Why does VCI argue that the EU's METSAF framework fails to make German industrial electricity costs internationally competitive?

VCI argues that METSAF’s relief effect is insufficient because: (1) the aid is only temporary—limited to one year until December 31—offering no long-term investment security; (2) the €50/MWh minimum price floor prevents full utilization of even the 50% relief, especially since the 2026 annual futures price is €87/MWh and cannot be reduced below €50/MWh; (3) higher war-driven electricity costs won’t be reflected in Germany’s industrial electricity price until the following year due to last year’s fixed reference price; (4) only up to half of eligible electricity consumption can be relieved; and (5) network charges, taxes, and levies remain untouched and are added back to the final price, further diluting the relief.

What key change did the EU Commission introduce in METSAF regarding the cumulation of electricity aid instruments, and how does VCI assess its impact?

The EU Commission revised METSAF to allow, for 2026, limited cumulation of electricity price compensation and the industrial electricity price aid for the *same* amount of electricity—unlike the earlier CISAF (June 2025), which prohibited such cumulation for identical consumption and only permitted it across *separately delineated* electricity uses. VCI acknowledges this change ‘temporarily strengthens the relief effect, at least for some particularly energy-intensive companies’, but stresses the improvement is marginal—‘the relief effect is, however, only slightly increased’—and still falls far short of delivering the ‘substantial help’ and ‘reliable perspectives beyond the [Middle East] war’ needed by German chemical industry investors.