Venezuela, Brazil, Guyana, and Argentina: An emerging new oil export bloc

According to the latest analysis, if oil prices remain sustained at $100 per barrel, Rystad Energy forecasts that South America’s crude oil supply could increase by up to 2.1 million barrels per day (bpd) by the mid-2030s. This finding comes amid an effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which has prompted a substantial upward revision of the average 2026 oil price forecast—from $60 per barrel for Brent crude in January to $89 per barrel currently. Based on current production levels, South American governments’ revenues are projected to rise by approximately $43 billion in 2026 alone compared with the baseline scenario—further underscoring the central role hydrocarbons play in public finances from Brasília to Caracas. Across the region, Petrobras stands to benefit most: under the current $89-per-barrel forecast, its revenue will increase by $13.1 billion relative to the January $60-per-barrel baseline. Radhika Bansal, Senior Vice President of Oil & Gas Research at Rystad Energy, notes that the Middle East conflict has not only driven oil prices higher but also exposed the dangers of the global supply chain’s heavy concentration around the Strait of Hormuz. South America is now the world’s most important source of incremental oil supply—timely, given the global search for alternative energy sources—and possesses scale advantages, geological resources, and relatively stable political conditions. Offshore development projects in Brazil, Guyana, and Suriname represent the most immediate source of oil production growth. Over the next decade, fast-track projects in these markets are expected to add approximately 1 million barrels of oil equivalent per day (boepd), with estimated greenfield capital expenditures reaching roughly $33 billion by 2035. In Guyana, ExxonMobil aims to raise daily output from its Yellowtail project to 300,000 bpd—up from an initial 250,000 bpd upon startup. Rystad Energy estimates that similar debottlenecking measures could boost output from the Errea Wittu, Jaguar, and Hammerhead fields by an additional 80,000–90,000 bpd. The greatest growth potential lies in early final investment decisions (FIDs) for new projects—not expansions of existing assets. However, limited shipyard capacity for new floating production, storage, and offloading (FPSO) units remains a constraint. Beyond these three countries, Venezuela has re-entered the global supply market following President Nicolás Maduro’s arrest in January 2026 and reduced supplies of medium-to-heavy, sulfur-rich crude from the Middle East. Under the $100-per-barrel assumption, Rystad Energy estimates Venezuela’s daily crude output could increase by 910,000 bpd by 2035—57% of which would come from existing fields in its eastern and western provinces, where operating costs for medium crude stand at just $7–$8 per barrel. ExxonMobil’s CEO had labeled Venezuela “uninvestable” in January 2026—but the company has since dispatched technical teams to assess opportunities there. In early March 2026, Shell signed a preliminary agreement with Venezuela’s state-owned oil company covering both offshore and onshore exploration. All timelines remain contingent upon sanctions relief and fiscal reforms; should investor confidence improve and more companies—including Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell—follow suit, the potential for growth would expand significantly.

Report on Competitive Landscape and Investment Outlook for China’s Oil & Natural Gas Development Industry, 2023–2030

Figure 58: Qatar’s Proven Natural Gas Reserves and Share of Global Reserves, 2017–2023 (Unit: trillion cubic meters, %) Figure 59: Qatar’s Oil Production and Consumption, 2017–2023 (Unit: million tonnes, %) Figure 60: Qatar’s Natural Gas Production and Consumption, 2017–2023 (Unit: billion cubic meters, %) Figure 61: Russia’s Proven Oil Reserves and Share of Global Reserves, 2017–2023 (Unit: billion barrels, %) Figure 62: Russia’s Proven Natural Gas Reserves and Share of Global Reserves, 2017–2023 (Unit: trillion cubic meters, %) Figure 63: Russia’s Oil Production and Consumption, 2017–2023 (Unit: million tonnes) Figure 64: Russia’s Natural Gas Production and Consumption, 2015–2023 (Unit: billion cubic meters) Figure 65: U.S. Proven Oil Reserves and Share of Global Reserves, 2017–2023 (Unit: billion barrels, %) Figure 66: U.S. Proven Natural Gas Reserves and Share of Global Reserves, 2017–2023 (Unit: trillion cubic meters, %) Figure 67: U.S. Oil Production and Consumption, 2017–2023 (Unit: million tonnes, %) Figure 68: U.S. Natural Gas Production and Consumption, 2017–2023 (Unit: billion cubic meters, %) Figure 69: Kazakhstan’s Proven Oil Reserves and Share of Global Reserves, 2017–2023 (Unit: billion barrels, %) Figure 70: Kazakhstan’s Proven Natural Gas Reserves and Share of Global Reserves, 2017–2023 (Unit: trillion cubic meters, %) Figure 71: Kazakhstan’s Oil Production and Consumption, 2017–2023 (Unit: million tonnes, %) Figure 72: Kazakhstan’s Natural Gas Production and Consumption, 2017–2023 (Unit: billion cubic meters, %) Figure 73: Main Responsibilities of Venezuela’s Ministry of Energy and Mines Figure 74: Venezuela’s Proven Oil Reserves and Share of Global Reserves, 2017–2023 (Unit: billion barrels, %) Figure 75: Venezuela’s Proven Natural Gas Reserves and Share of Global Reserves, 2017–2023 (Unit: trillion cubic meters, %) Figure 76: Venezuela’s Oil Production and Consumption, 2017–2023 (Unit: million tonnes, %) Figure 77: Venezuela’s Natural Gas Production and Consumption, 2017–2023 (Unit: billion cubic meters, %) Figure 78: BP plc’s Revenue and Profit, 2016–2023 (Unit: USD billion) Figure 79: ExxonMobil Corporation’s Revenue and Profit, 2016–2023 (Unit: USD billion) Figure 80: Royal Dutch Shell plc’s Revenue and Profit, 2016–2023 (Unit: USD billion) Figure 81: Chevron Corporation’s Revenue and Profit, 2016–2023 (Unit: USD billion) Figure 82: China’s Proven Oil Reserves and Growth Rate, 2011–2023 (Unit: hundred million tonnes, %)

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