Iran was hit hard right at the outset of the war: vessels of several top energy traders were stranded, and derivatives positions incurred losses.

In the early days of the Iran war, the world’s largest energy trading firms did not profit from the sharp market volatility—as they normally would—but instead found themselves in deep trouble: vessels stranded, cargo damaged, and derivatives positions misaligned, catching these usually volatility-savvy trading giants completely off guard. According to a report by the Financial Times on Thursday, on February 28—the day hostilities broke out—top traders including Vitol, Trafigura, and Mercuria held short positions in certain energy markets that had long been perceived as oversupplied. After Iran effectively blockaded the Strait of Hormuz, numerous vessels became trapped in the Persian Gulf, halting cargo movement and plunging traders into profound uncertainty about the status of their positions. Both Mercuria and Trafigura posted losses in the war’s initial phase, although some of those losses have since been partially recouped. Skyrocketing energy prices and extreme volatility—typically ideal conditions for traders to reap windfall profits—instead placed widespread pressure on market participants this time, due to the crisis’s unprecedented scale and complexity. To meet margin calls, Vitol and Trafigura each secured an additional $3 billion in credit lines, while Gunvor obtained $1.5 billion. Vessel stranding hit physical operations first and hardest. As the world’s largest independent energy trader, Vitol suffered especially severe impacts given its massive oil-product throughput across the Middle East. At the outbreak of war, over ten Vitol cargo shipments were stranded in the Persian Gulf. On March 12, two vessels carrying Vitol’s naphtha cargoes were set ablaze by Iranian forces, killing one crew member. Trafigura had ten vessels stranded in the Gulf—all chartered to third parties rather than carrying its own goods; Glencore had one vessel stuck. For vessels still lingering in the Gulf, insurance and operating costs surged dramatically as the conflict dragged on: weekly vessel insurance premiums in the Persian Gulf have risen more than sixfold since the war began. Vitol also evacuated staff from Bahrain and contended with operational disruptions at Fujairah—the UAE’s major oil export port—where it owns a refinery and storage facilities. Though the port’s infrastructure has been struck multiple times by Iranian attacks, Vitol’s own assets there remain undamaged so far.

Why is Turkey so eager to broker the Black Sea Grain Initiative? Beyond enhancing its image as a great power, it stands to earn substantial revenue.

Turkey has skillfully navigated the Russia-Ukraine crisis to bolster its international standing—particularly boosting its influence across the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—a source of national pride for Turks. Large volumes of energy and goods transit through these regions. To avoid Western sanctions pressure, shippers have increasingly diverted flows away from traditional Russian routes—making Turkey, situated at the Eurasian crossroads, an indispensable transit hub. Beyond geopolitical influence, there are tangible economic benefits. Turkey controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits—the sole maritime gateways to the Black Sea—giving it de facto chokepoint authority. Although unlike Egypt’s man-made Suez Canal, these natural straits still require commercial vessels to pay transit fees. Turkey earns substantial annual revenue this way. Effective July 1, the fee for commercial vessels transiting the straits rose to $4.42 per ton—projected to generate $900 million annually for the Turkish government. Ukraine historically exported over 45 million tons of grain per year; just Ukrainian grain exports alone yield roughly $200 million annually for Turkey. Add other agricultural commodities and steel—and the figure climbs further. This represents pure profit for Turkey. Moreover, vessels anchoring en route must refuel and replenish supplies—generating yet another significant revenue stream. As some seafarers online report, refueling starts at 100 tons per vessel; for large ocean-going ships, it can reach hundreds or even thousands of tons—costing substantial sums. Ocean-going vessels transporting Ukrainian grain typically carry tens of thousands of tons each. With over 45 million tons shipped annually, more than 1,000 vessels pass through each year—not an exaggeration.

Energy Trader Alkagesta Gains Its First Ships With Turkish Deal

20 hours ago

Malta-based trader Alkagesta acquired Turkish firm Energy Petrol, securing its first eight bunker vessels to expand distribution in the Mediterranean. The deal increases storage capacity and market share amidst volatile global energy conditions.

bloomberg

2026-10-22

Energy Trader Alkagesta Gains Its First Ships With Turkish Deal

Energy Trader Alkagesta Gains Its First Ships With Turkish Deal

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