65 billion barrels of oil, a 25-year agreement: Has Venezuela’s oil bowl truly been carried away this time?

Yet one day later, Venezuela’s interim president, Jorge Rodríguez, announced a different version of the agreement on national television. He stated it is a 25-year bilateral development project covering 17 strategic oilfields, expected to attract approximately $100 billion in investment, raise daily oil production to over 1.5 million barrels, and generate more than $209 billion in tax revenue for the Venezuelan government. One version emphasizes ‘control,’ while the other stresses ‘development cooperation.’ Earlier, U.S. officials had reportedly indicated that the development rights for the relevant oilfields could last up to 100 years—whereas Venezuela insists the project term is 25 years. Since the full text of the agreement has not been made public, external observers cannot yet confirm all its details. However, according to fact sheets released by the White House, the U.S. side—beyond holding equity stakes—has secured arrangements to purchase part of the output at cost price, and retains priority purchasing rights over the remainder. Chevron, for instance, plans to invest roughly $7 billion to develop two large heavy-oil fields in the Orinoco Belt. This capital is vital for Venezuela, which has suffered from chronic underinvestment and technological neglect; for the United States, it represents a crucial opportunity to re-enter Venezuela’s oil sector. What does 65 billion barrels actually mean? Venezuela’s proven oil reserves stand at approximately 303 billion barrels—the world’s largest. The agreement covers 65 billion barrels, roughly one-fifth of its total reserves: a substantial portion of Venezuela’s petroleum endowment. Yet this does not mean the U.S. can immediately extract or export 65 billion barrels. The term ‘control’ here does not necessarily equate to ownership of the resource; the oil remains underground in Venezuela, and legal sovereignty over the resource may still rest with Venezuela. 1.5 million barrels per day—how far back must we go? A daily output of 1.5 million barrels is not an unattainable new record. Around 2013, Venezuela was still producing about 2.5 million barrels per day; in the late 1990s, peak output exceeded 3 million barrels per day. On August 25, Rodríguez stated Venezuela’s current daily output had surpassed 1.23 million barrels—the highest since February 2019. Earlier this year, however, output stood at only around 940,000 barrels per day. Now, having signed a long-term agreement and attracted major investment, Venezuela’s immediate priority is restoring production to past levels. The oil industry is not as simple as turning a valve to release oil. Equipment requires maintenance, wells need refurbishment, heavy-oil extraction demands advanced technology, and transportation and refining infrastructure demands sustained investment. Years of underinvestment, sanctions, and mismanagement have converged, leaving Venezuela’s oil industry far removed from the notion that ‘resources underground automatically translate into revenue above ground.’ When a country must sign long-term agreements to secure funding and technology, possessing resources does not guarantee retaining full autonomy. At $65 per barrel, how much does Venezuela keep? Another figure reveals even more about the agreement’s weight. Rodríguez stated that, using a benchmark price of $65 per barrel, Venezuela receives approximately $19 per barrel sold. In other words, for every $65 barrel sold, Venezuela retains less than one-third.

The Venezuela oil narrative is purely theatrical.

The Pentagon previously authorized military operations explicitly targeting oil. Iraq in 2003 stands as clear evidence. The Gulf War was, at its core, about securing oil access, regional dominance, and sustaining petrodollar hegemony—regardless of whether the narrative about weapons of mass destruction was constructed for public consumption. Thus, the question is not whether the Pentagon acts for oil. Rather, it is why Venezuelan oil in 2026 fails to reach the strategic threshold that Iraqi oil achieved in 2003. Iraq represented multiple strategic imperatives: controlling the flow of Middle Eastern oil through the critical chokepoint of the Persian Gulf—through which roughly 20% of global oil supply transits; influencing global pricing via OPEC’s second-largest proven reserves; preserving the petrodollar system by ensuring oil transactions continue in U.S. dollars; and preventing a hostile regional hegemon from weaponizing Gulf energy supplies against Western economies. Iraq’s oil production potential exceeded 3 million barrels per day—and offered significant room for expansion. Though damaged by sanctions, its infrastructure remained largely intact and capable of rapid restoration. Venezuela in 2026 lacks these conditions. Due to sanctions, mismanagement, and lack of investment, output has plummeted from a peak of 3 million barrels per day to roughly 700,000 barrels per day. Infrastructure has severely deteriorated, requiring tens of billions of dollars to restore previous output levels. Venezuela lies in the Western Hemisphere, with no strategic chokepoints. For years, it has been sanctioned and marginalized by global markets. With the U.S. holding the world’s largest proven domestic reserves—and ready access to Canadian heavy oil, Saudi and UAE production, and rapidly expanding shale output—Venezuelan oil is no longer pivotal to global supply. Timing reveals actual priorities. If oil were the primary motive, such action would have occurred during the 2019 Guaidó crisis, when output hovered near 1 million barrels per day, infrastructure damage was comparatively limited, and international support for regime change was stronger. The January 2026 operation coincides precisely with critical minerals becoming the Pentagon’s top funding priority—receiving $7.5 billion in appropriations—China’s April 2025 rare-earth export restrictions signaling willingness to weaponize supply chains—China’s full integration of control over Venezuela’s mining operations—and the operational launch of IRGC drone-manufacturing facilities on Venezuelan soil. Target patterns confirm this. Struck sites included the Tinaco military base, Miranda Air Base, La Guaira port, telecommunications infrastructure, and presidential facilities—targets aimed at regime overthrow and degrading military command-and-control. PDVSA, Venezuela’s state oil company, reported that production and refining operations continued normally, with no damage to critical facilities. Had oil been the main objective, refineries and production infrastructure would have ranked first for seizure or destruction. They remained untouched. Trump’s public statements about managing Venezuela and controlling its oil production serve domestic political messaging. The American public understands oil. This framing has been entrenched since Iraq. Constructing action around oil control provides a simple, familiar rationale—requiring no explanation of tantalum supply-chain vulnerabilities or IRGC manufacturing infrastructure.

Venezuela's PDVSA Controlling Fire at Cardon Refinery's Cracker, Sources Say

Apr 29, 2026

Venezuela's PDVSA is battling a large fire at the Cardon refinery's fluid catalytic cracker unit following recent power outages, with no injuries reported. The incident highlights ongoing operational instability at the facility, which was running below capacity prior to the blaze.

reuters

2026-04-29

Venezuela's PDVSA Controlling Fire at Cardon Refinery's Cracker, Sources Say

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Venezuela Government Announces Debt Restructuring Process Including State Oil Firm PDVSA

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Venezuela Starts Sovereign, PDVSA Debt Overhaul; Liabilities Seen Above $150 Billion

2026-05-14

Ghost Oil Tankers’ Reversal Signals Venezuela’s Long Road Ahead

2026-05-15

Venezuela Launches Comprehensive Debt Restructuring Amidst PDVSA Hurdles