanish Ships and Caps on Olive Oil Imports Over Port Dispute

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