The EU's environmental policies are becoming increasingly surreal—is it really because policymakers are incompetent?

First, let’s address the surface layer: Why does the EU constantly regulate seemingly trivial matters? Bottle caps, eco-design requirements for products, battery passports, and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism—all share one key feature: they cost the EU almost nothing directly. Setting standards, establishing thresholds, and mandating corporate compliance require little more than a stroke of the pen in Brussels; the fiscal ledger barely registers a dent. Yet ask the EU to fund steel plant decarbonization, subsidize heating system upgrades for low-income households, or compensate farmers for green transition shortfalls—and it immediately runs out of money. Roughly 90% of innovation policy funding resides with member states; only about 10% is managed at the EU level. As highlighted in Draghi’s report, the EU would need to inject an additional €750–800 billion annually—roughly 5% of its GDP—to meet its decarbonization goals. Since the purse strings aren’t in its hands, policy naturally slides toward ‘regulation instead of investment.’ In plain terms: it’s not that the EU doesn’t want to tackle big challenges—it simply lacks the ammunition in its own arsenal. Dig deeper: Why doesn’t it control the purse strings? Because fiscal integration remains a non-starter for member states. The benefits of green transition are long-term and diffuse, while the costs are immediate and concentrated. Expanding the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to cover road transport and residential heating instantly raises heating and driving costs—prompting Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia to demand postponement until 2030, while Germany, France, and Nordic countries insist on sticking to the original timeline. Even France’s own report acknowledges that the Green Deal fuels cost-driven inflation—and already, 34 million Europeans live in energy poverty. In 2024, 900 tractors flooded Brussels’ streets—not protesting ‘environmentalism’ per se, but objecting to bearing a disproportionate share of transition costs without adequate compensation or fairness mechanisms. So how does the EU respond? By granting flexibility, delaying deadlines, and loosening rules at critical junctures. Its ambition remains nominally intact—but in practice, it has tacitly conceded: it possesses no unified mechanism to absorb or distribute transition costs. The third layer is harder still: energy security has effectively hijacked green transition. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU did reduce its dependence on Russian energy—but merely shifted fossil fuel imports from Russia to Gulf countries. In 2024, fossil fuels accounted for over 75% of the EU’s total imports from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. So long as fossil fuel import dependency persists, energy security remains precarious—and green transition ceases to be purely an environmental calculation. It becomes a security calculation too. Compounding this is defense spending. When security threats mount, military budgets expand—and climate budgets shrink. A European Parliament study estimates that increased NATO defense expenditures over the next decade could generate an additional 1.32 billion tonnes of CO₂ emissions, while defense spending routinely crowds out social and climate investments. Between guns and butter, green transition is often the first slice of butter to be cut away. Under such conditions, expecting the EU to rationally advance environmental policy based solely on cost-benefit analysis is unrealistic. The fourth layer is industrial anxiety. Initially, the EU hoped to procure green products globally within a free-trade framework—only to find the U.S. luring green industries home with massive subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act, while China’s cost advantages and scale in solar PV and batteries loom large: China’s clean energy capacity is already 2.4 times that of the EU, and its deployment pace is five times faster. Today, fewer than nine EU-based companies remain in solar manufacturing.

A record for reference: providing Europe with affordable, secure, and sustainable energy

• This summer, the EU approved its first EU-wide hydrogen project. • Launched an EU-wide energy-saving exchange initiative, offering recommendations to citizens and businesses on how to save approximately 13 billion cubic meters of natural gas imports. • By 1 November 2022, filled all EU gas storage facilities to at least 80% capacity. • In the event of natural gas supply disruptions, the EU will coordinate demand reduction measures. Medium-term measures to be completed by 2027: • Develop a new ‘REPowerEU’ plan under the revised Recovery and Resilience Facility, supporting €300 billion in investments and reforms. • Establish a €3 billion pre-commercial project fund under the Innovation Fund to accelerate industrial decarbonization. • Introduce new legislation and guidance to speed up renewable energy permitting—especially in designated low-environmental-risk ‘go-to’ areas. • Invest in integrated infrastructure networks combining gas and electricity systems. • Raise the EU’s 2030 energy efficiency target from 9% to 13%. • Increase the EU’s 2030 renewable energy target from 40% to 45%. • Propose new EU initiatives to ensure industry access to critical raw materials. • Improve energy efficiency in the transport sector. • Accelerate hydrogen deployment: build 17.5 GW of electrolyzer capacity by 2025 to power EU industry, and achieve 10 million tonnes of domestically produced renewable hydrogen by 2030. • Establish a modern regulatory framework for hydrogen. Clean Energy: Ending the EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels requires massive renewable energy deployment, accelerated electrification, and replacing fossil-fuel-based heat and fuels across industry, buildings, and transport. The clean energy transition helps lower energy prices over time and reduces import dependency. Renewables are the cheapest and cleanest energy source—and can be produced within the EU, cutting reliance on energy imports. The European Commission proposes raising the EU’s 2030 renewable energy target from 40% to 45%. The REPowerEU Plan aims to reach 1,236 GW of renewable electricity generation capacity by 2030—compared to just 1,067 GW projected under the ‘Fit for 55’ package. The EU Solar Strategy will drive photovoltaic expansion. As part of REPowerEU, it targets over 320 GW of newly installed solar PV capacity by 2025—more than double current levels—and nearly 600 GW by 2030. By 2027, this solar capacity will displace 9 billion cubic meters of natural gas consumption annually. Clean Industry: Replacing coal, oil, and gas in industrial processes reduces dependence on Russian fossil fuels, advances cleaner energy use, strengthens industrial competitiveness, and supports global technological leadership. • By 2030, electrification, energy efficiency improvements, and renewable energy use in industry will save 35 billion cubic meters of natural gas—exceeding the ‘Fit for 55’ target. • The largest natural gas savings will come from sectors with the highest gas consumption—non-metallic minerals, cement, glass and ceramics, chemical production, and refineries—reducing gas use by around 22 billion cubic meters. • By 2030, around 30% of the EU’s primary steel output is expected to be produced using renewable hydrogen for decarbonization.

Survey: Most EU Citizens Back Urgent Transition to Greener Fuel

19 hours ago

An EIB survey reveals 75% of EU citizens urge a rapid shift away from fossil fuels toward renewable energy, with 87% prioritizing low-carbon solutions. Annual EIB energy financing doubled since 2022, reaching €33 billion in 2025 for over 870 projects.

reuters

2026-11-04

Survey: Most EU Citizens Back Urgent Transition to Greener Fuel

Survey: Most EU Citizens Back Urgent Transition to Greener Fuel

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