Is it true that 'Western electoral democracies today sustain their high-welfare systems through six centuries of global plunder—from the Age of Exploration to the present'?

Step 2: Reach an agreement with Zambia: Glencore gains rights to all copper extracted, but commits to hiring a certain percentage of local employees and pays customs duties to the Zambian government. Naturally, this sounds unattractive on its own—so Glencore privately provides roughly $10 million in ‘cooperation funding’ to the Zambian representative as a gesture of goodwill. This is absolutely *not* bribery—merely a sincere expression of cooperative intent. In a country like Zambia, $10 million would make that individual the nation’s wealthiest person. Once the agreement is signed, it must be verified and confirmed by the World Trade Organization (WTO), so that if the Zambian side later attempts to nullify the deal upon discovering Glencore’s ‘private cooperation,’ it faces WTO sanctions. Correction: My mistake—this is *not* the WTO, but rather the World Bank, which wields far greater leverage. The World Bank’s notorious track record merits its own dedicated answer—I won’t elaborate here, but this was indeed my error. After signing the mining agreement, extraction begins. To maximize efficiency, all equipment must be imported from abroad—preferably irreplaceable EU-sourced machinery—and even the engineering team must be brought in from the EU, ensuring the host country cannot operate the equipment independently should relations sour. • Once ore is extracted, Glencore refines it locally—ensuring environmental pollution remains in Zambia. • After processing, Glencore sells the copper on international markets. Suppose the extracted copper is valued at $3 billion. If the Zambian government levies a 25% export duty, Glencore would owe $750 million—unacceptable. Instead, Glencore sells the copper to a shell company it controls for $1, paying the Zambian government just 25 cents—fair, and fully compliant with contractual formalities. • Does Glencore ship this copper to Switzerland? Of course not—it’s merely registered there to minimize tariffs. The copper physically remains in Zambia. Glencore then ships it to various European countries using Panamanian-flagged vessels—because Panamanian seafarers’ wages are low. In short: Glencore builds a $500-million facility, bribes one official with $10 million, pays several million in salaries, hands over 25 cents in export duty, incurs $240 million in import duties—and pockets $2.7 billion in profit. Naturally, the Swiss government earns far more than the Zambian government—but can Africans possibly compare themselves to noble European masters? Preposterous. Note: This is a real-world case. You may verify it against Swiss import statistics. As for why Switzerland—a country with no bilateral trade agreement with Zambia—imports such massive volumes of Zambian copper, I’ll leave that question deliberately unanswered. Correction: Given some readers’ penchant for semantic nitpicking, I revise the earlier claim: Glencore does *not* sell copper for $1. Rather, Glencore’s subsidiary Mopani Copper Mines sells copper products to its affiliate Glencore International AG at prices approximately 25% below the London Metal Exchange (LME) market rate. Revision 1: Seeing many people defend Glencore—how amusing.

Zambia’s ambition, confidence, and hidden concerns regarding its 3-million-ton copper production target

#Zambia #LobitoCorridor #AfricanMining #Copper #AfricanMiningInvestmentConference #Africa #ChinaAfricaCooperation #ChinaAfricaTrade #GoingGlobal #Exports The turning point at 890,000 tons: From near-collapse to bottoming out and rebounding February 9, 2026, Cape Town, South Africa. Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema stood on stage at the African Mining Conference, holding a newly released set of figures: Zambia’s copper output in 2025 reached 890,346 metric tons. This represents an 8% increase over 2024. To outsiders, this may seem like an ordinary growth rate—but for Zambia’s mining sector, which endured three consecutive years of declining output from 2021 to 2023 and was left far behind by the Democratic Republic of Congo, this figure signals successful stabilization. Hichilema’s confidence stems from tangible investments delivered in the past year. Canada’s First Quantum Minerals completed the S3 expansion project at the Kansanshi mine in August 2025—a $1.25-billion capital expenditure that directly lifted production upward. Coupled with the super-expansion plan for the Lumwana mine, Zambia has finally emerged from its darkest hour: a period of investor exodus triggered by policy volatility. The Zambian government now publicly targets 3 million tons of annual copper output by 2031. This goal is highly ambitious—current output stands at less than one-third of that target. Achieving it will require more than squeezing additional yield from existing mines; new heavyweight investors must enter the arena. Middle Eastern capital enters—and Vedanta dons an American façade Under the spotlight in Cape Town, what matters more than output recovery is *who is footing the bill*. Zambia’s mining capital structure is undergoing dramatic geopolitical realignment. The Mopani Copper Mine—once stalled due to debt crises—is now majority-owned (51%) by International Resources Holding, a firm backed by Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund. Oil-rich Gulf capital has decisively entered the copper-and-cobalt race, ending the long-standing duopoly between Western mining giants and Chinese investors. Middle Eastern capital has arrived as an undeniable third pole. A subtler shift is unfolding at Konkola Copper Mines. Though India’s Vedanta Resources has regained operational control, its tactics reflect acute geopolitical savvy: In late 2025, it incorporated a U.S.-based subsidiary—CopperTech Metals Inc.—and transferred Konkola’s assets into it. This American ‘shell’ is no coincidence. Its existence qualifies Konkola for low-interest loans from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), bypassing India’s higher financing costs—and simultaneously brands Konkola as aligned with Western critical-minerals supply-chain security priorities. CopperTech plans to raise $1.5 billion, earmarked specifically to resolve the chronic flooding plaguing Konkola’s deep ore bodies. The Lobito Corridor: Substance or spectacle? Hichilema repeatedly emphasized supply chains and transport—not least to promote the Lobito Corridor. This railway linking Zambia’s Copperbelt Province to Angola’s Atlantic port of Lobito is widely seen as key to overcoming logistical bottlenecks tied to the aging TAZARA Railway and South Africa’s Durban port. Yet investors in attendance must soberly assess the gap between vision and reality. As of February 2026, although the U.S. and EU have pledged hundreds of millions of dollars—and the EU recently disbursed $130 million to rehabilitate the Mwinilunga–Jimbe road along the Angolan border—the 500-kilometer new rail segment *within Zambia* has yet to see a single rail laid.

Zambia Firm Accuses Abu Dhabi’s IRH of Breaching Mopani Mine Deal

17 hours ago

Zambia's ZCCM-IH accused Abu Dhabi's IRH of breaching the Mopani copper mine deal due to funding and operational failures. The dispute impacts Zambia's goal to triple copper production amidst constrained global supply.

bloomberg

2026-09-28

Zambia Firm Accuses Abu Dhabi’s IRH of Breaching Mopani Mine Deal

Zambia Firm Accuses Abu Dhabi’s IRH of Breaching Mopani Mine Deal

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