How should we view the Financial Times’ report stating that Ukraine’s steel industry has been severely devastated by Russia?

Ukraine is truly suffering terribly. Oil refineries producing gasoline can supply the military—so refineries are military targets. Power plants generating electricity can power weapons factories—so power plants are military targets. Supermarkets selling food can feed soldiers—so supermarkets are military targets. In short, from the Russian military’s perspective, the entire territory of Ukraine is a military target. At 4:12 p.m. local time on July 26, an ATB chain fresh-food supermarket operating in Chernihiv City, northern Ukraine, was struck by a Russian ‘Geranium-4’ jet-powered drone. The attack occurred during daytime peak shopping hours, with dense crowds inside. Ukrainian authorities reported casualties: two civilians killed (including a 9–10-year-old child) and 25 injured, among them three children. On July 3, 2026, a large-scale poultry farm in Kherson Oblast—Chornobayivka—was attacked. Russian forces dropped several guided aerial bombs on this European-leading integrated chicken-and-egg production complex, igniting widespread fires across the facility, destroying numerous buildings, and causing preliminary estimated losses amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. The farm belongs to UkrLandFarming, a major Ukrainian agricultural group specializing in egg and broiler production and agricultural exports—one of Ukraine’s key sources of foreign exchange. As early as 2022, during Russia’s initial occupation of Kherson, the farm suffered catastrophic losses due to power outages disrupting feed supply, resulting in the death of 4.7 million birds. Since eggs from this farm nourish Ukrainian soldiers, it is, naturally, deemed a military target. Since February 2022, no civilian passenger flights have been able to land at Ukrainian airports—thanks entirely to Russian bombing. Let’s focus solely on Kyiv—not counting other cities. From January 1 through July 20, spanning 201 days: Only large-scale coordinated missile-and-drone air raids are counted. During this period, Kyiv endured 22 such raids. That averages one major bombardment every nine days. If smaller-scale attacks are included, the average drops to one strike every five days. January: Jan. 20—nationwide missile-and-drone raid on Kyiv → 1 raid February: 3 large-scale raids → 3 raids March: 4 large-scale raids → 4 raids April: 3 large-scale raids → 3 raids May: 5 large-scale raids—including May 24, the largest raid of the first half of the year → 5 raids June: Two major strikes on June 2 and June 15 → 2 raids July 1–20: Large-scale raids on July 2, July 6, July 14, and July 19 → 4 raids We owe thanks to the Soviet Union: Kyiv was deliberately built as a nuclear-war-resistant city—so its reinforced concrete infrastructure remains remarkably resilient. Thus, even Russia’s large-scale raids typically kill only a few people. For example, on June 2, a nine-story residential building collapsed after being hit; three children were among the dead, and 66 people were injured. On June 15, multiple residential buildings and a market were struck in the city center; four adults and one child died, and 23 others were injured. Ukraine has already been reduced to barefoot poverty—because the whole country is treated as a military target. Ukraine has been battered into ruins—reduced to barefoot destitution. Under relentless Russian bombardment, Ukraine has become utterly barefoot.

A perfect storm: How will disruptions to logistics and port shutdowns impact Ukrainian businesses and ordinary citizens’ wallets?

Given this—and falling domestic purchase prices—many producers are opting to hold back their harvests, placing their faith in the Ukrainian military’s ability to reopen sea routes. Warehousing capacity has indeed expanded during wartime, currently accommodating approximately 50 million tons of grain. Yet Russian strikes could also hit these storage facilities. Ports may reopen—but as long as Russian aggression continues, ports and vessels remain perpetually vulnerable to further attacks. More critically: July, August, and September traditionally mark the opening months of the new marketing year—when farmers and traders settle accounts with creditors, demonstrate solvency, and prepare for sowing. Money is essential—not just for smallholders, but also for agro-holdings, which must prove stable, reliable income to their creditors. ‘It’s about survival.’ Every producer and trader has their own story—but all must prepare for a protracted crisis, says Oleksandr Verzhkovskyi, General Director of agricultural company IMC, whose fields lie in northeastern Ukraine—in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Poltava oblasts. ‘Historically, exporting our main crops—corn, sunflower, and winter wheat—via western borders has never been cost-effective for us,’ he explains. Westward exports cost roughly twice as much as traditional shipments via Odesa. The Danube route isn’t optimal either—about 50% more expensive—but the company used it during 2022–23. Now, he believes the situation is even harder: ‘In 2022, we avoided Polish border exports, relying instead on Danube ports and Romania—including the port of Constanța. Today, however, we have no alternative but to begin using western routes—even though costs will be exorbitant. Right now, it’s not about profit—it’s about survival.’ Verzhkovskyi notes that the Danube and western border routes combined can absorb only about half of his company’s grain and oilseed output—goods for which customers are already waiting. Thus, while seeking new export channels, the company must simultaneously secure additional storage for goods it cannot ship in the near term. Exporting only half its output allows the company to fulfill only its most basic obligations—such as payments to the state and employees—and only for a limited time. ‘We have no choice but to tighten our belts and endure this period. No one knows how long it will last. We still have some reserves—but they’re finite,’ Verzhkovskyi says. He adds: ‘Besides exports, imports matter too—fuel and crop protection agents—which previously arrived by sea.’ What do seaports deliver? In the first half of 2026, Ukrainian seaports handled over 40 million tons of cargo—approximately half of it, valued at $12.5 billion, consisted of agricultural products. Metal and ore exports contributed another $2 billion. By comparison, during the same six-month period, Ukraine received $18 billion in international aid from partner countries. Overall, seaports handle 90% of Ukraine’s agricultural exports, 50% of its steel exports, 95% of its pig iron and iron ore exports. Ports are equally vital for imports—including containerized goods and coking coal, now critically scarce in Ukraine following the occupation of parts of Donbas. Cargo destined for ports and other border checkpoints moves primarily by rail. Valerii Tkachov, Deputy Head of Commercial Operations at Ukrainian Railways, states that even during wartime, Ukraine exported between 45 and 50 million tons of grain—90% of it headed toward the Greater Odesa region. According to him, western border checkpoints account for only 9% of total agricultural exports, while Danube ports represent roughly 1%. These figures reflect underlying realities: transporting one ton of goods via port costs approximately $25–$35, whereas shipping the same ton via Poland costs €90–€110.

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ArcelorMittal to book $1 billion charge as Russian strikes shutter Ukraine plant

ArcelorMittal to book $1 billion charge as Russian strikes shutter Ukraine plant

FAQ