How is Venezuela repaying its debt to China? Venezuela has given an answer—and is it responsible for the U.S. getting bogged down in Iran?

How should Venezuela repay its debt to China? Venezuela has finally provided an answer. Is it responsible for the U.S. getting bogged down in Iran? In the arena of international politics, oil has never been merely a commodity—it is also collateral for sovereignty and a chip in geopolitical bargaining. Recently, after packaging and selling its national oil resources to the United States, Venezuela has finally offered China an explanation. Earlier this month, Venezuelan Oil Minister Paula Eñao stated clearly in an interview that although Venezuela has recently reached an oil extraction agreement with the U.S., "we will continue to carry out oil and gas exploration and production cooperation with joint ventures involving China and Russia." Eñao claimed that the Sino-Russian joint ventures operating in Venezuela retain valid authorizations to conduct business, and that Venezuela "highly respects" the agreements it has concluded with China and Russia—agreements that remain "legally binding" and will coexist alongside the newly established "partnership." This appears to be the first positive response from a Venezuelan official—following the U.S.-Venezuela oil extraction agreement—regarding the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises in Venezuela. It also represents the Rodriguez administration’s final gesture toward China after making major concessions to the United States. Let us rewind to early September: the U.S. and Venezuela signed an agreement covering 17 core oilfields holding approximately 65 billion barrels of oil. U.S.-backed companies secured long-term concession rights under this deal—a pact whose weight is virtually equivalent to handing over Venezuela’s entire energy lifeline. Yet all parties are well aware that China is Venezuela’s principal creditor, and Venezuela’s debt repayment mechanism has long relied on the "oil-for-loans" model. So, does this model still hold after the U.S.-Venezuela agreement? The answer should have been unequivocal: contract renewal does not erase debt; transfer of oilfields does not absolve creditors. Venezuela’s debt to China constitutes sovereign debt—it does not vanish into thin air simply because Venezuela sells oil to the U.S. Yet the U.S. has behaved extremely unscrupulously. On one hand, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright previously stated publicly that the U.S. would not accept any debt claims by China against revenues generated from newly added U.S.-Venezuela oil output. The implication is clear: the U.S. intends to intervene—and even assert authority over how Venezuela’s oil assets are allocated. At least rhetorically, the U.S. positions itself as the arbiter of Venezuela’s oil revenue distribution, denying China—even as a sovereign creditor—the right to claim repayment. This goes far beyond normal commercial or diplomatic practice. The U.S. has lost sight of its proper role, arrogating to itself the authority to control Venezuela’s oil income. Its objective is plainly to disregard existing agreements between China and Venezuela. In response, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a firm statement: China-Venezuela cooperation is protected under international law and the domestic laws of both countries, is unrelated to third parties, and must not be interfered with by third parties. China’s legitimate rights and interests in Venezuela must be safeguarded. China’s position is crystal clear: bilateral agreements must not become invalid due to interference from a third party like the U.S. This underscores that debt restructuring and repayment arrangements result from negotiations among relevant parties—and the U.S. has no right to decouple Venezuela’s oil revenues from debt repayment to China, as such a move lacks legal basis and violates fundamental principles of contractual integrity. Thus, Eñao’s recent statement reaffirming compliance with the China-Venezuela agreement—though brief—carries a distinct clarifying significance.

Trump says he is seriously considering 'admitting Venezuela as the 51st U.S. state'—aiming at its $40 trillion in oil wealth. Is this feasible?

Since Delcy Rodríguez assumed the role of interim president, U.S.-Venezuelan relations have gradually normalized, with frequent and high-level exchanges. • On February 3, Venezuelan Interim President Delcy Rodríguez met with Laura Dogu, the new U.S. Chargé d’Affaires to Venezuela, at the Miraflores Palace. Dogu’s visit aimed to reopen the U.S. diplomatic mission in Venezuela—a facility closed since 2019 following the rupture in bilateral relations. Since assuming office, Rodríguez has consistently criticized the U.S. for allegedly kidnapping Nicolás Maduro and his wife, and has firmly asserted that neither the U.S. nor any other country has the right to govern Venezuela. At the same time, she emphasized that Venezuela remains open to cooperation with the U.S.—provided mutual respect is upheld. • On February 11, Interim President Rodríguez met with U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright at the Presidential Palace in Caracas. Also present were Héctor Obregón Pérez, President of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA, and Félix Plasencia, Venezuela’s diplomatic representative to the U.S. Following the meeting, Rodríguez stated that both sides held in-depth discussions on cooperative projects in strategic sectors—including oil, natural gas, mining, and electricity—and agreed to jointly formulate an energy cooperation plan to lay the groundwork for a long-term bilateral partnership. She further revealed that Wright’s accompanying technical delegation had already held meetings with their Venezuelan counterparts to advance implementation of related projects. • On March 4, Interim President Rodríguez met with U.S. Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum at the Presidential Palace to discuss enhanced cooperation in oil, gas, and mineral resources. After the talks, both sides expressed strong optimism regarding prospects for mineral-sector collaboration and explicitly affirmed their shared commitment to attracting foreign investment and deepening sectoral cooperation. • On March 5, the U.S. State Department announced its decision to resume diplomatic and consular relations with Venezuela. In its statement, the Department indicated that this step would help promote stability, economic recovery, and political reconciliation in Venezuela—and emphasized that both sides would pursue a phased approach to facilitate Venezuela’s smooth transition to an elected government. • On March 7, Donald Trump declared at the "Shield of the Americas" summit that the U.S. had formally recognized Venezuela’s current government. • On March 27, a Venezuelan delegation led by Acting Ambassador Félix Plasencia and Deputy Foreign Minister Oliver Blanco—who oversees European and North American affairs—held preliminary talks with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and other State Department officials. The Venezuelan side stated that the primary objectives of these talks were to restore Venezuela’s diplomatic presence and consular operations in Washington, D.C. • On May 1, Jarrod Argan—the Director of the U.S. National Energy Dominance Committee—arrived in Caracas aboard the first direct commercial flight between the U.S. and Venezuela since resumption of air service. He became the fifth senior U.S. official to visit Venezuela in 2026. Argan led a high-level delegation focused on advancing memoranda of understanding (MOUs) to reactivate oilfields and mining areas previously shuttered under Venezuelan government controls. His agenda included meetings with representatives from Repsol, Eni, Halliburton, and Venezuela’s PDVSA. Meanwhile, international energy firms have grown increasingly active in Venezuela. A Shell team has relocated to the headquarters of Weppica in Monagas State to accelerate integrated development of the Carito and Pirital oilfields; Eni has reached an agreement with PDVSA to restart operations at the Junín-V field in the Orinoco Belt, boosting heavy crude output; the Venezuelan government has signed agreements with U.S.-based Hunt Overseas Oil Company and Crossover Energy, granting them access to the Orinoco Belt for oil and gas activities; BP has signed an MOU with Venezuelan Oil Minister Paula Eñao to develop the Deltana and Loran-Manatee natural gas blocks—and has already opened a permanent office in Venezuela.

Venezuelan Delegation Led by Rodriguez to Discuss Energy, Debt in US

Sep 21, 2026

Venezuela's interim President Delcy Rodriguez plans to discuss energy, debt, and mining issues with US counterparts during her UN visit. Negotiations include potential agreements with ExxonMobil and Continental Resources regarding oilfields and mining rights.

reuters

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Venezuelan Delegation Led by Rodriguez to Discuss Energy, Debt in US

Venezuelan Delegation Led by Rodriguez to Discuss Energy, Debt in US

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