Geely's acquisition of Meizu has finally been finalized—what is your take on this deal?

After months of intense speculation, the deal has finally been sealed. As for my view on this matter, I remain consistent with my earlier stance: it’s likely beneficial for both Geely and Meizu—but I still say, cautiously optimistic. Why? Let’s start with Geely. As a driver who has owned both Lynk & Co and Volvo vehicles, I can speak from personal experience: Geely’s in-car infotainment systems are truly, truly subpar—especially its Android-based units. How bad are they? So bad that I’d rather revert to using a custom-built system and keep an iPhone permanently mounted in my car just to run CarPlay—and even CarPlay occasionally freezes so badly it forces the entire infotainment system to reboot... Ecovacs (Yika Tong), Geely’s long-time infotainment supplier, seems to have accomplished little over recent years; instead of improving, their systems have grown progressively worse. Amid intensifying competition among domestic Chinese automakers, intelligent connectivity has become indispensable. Geely simply no longer has time to wait for Ecovacs to catch up—it must urgently fill this critical gap. Acquiring an established, mature company is thus the fastest possible route. Now, let’s turn to Meizu. For Geely, Meizu—with its years of proven expertise in both hardware and software development—is an ideal acquisition target. Meizu’s Flyme OS was once one of China’s top-tier mobile operating systems, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with MIUI. Its M8 and MX series smartphones enjoyed enormous popularity—especially the groundbreaking M8, whose launch triggered genuine euphoria across China’s tech community. Yet in recent years, Meizu has stumbled repeatedly—both strategically and in product planning—causing its market share to plummet steadily. Today, it’s relegated to the ‘Others’ category. Even Huang Zhang—the revered ‘God of Coal Oil’—has made multiple comebacks, yet none could reverse Meizu’s decline. Gradually marginalized by the market, Meizu has shrunk into a small Zhuhai-based manufacturer. So here we have: one party—a financially and commercially struggling Meizu; the other—a Geely hampered by poor infotainment systems yet eager to build an integrated ecosystem. Can they truly uplift each other and achieve a synergistic win—where 1 + 1 > 2? I’m not convinced—especially as BYD and Huawei’s collaboration appears imminent.

Lynk & Co pushes Volvo back 'home'—the Geely-Volvo 'split'

According to Volvo’s published financial data, its operating profit for last year totaled 14.3 billion Swedish kronor—just 100 million kronor higher than in 2018—while its global vehicle sales rose by a substantial 63,000 units year-on-year. In contrast, between 2015 and 2016, Volvo’s operating profit increased by 4.4 billion kronor, despite only a 31,000-unit rise in sales. Although differing investment and operational conditions make direct comparisons between recent years and 2015–2016 unreliable for assessing Volvo’s overall health, the stark disparity in per-vehicle profitability still reveals Volvo’s strategy of cutting prices to boost volume. With global sales hovering around 700,000 units and corresponding revenue, Volvo’s average selling price per vehicle falls below RMB 300,000—eroding its brand value with every discount. As noted at the outset of this article, Volvo’s persistent price erosion has begun constraining Lynk & Co’s development. Meanwhile, Volvo’s integration with Lynk & Co—both technologically and commercially—has left its position in the Chinese market increasingly awkward. Returning to Europe and Global Expansion If Volvo’s drag on Lynk & Co’s growth served as a key catalyst for Geely’s decision to relocate Volvo back to Europe, then preparing Volvo for a public listing represents the pivotal step toward maximizing its profitability. Since 2016, industry rumors have circulated about Volvo pursuing an IPO to achieve independent listing. Yet by 2018, reports indicated that investor feedback yielded valuations significantly below Geely Holding Group’s internal assessment of Volvo’s true worth—delaying the IPO. Then, on February 10 this year, Volvo announced it was planning to integrate its operations with Geely Holding Group, aiming to form a stronger, unified global enterprise group. The newly restructured group also intends to list on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in Sweden. Unquestionably, a full-scale listing will deepen integration between Volvo and Geely—and such integration implies both parties must now adopt a truly global perspective. Optimizing worldwide deployment thus becomes the foremost challenge facing the ‘Geely-Volvo’ alliance. Viewed through the lens of a unified listing and global strategy, redefining the respective roles of Volvo and Lynk & Co is therefore essential. At present, Volvo’s deliberate price cuts appear strategic: first, to expand its overall market share and thereby lift its valuation ahead of listing; second, to gradually align Volvo and Lynk & Co—enhancing Lynk & Co’s brand image and positioning it to absorb Volvo’s existing market share in China. Seen this way, Volvo’s price reductions may not be detrimental after all. Applying the same logic, for the ‘Geely-Volvo’ alliance, whether Lynk & Co succeeds in establishing itself in Europe matters less than the mere announcement of its European entry—because even that decision alone can boost market valuation ahead of the planned listing. That, too, serves Geely-Volvo well. Europe—a mature market steeped in automotive culture—holds deep affection for brands with rich heritage, especially European ones. This emotional resonance explains why American and Japanese automakers continue to struggle there. As a new brand riding on Volvo’s legacy, how should Lynk & Co win over European consumers? Through pricing advantage—or via its strengths in new-energy vehicles?

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