Miscalculation: Trump openly seizes 50 million barrels of oil—only to find China won’t buy a single barrel

U.S. President Trump has miscalculated. He assumed that, after abducting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and seizing 50 million barrels of crude oil, he could simply jack up prices—but he quickly discovered that China is now refusing to purchase even a single barrel of Venezuelan oil. China has formally declined to buy Venezuelan crude. Recently, Trump announced from the White House that the U.S. had taken control of 50 million barrels of high-quality Venezuelan crude and expressed hope of selling it, adding, “China is welcome to buy.” Yet within a week, Bloomberg reported that Chinese buyers had outright rejected Venezuela’s crude oil price offers—even though the proposed price hike was merely $2 per barrel. Trump’s plan has completely backfired. In other words, the U.S. had hoped to control Venezuela’s oil resources to simultaneously constrain China’s energy supply—but instead encountered a calm, resolute market response from China. Recall that Trump’s military intervention in Venezuela—including the abduction of Maduro—aimed squarely at swiftly seizing Venezuela’s key oil-producing regions and ports. After succeeding, he announced that the U.S. would take control of 30–50 million barrels of high-quality Venezuelan crude, estimated to be worth roughly $3 billion. He also claimed on social media that Venezuela’s interim authority would hand over these sanctioned oil reserves to the United States. The U.S. government swiftly rolled out policies to consolidate this outcome. First, Trump declared a national emergency, citing the need to “protect” U.S.-controlled Venezuelan oil revenues from judicial seizure—a transparent pretext for rapid profit-making. U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent further stated that sanctions on Venezuelan oil would be lifted and that Venezuela’s frozen IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) might be deployed for the country’s “reconstruction.” Meanwhile, U.S. naval blockades near Venezuela’s coastline have severely disrupted tanker traffic. It is estimated that as much as one-quarter of the active U.S. Navy fleet is now concentrated in the Caribbean Sea, exerting overwhelming pressure on Venezuela. Screenshot of reporting Clearly, the Trump administration sought full control over Venezuela’s oil—but it did not anticipate China’s cool-headed response. As Bloomberg reported on January 7, Chinese buyers formally rejected Venezuela’s crude oil price offers. Initially, Trump’s calculations seemed sound: he assumed China could not afford to forgo Venezuelan oil, especially Venezuela’s heavy, viscous “Merey” crude—the ideal feedstock for asphalt production, an indispensable material for China’s infrastructure projects. Previously, due to U.S. sanctions, Venezuela had been forced to offer steep discounts—selling each barrel $15 below international benchmark prices. That $15 discount represented the “risk premium” or “hazard fee” Chinese buyers willingly accepted to circumvent sanctions. But everything changed once the U.S., under the pretext of “inspecting oil shipments,” deployed warships to blockade Venezuela’s maritime transport routes. Shipping costs surged—and so did risks. Logically, Venezuela should have deepened its discount to offset buyers’ added costs and risks. Instead, Venezuela didn’t lower its price further; it actually narrowed the original $15 discount to just $13—effectively raising the price by $2 per barrel.

The U.S.: Venezuela’s Perfect Employee (Part I)

This article primarily introduces the U.S. economic trusteeship policy toward Venezuela and its implementation—essentially constituting a state-level 'hostile takeover.' Given the article’s length, it is divided into three parts. This first part outlines how top U.S. agencies—the State Department, Treasury Department, and U.S. Northern Command—jointly formulated petroleum sales policies for Venezuela (covering shadow tankers, ongoing production, and inventory) following the January 3 raid; details their achieved sales performance; and describes efforts to attract investment aimed at preserving, expanding, and boosting output from Venezuela’s already-collapsed oilfield infrastructure. Table of Contents Preface Seizing Cargo: Detaining Shadow Tankers Selling Cargo: Charging $35 More Per Barrel Raising Capital: Preserving, Expanding, and Boosting Production Revenue Sharing: Taking Only 4.2% Debt Resistance: Paying Zero Venezuela’s Prospects They’re All at the Table Other: Executive Order 14373 Preface After arresting Maduro, Trump resumed his role as a businessman—becoming Venezuela’s global petroleum sales agent. If Venezuela were a company, it would be on the verge of bankruptcy and awaiting liquidation: (as of 2025) cumulative inflation over the past decade reached 1,330-fold; employee salaries remain unpaid, causing extreme workforce instability; external debt has ballooned to $160–180 billion; its core product—oil—is sold at a loss per barrel; and cash flow is visibly evaporating before our eyes... As the company teeters on collapse, the market’s dominant player barges in, volunteers as its global sales agent—and even agrees to shoulder liabilities. Upon assuming this role, he throws himself fully into work: seizing cargo, opening distribution channels, promoting and selling products, attracting investment, personally confronting creditors—and even doubling as security. His fee? Minimal: no base salary, no sales bonus—just an overtime stipend equal to 4.2% of total sales revenue. By any measure, he qualifies as the perfect employee. Seizing Cargo: Detaining Shadow Tankers The petroleum sold by the U.S. agent includes not only newly produced oil but also oil seized earlier from shadow tankers. As of April 2026, the U.S. and its allies have intercepted and detained at least ten tankers linked to Venezuela’s 'shadow fleet,' including at least three vessels closely tied to their operators and owners (Centuries [IMO 9206310], Sagitta [IMO 9296822], Aquila II [IMO 9281152]). Most of these vessels have been redirected to specialized terminals in Texas and Louisiana (e.g., Houston or Lake Charles), equipped to handle Venezuelan heavy crude—or temporarily held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay for preliminary processing. Some detained vessels are listed below in Table 1. Vessel Name Cargo Volume (Million Barrels) Status/Location MT Skipper (Adisa) 1.85 Berthed along the U.S. Gulf Coast (PADD 3) MT M Sophia 1.80 Berthed along the U.S. Gulf Coast MT Centuries 1.83 Intercepted near Venezuela MT Veronica III 1.90 Intercepted in the Indian Ocean MT Aquila II 0.70 Intercepted in the Indian Ocean MT Olina 0.70 Returned to Venezuela (joint operation)

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Traders Seek Discounts on Venezuelan Oil as Shipping Costs Surge

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