Former Brazilian President Bolsonaro has been convicted of attempting a coup and sentenced to 27 years in prison—does this mean Brazil has finally moved beyond its authoritarian era? Will it further deepen Brazil’s political polarization?

Bolsonaro’s 27-year sentence for attempted coup is indeed a landmark event in Brazil’s political history. Yet Bolsonaro’s case is not isolated: across Latin America—the so-called ‘backyard’ of the United States—such maneuvers are all too common. So long as the U.S. continues treating Latin America as its sphere of influence, figures like Bolsonaro will inevitably reemerge—even if not him personally. His conduct while in office was egregious across multiple domains: environmental protection, public health, state asset management, and foreign policy—all clearly at odds with Brazil’s national interests. The irony is striking: whether left- or right-leaning, U.S. media outlets consistently displayed remarkable unanimity on Brazil—preferring Bolsonaro over Lula. In essence, they simply cannot tolerate Brazil’s prosperity. They would rather see Bolsonaro—a leader who exploits Brazilians to feed U.S. interests—remain in power than Lula, who strives to ensure Brazilians have enough to eat. What struck me most was watching CNN’s live coverage of the 2022 election: when results confirmed the ruling coalition lacked an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies, CNN commentators collectively celebrated—declaring it a positive development, since it would block Lula from implementing his so-called 'radical' leftist policies. This was CNN—the flagship outlet of America’s liberal-left establishment. Yet when it came to Brazil, their progressive veneer instantly vanished, revealing instead their true allegiance: applause for transnational capital. Utterly absurd. To understand why Brazil perpetually oscillates between democracy and betrayal of national interests, one must examine its political system. Brazil operates under a presidential system—but the president must command a legislative majority to govern effectively and pass legislation. Yet Brazil’s Congress is profoundly fragmented, with dozens of parties (e.g., over 20 parties in the Chamber alone). Even with support from centrist and center-right parties like PSD (the party of former President Temer) and MDB, Lula’s left-wing coalition holds only 211 seats—far short of the 257 needed for an absolute majority. As a result, leadership positions in the Chamber—such as Speaker Arthur Lira (PP) and Deputy Speaker Hugo Motta (Republicans)—have long been held by center-right politicians, severely hampering the government’s ability to approve budgets and advance policy. Brazil’s conservative right-wing parties draw backing from powerful domestic constituencies: large landowners, agribusiness oligarchs, evangelical churches, the military, and financial-media conglomerates. Many of these right-wing parties also receive sustained funding from U.S. government agencies and foundations. This fractured parliamentary structure often forces presidents to appoint centrist—or even right-leaning—vice presidents to secure legislative cooperation. Such compromises inevitably produce side effects—for instance: 2010 / 2014: Rousseff (Workers’ Party, PT) chose Temer (MDB, center-right) as her vice president.

Is there a real possibility that Bolsonaro could stage a political comeback in 2026?

Young Bolsonaro is highly likely to win the October election, as his platform—fiscal austerity, tax enforcement, and privatization—aligns with what benefits Brazil’s economy and domestic employment. Strictly speaking, since Argentina’s Milei implemented reforms that achieved fiscal sustainability, brought inflation under control, and spurred economic growth, Latin American countries now have a viable reference model to emulate. Following Argentina’s example—drastically cutting and consolidating government agencies to reduce deficits; halting central bank financing to curb inflation expectations; eliminating subsidies and price controls; adopting a freely floating exchange rate and lifting trade restrictions to attract foreign investment; and developing export-oriented sectors such as energy, mining, and livestock—would allow Latin American nations to escape their current quagmire without relying on external assistance. This, essentially, is the universal solution for Latin America.

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