Can NIO Inc. weather this wave of class-action lawsuits?

Good news rarely travels far; bad news spreads like wildfire. Just as the adverse impact of NIO’s high-speed ‘vacation’ incident during the Qingming Festival had yet to fully dissipate, the company was hit with a class-action lawsuit filed by U.S.-based Rosen Law Firm. On April 8, AsiaInfo Technologies announced that its Board of Directors had received notice from Zhang Yaqin, an independent non-executive director, stating that he was implicated in a securities class-action lawsuit against NIO filed in the Supreme Court of Kings County, New York. The complaint alleges that NIO’s Registration Statement dated September 11, 2018, and its Prospectus dated September 12, 2018, contained material false or misleading statements, resulting in investor losses—and seeks compensation. According to publicly available reports, since March this year, NIO has faced at least three separate class-action lawsuits initiated by U.S. law firms. In March, Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP filed a class-action suit against NIO, alleging violations of relevant provisions of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related rules promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), suggesting NIO misrepresented its current business status. On April 2, Pomerantz LLP announced it had filed a class-action lawsuit against NIO and certain of its executives, accusing the company of making material false and misleading statements regarding its business, operations, and compliance policies between September 12, 2018, and March 5, 2019. Given that litigation against Chinese companies listed in the U.S. is commonplace, NIO responded: “The allegations are baseless, and we will vigorously defend ourselves.” Whether Rosen Law Firm’s class-action suit against NIO is groundless or merely nitpicking—readers may draw their own conclusions following Qingyang Jun’s analysis. The core issues raised in the lawsuit include: 1. Material false or misleading statements in the registration statement, specifically: (1) NIO would not build its own manufacturing plant but would continue relying on Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Group Co., Ltd. (“JAC”) to produce its electric vehicles; (2) Reduced government subsidies for electric vehicles would severely impact NIO’s sales volume; (3) Statements concerning NIO’s business, operations, and prospects were false and misleading throughout all relevant periods. 2. Following its IPO, NIO’s stock price declined due to its failure to disclose material adverse facts in the registration statement, causing losses to investors. 3. Defendant Zhang Yaqin, one of NIO’s directors, resigned immediately after the SEC declared the registration statement effective—and had signed that very registration statement. Is this truly the case? According to Qingyang Jun’s research, NIO’s 2018 U.S. IPO registration statement claimed the company would construct its own manufacturing facility in Shanghai, scheduled for completion by the end of 2020. Yet six months later, NIO announced in its financial report the termination of the Shanghai factory project, reaffirming its continued reliance on contract manufacturing. NIO stated that JAC’s Hefei factory could support its market growth for the next two to three years. However, many NIO owners reportedly remove the “JAC Automobile” badge from their vehicles immediately upon delivery. In Qingyang Jun’s view, many NIO owners feel that having their premium luxury SUV—the ES8—manufactured by JAC significantly diminishes its prestige!

Chemours sues DuPont; a subsidiary suing its parent company has exposed a series of scandals!

Court documents state that DuPont “orchestrated the spin-off of its Performance Chemicals Unit into a new company named Chemours as part of a broader effort to mitigate its historical environmental liabilities.” These documents were originally filed in Delaware courts under seal. However, when Chemours’ attorneys failed to submit a public version by the court-mandated deadline, the Associated Press petitioned the Delaware Supreme Court to unseal the documents—without redaction. The documents state that in 2010, DuPont commissioned “a blue-ribbon panel composed of company managers, scientists, and engineers to devise a solution to this widely acknowledged problem.” The company could have spent $60 million to completely halt emissions—or $20 million to reduce them by 70%. “But even the mildest recommended solution was too much for DuPont,” the court documents state. Instead, after installing a $2.3 million system that eliminated one wastewater stream, DuPont chose to shut down the system by the end of 2013. Coincidentally, that was precisely when DuPont announced its plan to spin off Chemours—an internal initiative codenamed “Project Beta.” Project Beta focused on DuPont’s Performance Chemicals Unit—the very division responsible for “many of DuPont’s environmental liabilities,” including those tied to PFAS chemicals such as GenX. The documents state: “Since this problem could be conveniently transferred to Chemours, why spend money solving it?” And indeed, that is exactly what happened. This year, Chemours, North Carolina’s Department of Environmental Quality, and Cape Fear River Watch entered into a consent order imposing a $12 million penalty on Chemours. The order requires Chemours to “deploy the very same technology DuPont previously refused to install.” When DuPont established Chemours as a subsidiary in spring 2015, it knew the Fayetteville plant had been discharging PFAS into the Cape Fear River for over 30 years. Yet, in private corporate discussions, DuPont assured Chemours it would need to spend no more than $2 million to clean up the Fayetteville site’s contamination. That figure is now estimated at $200 million—not including potential fines from class-action lawsuits. Moreover, Chemours must spend hundreds of millions more to remediate several sites in New Jersey. DuPont also “shockingly” underestimated the cost of resolving roughly 3,500 lawsuits—filed by residents near DuPont’s Washington Works plant in Ohio/West Virginia, whose drinking water had been contaminated with PFAS discharged from the facility. “These are serious cases. Hundreds of plaintiffs have cancer; others suffer from other severe illnesses.” DuPont engaged Deloitte to analyze potential litigation costs; Deloitte estimated DuPont would win 68% of these cases. “The remaining cases could be resolved relatively cheaply”—at $128 million, including defense attorney fees.

Pomerantz Law Firm Announces Class Action Against Chemours Company and Officers

Oct 15, 2026

Pomerantz LLP filed a class action lawsuit against Chemours Co and officers, alleging misleading statements about Opteon product demand caused a stock price drop. Investors may claim lead plaintiff status until December 7, 2026.

PR Newswire

2026-08-06

California AG Accuses DuPont of Shell Game to Dodge PFAS Cleanup

2026-09-05

Chemours, DuPont found liable for PFAS contamination in North Carolina properties; jury trial set for March

2026-09-23

Environmental groups allege Chemours hasn't met PFAS limits agreement

2026-10-11

The Chemours Company Sued for Securities Law Violations

2026-10-12

Faruqi & Faruqi Reminds Chemours Investors of Securities Class Action Deadline