Under the global context of emission reduction, how should carbon emission rights be fairly allocated?

The above is entertainment. This accounting dispute has raged for over thirty years—and at its core boils down to a single question: Should emission reduction responsibility be calculated based on historically accumulated emissions (the stock), or on current annual emissions (the flow)? The proponents—China, India, and other developing countries—take a clear stance: historical cumulative emissions must be the starting point. Developed countries, having emitted more over history, must cut deeper and earlier—and must also pay up first. The opponents include the European Union and certain developed countries, as well as the ‘Climate Ministers’ Alliance’, jointly launched by the EU, developed nations, and the least developed countries. Their position is the reverse: accounts must start from today—allocating responsibility according to each country’s current emissions volume, emission intensity, or even technological efficiency. Whoever emits more—or more inefficiently—today must cut more. I side with the proponents, for one simple reason: the carbon dioxide lingering in the atmosphere is the accumulated legacy of over a century of emissions; calculating responsibility solely on this year’s flow effectively excuses the vast quantity already emitted. I. Three Allocation Methods—Placed Side by Side First, allocation by historical cumulative responsibility: Starting from the earliest year with verifiable data, the more a country has cumulatively emitted, the more it must cut—and the more it must pay. Second, allocation by per-capita convergence: Align all countries’ per-capita emissions toward a common benchmark—requiring developed countries to reduce while allowing developing countries some remaining room for upward adjustment. Third, allocation by current emissions and intensity: Consider only this year’s total emissions and emissions per unit of output—assigning greater cuts to those with higher volumes or intensities. Applying these three distinct metrics to the same world yields completely different rankings. The very same group of countries can shift from defendant to plaintiff simply by switching metrics—precisely why climate conferences have been mired in endless disputes year after year. II. The Historical Account: The Proponents’ Strongest Card The historical account carries weight because it directly translates into real money. Developed countries pledged in 2009 to provide $100 billion annually in climate finance—a commitment reaffirmed at the 2015 Paris Climate Conference. In October 2026, India’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, Piyush Goyal, speaking at the Berlin Global Dialogue, stated plainly: Eleven years on, the promised funds have yet to materialize. He further reminded the audience that, as of 2024, 750 million people worldwide still lacked electricity access, and over two billion lacked clean cooking fuel. China’s official position ahead of COP31 likewise includes this demand: a thorough discussion on roadmaps for developed countries to fulfill their $300 billion climate finance target by 2035—and their tripling target for adaptation finance. The historical account has also been diluted once through technical provisions. Under the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, developed countries permitted developing countries a ten-year delay both in the start and end dates for phasing down HFCs. Though framed as a concession, this was widely criticized as “tolerating complacency among some developing countries.” Yet the historical account faces an unresolved hurdle: There is no universally accepted quantitative methodology for determining the starting year for cumulative emissions, adjusting for shifting national borders, or crediting forest carbon sinks. Neither of the two domestic databases consulted in this material covers these issues—both explicitly state “not covered.” Morally, this hurdle is surmountable—but arithmetically, we still lack a universally accepted measuring stick. And the absence of such a standard—ironically—most benefits those unwilling to settle their accounts. III. Per-Capita Convergence: Sounds Most Fair, Yet Feels Most Awkward for Populous Nations Academician Zhongli Ding famously stated—repeatedly cited—that carbon emission rights are development rights; any emission-rights scheme must account for historical emissions, per-capita emissions, and stage of development. International climate law actually enshrines four principles: common but differentiated responsibilities, equity, respective capabilities, and sustainable development.

Climate negotiations enter a critical juncture: Expectations and realities of COP31

Climate negotiations enter a critical juncture: Expectations and realities of COP31 From the Paris Agreement to Glasgow, and then to São Paulo—where does global climate governance stand? 2026 marks a pivotal year for global climate governance. COP31 will be held in São Paulo, Brazil—the eleventh Conference of the Parties since the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Under the Agreement’s mechanism, countries were required to submit updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) by 2025. Yet reality tells a different story: global greenhouse gas emissions have still not peaked—and 2025 set a new record high. The developed countries’ pledged annual $100 billion in climate finance remains incompletely delivered. Operational details of the Loss and Damage Fund remain under contentious debate. As extreme weather events strike the globe with ever-increasing frequency and ferocity, the pace of climate negotiations lags far behind the accelerating deterioration of the climate crisis. 01 Progress and Gaps in Global Climate Governance The Gap Between Commitments and Action The Paris Agreement sets the goal of “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C.” Yet, based on countries’ currently submitted mitigation pledges, the projected global warming trajectory remains between 2.5°C and 2.9°C—far off target. Even worse, a gap persists between pledges and actual action: many countries’ real-world emissions continue to exceed their pledged reduction pathways. China is the world’s largest investor in renewable energy—its newly installed wind and solar capacity in 2025 exceeded 300 GW, accounting for over half the global total. Yet China remains the world’s largest carbon emitter, and coal-fired power generation continues to grow. Emerging economies—including India and Indonesia—are experiencing even faster emission growth. The physical laws of climate change will not wait for political negotiations to catch up. Each year of delayed mitigation necessitates steeper, costlier reductions in the future.

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