Shale Revolution, U.S. Energy Imperialism, and Mexico’s Dependence — Monthly Review

The formidable presence of these and other financial conglomerates indicates that focusing solely on oil companies themselves is insufficient when assessing who profits from the Western petroleum industry. Although the supermajors drive most crude oil production in North America, the dynamics of oil production are ultimately inseparable from the interests of large financial groups that operate simultaneously in both financial markets and the day-to-day realities of energy production. Through deep involvement in the ownership of supermajors and the broader North American and European oil industries, these financial investors have become principal beneficiaries of the carbon economy. In global energy trade, the U.S. repositioning within the fossil fuel sector—sparked by the shale revolution—holds profound significance. This is not only because the United States has achieved self-sufficiency in the global natural gas market, but also because it has positioned itself as the world’s largest natural gas exporter. In 2023, the U.S. consumed approximately 80–83 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day, while producing 100.5 billion cubic feet daily—placing it in a position of production surplus. Exports surged from 0.2 billion cubic feet per day in 1990 to 19 billion cubic feet per day in 2022 (see Figure 2). In 2022, 11 billion cubic feet per day of U.S. natural gas exports were liquefied natural gas (LNG), primarily shipped by sea, while 9 billion cubic feet per day were delivered via pipelines. Consequently, the United States has become not only the world’s top natural gas producer but also the leading exporter of this energy resource (see Figure 3). This transformation into a major natural gas exporter has been driven by massive infrastructure investments enabling access to international shale gas markets. Notably, large-scale LNG terminals have been constructed along the Atlantic coast to supply Europe with LNG. Prominent examples include the Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana, completed in 2016, and the Cameron LNG terminal, completed in 2019, with export capacities of 4.5 and 2.2 billion cubic feet per day, respectively. Also noteworthy is the Corpus Christi terminal, built in 2019 in the Gulf of Mexico, with an export capacity of 1.8 billion cubic feet per day. These LNG facilities are operated and overseen by major energy firms such as Cheniere Energy, Sempra, TotalEnergies, and ExxonMobil—firms strongly backed by financial giants like BlackRock and Vanguard, underscoring the central role of financial capital in reviving U.S. energy imperialism. To fully grasp the rise of the United States as the world’s largest natural gas exporter, one must acknowledge its strategic exploitation of the Ukraine war and the disruption of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe. Although the interruption of Russian gas deliveries inflicted severe hardship on Europe’s working class—particularly through soaring inflation—Europe did not resist this crisis; instead, it accommodated U.S. interests by rapidly increasing imports of U.S. natural gas. Within just one year after the outbreak of the conflict, Europe’s LNG imports from the United States surged from 2.2 billion cubic feet per day at the end of 2021 to 6.3 billion cubic feet per day in 2024. This shift was not merely a change in supply—it represented a clear realignment: the U.S. share of Europe’s LNG imports rose from 22% to 45%, further consolidating its energy dominance at the expense of Europe’s economic stability.

Global Investment Talk, October 12: The Spin-Off Wave Returns—How to Seize Investment Opportunities? ETF Giants Wield Immense Power, Becoming Decisive Factors in Corporate Governance Battles

Here’s an industry update: Vanguard—the third-largest ETF provider—has disclosed its latest asset figures. Over the past nine months, the firm attracted $300 billion in inflows, bringing its total assets under management to $4.7 trillion. Examining Vanguard’s asset growth trajectory reveals explosive expansion beginning after 2000 and accelerating sharply following the subprime mortgage crisis—making it arguably the single greatest beneficiary of the passive investing boom. Indeed, the ‘Big Three’ ETF providers—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—are now also the world’s top three asset managers. Prior to Vanguard’s latest disclosure, their respective AUM stood at $5.7 trillion (BlackRock), $4.4 trillion (Vanguard), and $2.6 trillion (State Street)—figures so vast they rival national GDPs. A recent event in U.S. capital markets further demonstrates the immense influence wielded by these three giants: the proxy battle for board seats at Procter & Gamble (P&G). As many readers familiar with the background know, Nelson Peltz’s activist investment firm Trian Partners invested $3.5 billion in P&G and launched a forceful campaign demanding corporate reform and seeking board representation. The latest vote results show Peltz’s effort failed—he did not secure a board seat. In this contest, the ‘Big Three’ ETFs played a pivotal role—not because they actively chose sides, but because their index and ETF funds passively held P&G shares, effectively turning them into major shareholders. Reportedly, BlackRock and State Street together held 10% of P&G shares and supported Peltz. Yet Vanguard—holding 7% of P&G shares, making it the company’s largest single institutional shareholder—stood firmly with management. Ultimately, Peltz lost the vote—but he declared the fight far from over. Even institutions supporting management acknowledged that P&G genuinely needs substantive reforms, suggesting they may yet become Peltz’s allies in future campaigns. Meanwhile, industrial giant Honeywell announced its latest spin-off plan, intending to separate its aerospace business. Indeed, corporate spin-offs have recently drawn heightened investor attention as an investment theme. Statistics show that over the past decade, the S&P Spin-Off Index has outperformed the S&P 500 Index by nearly threefold. Why do companies spin off businesses? In U.S. markets, such moves often stem from shareholder pressure: for diversified conglomerates, valuation tends to focus on the company as a whole, potentially suppressing the premium valuation of high-growth or high-margin businesses. Thus, spin-offs serve as a capital-market strategy to highlight the standalone value of fast-growing units—and thereby lift the overall group’s valuation.