Venezuela, Brazil, Guyana, and Argentina: An Emerging New Oil Export Group

Currently, U.S. energy supermajor Chevron has consolidated its position in Venezuela’s oil sector through asset swaps, increasing its stake in the joint venture Petroindependencia to 49%. This entity operates the Carabobo 3 project in the Orinoco Heavy Oil Belt. Chevron has also secured rights to develop the Ayacucho 8 block in the same region and plans to raise its daily Venezuelan output from the current 260,000 barrels by 50% within the next 18–24 months. Meanwhile, several European companies have recently regained control over key assets under a new production-sharing framework. For instance, Spain’s Repsol aims to triple its Venezuelan oil output within three years; while the UK’s Shell expects to soon advance an agreement to jointly develop the Loran gas field (Venezuela) and the Manatee gas field (Trinidad) as a single integrated project—providing a fast-track pathway for natural gas exports. Italy’s Eni Group continues producing natural gas via its Cardón IV offshore joint venture with Repsol at the Perla field, which supplies around 30% of Venezuela’s domestic natural gas demand. Although the U.S. government has lifted Eni’s prior arrangement allowing it to repay oil deliveries with its own natural gas production, the company is currently negotiating a new payment mechanism compliant with U.S. sanctions. There is no shortage of heavyweight buyers for any product Venezuela can export. India has signaled its willingness to consider purchasing Venezuelan oil—as an alternative to further increasing its imports from the United States. A positive precedent already exists: before the U.S. intensified sanctions against Maduro’s Venezuela, India imported approximately 300,000 barrels per day of Venezuelan crude in 2019, with Reliance Industries serving as India’s primary buyer. More recently, Indian Oil Corporation emphasized its readiness to receive Venezuelan crude and added that it is among the few domestic refineries capable of processing such heavy, high-sulfur crude. For years, a hallmark of U.S. diplomatic policy toward the Middle East has been positioning India as the principal terminal buyer for oil from countries Washington targets for geopolitical reasons—including during Trump’s first term. Beyond acting as a key mediator among Arab states to enhance Washington’s influence over them, the U.S. has leveraged such trade to encourage India to serve as a political, economic, and military counterweight to China’s growing presence across the Asia-Pacific. Just as Washington collaborates with Venezuela, Javier Milei—the Argentine president whom Trump has called his “favorite president”—is likewise expected to see his country benefit from sustained U.S. corporate investment in its oil and gas sector. In October 2025, the U.S. Treasury extended $20 billion in emergency assistance to Argentina—including currency swap arrangements and direct purchases of Argentine sovereign bonds—explicitly designed to support Milei’s pro-market reforms and stabilize Argentina’s economy to attract foreign investment. On February 4, 2026, the two countries signed the Reciprocal Trade and Investment Agreement, accelerating U.S. investment in strategic Argentine sectors including energy and critical minerals.

America First: The Economic Calculus and Global Restructuring Behind Trump’s Second-Term National Security Strategy

Energy cooperation remains a vital pillar of U.S.–Middle East relations—but the model has shifted from "import dependence" to "export complementarity." By exporting LNG and petrochemical products to Middle Eastern countries while simultaneously importing heavy crude oil and natural gas condensate from the region, the U.S. has achieved mutually reinforcing energy trade. In 2024, U.S.–Middle East energy trade reached $80 billion—a 25% year-on-year increase. More significantly, U.S. economic cooperation with Middle Eastern nations now extends well beyond energy into high-end sectors such as artificial intelligence, defense technology, and nuclear energy. During President Trump’s 2025 visit to Gulf states, multiple major cooperative agreements were signed: U.S. firms secured $50 billion worth of contracts in AI and nuclear energy projects, while Gulf states were encouraged to deepen their investments in the United States—reaching $30 billion in direct investment in 2024, primarily in technology, energy, and real estate. The expansion of the Abraham Accords serves as a crucial instrument of U.S. Middle East strategy. By facilitating normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states, the Accords have opened new market opportunities for U.S. enterprises. In 2024, trade between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco totaled $20 billion. U.S. companies, establishing regional headquarters in Israel, have gained indirect access to Arab markets—leading to a 30% year-on-year increase in U.S. exports to Abraham Accords member states in 2025. Simultaneously, the U.S. has supported Middle Eastern countries’ efforts to combat extremism and stabilize the region, thereby creating a secure environment conducive to economic cooperation: foreign direct investment in the Middle East reached $150 billion in 2024—a 40% increase year-on-year—making the region a new global investment hotspot. (V) Africa: Transitioning from an "Aid Model" to an "Investment-Driven" Approach For decades, U.S. policy toward Africa centered on "ideological export + foreign aid," yet yielded minimal results—the continent’s poverty and conflict remained largely unresolved. The 2025 strategic document proposes shifting U.S. Africa policy "from foreign aid to investment-led growth," selectively forging partnerships with specific countries to harness Africa’s abundant natural resources and latent economic potential for mutual benefit. Energy and mineral resources lie at the core of U.S. investment in Africa. Africa possesses vast reserves of oil, natural gas, lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements—critical to U.S. energy independence and supply chain security. Between 2023 and 2025, U.S. investment in African energy and mining sectors totaled $40 billion: Chevron and ExxonMobil intensified oil development in Nigeria and Angola; U.S. firms invested in lithium and cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia—key raw materials for electric vehicle batteries—establishing vertically integrated supply chains spanning extraction to processing. Meanwhile, the U.S. leverages the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to grant select African countries duty-free access to the American market. In 2024, U.S. mineral imports from Africa reached $30 billion—a 50% year-on-year increase.

US to fund $7 billion of Argentina mineral, energy projects, document shows

17 hours ago

The US Export-Import Bank plans to fund up to $7 billion in critical minerals and energy projects in Argentina, targeting lithium, copper, and shale resources. This move supports American equipment manufacturers and deepens economic ties in the Western Hemisphere.

reuters

2026-09-22

US to fund $7 billion of Argentina mineral, energy projects, document shows

US to fund $7 billion of Argentina mineral, energy projects, document shows

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